Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on Consolidating of Intelligence Analysis

COLLINS:

Good morning. The committee will come to order. First, I wanted to disclaim any responsibility for the weather, even though I am from Maine, I did not bring this weather with me in any way. And, I just wanted to make that clear while we have all these intelligence experts in the room.

Today, the Governmental Affairs Committee is holding its second hearing on the president's proposal to create a terrorist threat integration center. We are very pleased to have a distinguished panel of administration witnesses to answer the many questions about the mission, structure and responsibilities of the new center.

The sharing of intelligence among federal agencies was a serious problem long before the horrific attacks of September 11, but it was the terrorist attacks that focused attention on the serious consequences of inadequate communication and interagency rivalries. As the lead federal law enforcement agency responsible for collecting domestic intelligence, including terrorism related intelligence, the FBI, historically, has focused on investigating and developing criminal cases. At times, the FBI has failed to share critical domestic intelligence because of concerns that the disclosure of such information could jeopardize its criminal cases.

As the primary federal agency responsible for collecting foreign intelligence related to terrorism, the CIA also has been hesitant to share information because of concerns that such disclosures would jeopardize its methods and sources. The results of these barriers has been that far too often critical intelligence has not reached those who really needed it.

After September 11, it became readily apparent that government agencies must do a better job analyzing and sharing terrorism related intelligence. Congress moved toward that goal in 2001 by passing legislation to facilitate the sharing of intelligence information and then last year by approving the Homeland Security Act. The administration has also taken a number of positive steps since September 11. The FBI and the CIA have expanded both their analytical capabilities and their cooperation. But, these changes have not gone far enough.

Administration representatives have states that information sharing between the FBI and the CIA still is too often achieved through, quote, "brute force". The president is attempting to address these impediments to the timely sharing of critical information by creating the terrorist threat integration center. Nevertheless, there are many questions that remain about the implementation of the administration's plan.

The first, and perhaps most fundamental question is how will the integration center be an improvement over the existing intelligence structure? We currently have a counter-terrorism center within the CIA that has access to all government intelligence relating to terrorism. As CIA Director George Tenet has noted, the center, quote, "was created to enable the fusion of all sources of information in a single action oriented unit." End quote

Frankly, that sounds a lot like the proposed integration center, which raises the obvious question of how the new center will improve the sharing of intelligence information among agencies.

A second key question is what is being done to ensure that the integration center will streamline and consolidate intelligence analysis rather than create duplication and mission confusion? I've prepared a chart that shows some of the agencies that are now responsible for collecting and analyzing terrorist and related intelligence.

As you can see, it is a very confusing picture. Including the integration center in the chart does not make the picture any less complex. It simply adds another box. We need to understand how this additional box will improve the flow of information to the agencies and individuals that need it.

A third question concerns the proper location of the new center. Some experts believe that the Department of Homeland Security should be the hub of all homeland security activities, including intelligence analysis. By reading the Homeland Security Act, one could make a compelling case that the new department was meant to be the fusion center for the analysis of intelligence relating to homeland security.

Should the integration center, therefore, be under the control and the direction of the Secretary of Homeland Security, rather than the Director of Central Intelligence? We would like to obtain a better understanding of the reasoning behind the administration's decision and how the integration center will interact with the new Department of Homeland Security.

Another important question is how will the center share appropriate information with state and local authorities, our frontline troops in the war against terrorism? It is one thing to analyze intelligence information well, but if the people who need the intelligence don't receive it, then the effort has been of little use.

Still another key issue is the center's ability to overcome historic agency resistance to change. There have already been news reports indicating opposition to the integration center in both the CIA and the FBI. What is being done to overcome agency resistance so that it does not undermine the center's core mission?

Finally, will the integration center adequately address and safeguard privacy and to other legal concerns? The president's proposal places the Director of Central Intelligence in charge of the integration center. In that position he will be responsible for the analysis of domestic, as well as foreign, intelligence. I understand that the administration has reviewed the legal issues carefully, but I want to ensure that the center's activities will not infringe on the constitutional rights of law-abiding Americans.

At least week's hearing we did not hear of any opposition to the concept of a terrorist threat integration center.

COLLINS:

But, a number of questions were raised by members of this committee and by our witnesses, concerning the implementation of this plan. It is my hope that our expert administration witnesses will help us fully answer those questions today.

If the administration can achieve its stated goals by the creation of this new center, I believe that the integration center will usher in important new capabilities in the way that our government analyzes intelligence and shares it with those who are responsible for protecting our people and our nation. But, its success will depend on overcoming formidable historic barriers to information sharing and cooperation.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today. At this time I'd like to ask the Senator from Minnesota if he has any opening comments that he would like to make.

COLLINS:

Thank you very much, Senator Coleman. Your perspective as a mayor will be very helpful as we sort through how this new center should interact with state and local law enforcement officials. It's often a challenge because they do not have security clearances, in most cases, and because we don't want to overwhelm the center with responding to local inquiries.

But, at the same time, there needs to be some kind of system for sharing essential information and we look forward to your insights in that regard.

I'm very pleased to welcome our distinguished panel of administration representatives today from the FBI, the CIA, and the Department of Homeland Security. They are leading their respective agency's efforts to create the new terrorist threat integration center. We understand that the president's proposal is still under development, but we very much appreciate your sharing your preliminary insights with us today.

We are pleased to be joined by the Honorable Gordon England, who is Deputy Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the first deputy secretary. He previously served as Secretary of the Navy and before that had a distinguished career in the private sector at General Dynamics Corporation.

Pasquale D'Amuro is the Executive Assistant Director for Counter- Terrorism at the FBI. He was appointed by the director to be the executive assistant director for counter-terrorism and counter- intelligence in November of last year. He is the lead FBI official on counter-terrorism issues and has had a distinguished career with the FBI since 1979.

Our third panelist is Winston Wiley who became the associate director of central intelligence for homeland security in May of 2002. In this capacity, Mr. Wiley is tasked with ensuring the efficient and timely flow of intelligence in support of the homeland security effort. He is also the acting chair of the terrorist threat integration center's steering committee. So, I very much appreciate his being with us as well.

I'm going to start with Mr. Wiley, I understand that Secretary England does not have a formal statement.

Is that correct, Mr. Secretary? So, we'll start with Mr. Wiley.

Thank you. You may proceed.

COLLINS:

Thank you.

Mr. Wiley, and Mr. D'Amuro, our government already has a counter- terrorism center, which is under the supervision of the Director of Central Intelligence, and when you look at the details of the current counter-terrorism center, and the proposed terrorist threat integration center, they seem, at first analysis, to be quite similar. I quoted Secretary—not secretary, but Director Tenet's comments that it was supposed to be all sources of intelligence will be analyzed. Both do have access to all sources of government information about terrorism. Both are under the supervision of the Director of Central Intelligence. I believe both have staff from a number of agencies conducting intelligence analysts. In light of those similarities, I have two questions.

First, in practical terms, how will the proposed terrorist threat integration center be different from the counter-terrorism center that already exists on the organizational chart that I showed you?

And, second, given the fact that at least at first glance they appear very similar. How will the new center address problems that have plagued our analytical efforts so far? They seem so similar that I'm concerned about duplication. And if they are structured in similar ways, how will the new center be an improvement over what we have? And I'm going to ask a similar question to Mr. D'Amuro.

WILEY:

Thank you, Senator. I think that at first blush it's possible to say that TTIC bears a similarity to the counter-terrorist center. But, I think that you have to go a step beyond that first level of analysis. And, I think that what you have in TTIC is a much more vigorous presence of both intelligence community and law enforcement and DHS employees in a common environment with reach-back capability to their respective agencies in which all of that information is brought together.

CTC does have and has long had and will continue to have, detailees from other agencies in it. But, what we envision in TTIC is a more robust presence and a more explicit set of responsibilities for integrating that flow of domestically collected foreign intelligence, which is growing. The bureau—the TTIC by itself is not the only change that's going on. The change in collection philosophy and dissemination philosophy of what's going on at the bureau. Pat D'Amuro can talk about is instrumental in helping to make TTIC a success. We'll increase the amount of domestically collected information about foreign terrorist groups that can be fused.

And by bringing the analysts together, having them work literally in a common environment, I think that that is a significant step up from where we are today.

COLLINS:

Mr. D'Amuro, the FBI has a counter-terrorism division. It's my understanding that's still going to exist when the new center is created. How can we avoid duplication?

D'AMURO:

I think it's important to understand that the TTIC is being created for the fusion of an analytical product with respect to threat information. It is not an operational entity. The counter- terrorism division at the FBI headquarters will still maintain its operational role throughout the country as being the lead agency domestically with respect to counter-terrorism investigations.

If I could just add a few comments to Winston, it's the fusion of that intelligence and the production of one analytical product that I see extremely critical important that we will be able, through the JTTF's to disseminate that product to all the state and local law enforcement authorities that are part of the JTTF.

There is also a program underway at the bureau to reach out for all the state and local entities that are not members of the JTTF so that we can make sure, not only do we provide them with one fused analytical product, but also tap into their ability to collect information and intelligence which could be critical to preventing the next terrorist act.

So, while the TTIC is being formed for the fusion of the intelligence product, both CTC will maintain their operational responsibility, as well as the FBI maintaining its responsibility for the conducting of intelligence and criminal investigations with respect to counter-terrorism.

COLLINS:

Well, let me follow-up on the issue of sharing information with state and local law enforcement. You've described a system under which the joint terrorism task force I guess would act as an intermediary to distribute information. Is that correct?

D'AMURO:

Well, what the plan is is that through the national JTTF at FBI headquarters, that would be the distribution mechanism for the fused analytical product out to all the JTTF's, the 66 JTTF's that are now in existence across the country. In addition to that, we are going to be reaching out for all state and local entities even if they are not permanent members of the JTTF's.

So, yes, it will be the mechanism for distribution of that product.

COLLINS:

But, what's going to happen in the other direction? The complaints that I hear from police chiefs of our major cities in Maine is that when they are in a state of high alert, as we are now, and they have reason to be concerned, and this happened recently in Portland, Maine, where a foreign national was taking photographs of our oil tank farms on the Portland waterfront. And, when the police chief tried to get information from the FBI about whether this individual was on the watch list, he had a very difficult time in getting an answer from the FBI.

What are we doing in the other direction? I understand when you have a product or information that needs to be shared, it will go through the joint terrorism task force, but what does a police chief in Portland, Maine whose concerned about the vulnerability of our ports and sees something suspicious or certainly raising concern. How do we improve the flow of information in the other direction?

D'AMURO:

That's the main purpose of the creation of the office of intelligence for the bureau. What that office of intelligence will do and what the bureau has not conducted in the past, is setting up intelligence requirements. It will ensure that the field offices are out collecting the intelligence necessary for the protection of this country. Providing information and intelligence with respect to vulnerabilities of various seaports and other infrastructure protection matters, will be, of course, the mission of Homeland Security. And we will provide that information through the executive assistant director setting those requirements, making sure those requirements are met, making sure that intelligence is collected in the field.

I'm unaware of the situation that you mentioned, but that police chief should have been able to get information from the joint terrorism task force, which, in that case, would have been out of Boston and I believe a resident agency in Portland. That's the way it's supposed to work. That's the vision of how we plan to collect that intelligence and making sure that it gets to the difference agencies that it needs to go to. And that establishment of the requirements won't be the only mechanism for the office of executive assistant director for intelligence. We are also changing the metrics by how we judge our field offices and how we judge and promote executives into the bureau. They will have requirements for the collection of that intelligence that will be used in their performance appraisals.

COLLINS:

Senator Akaka?

COLLINS:

You're welcome, Senator Levin.

I want to follow up on the issues that Senator Levin just raised.

Senator England, I'm trying to get a better sense of what the role of the information analysis and infrastructure protection director will be once TTIC is created. Will it conduct any analysis of raw intelligence, or will it merely be a consumer of analysis that's produced by the new center, the FBI and the CIA?

ENGLAND:

The IA organization, part of the IA organization, information analysis will physically be located in the TTIC. So, we will not have a separate analysis center. I mean the analysis center will be in the TTIC and it will have access to all the data available in the TTIC.

Now, we will also, in addition, cause people who are located in the TTIC, we will, I believe, have some number of people who will also do analysis, you know, for understanding of the secretary, myself et cetera, I mean we're not there, how do you interpret the data et cetera. But, we will also have an assessment group. And the assessment group will determine what the effect of that analysis is, what that means in terms of our infrastructure. I mean to assess that in terms of what you go do across American in terms of protection.

So, it's both analysis and assessment, but we will not have a separate analysis group, per se. We will rely on the TTIC and our representation in TTIC.

COLLINS:

A related issue here, which I raised in my opening statement is where the new center should be located. Many would argue that when Congress created the new information and analysis director at the Department of Homeland Security, it did so to try to create and intelligence fusion center. One of the witnesses at our hearing last week, James Steinberg, recommended that the new center be located at the Department of Homeland Security. He said the new department's supposed to be the hub of all homeland defense efforts and that's the natural place where the fusion of terrorist analysis should take place. It's also the one department responsible for protecting our borders and our critical infrastructure.

I guess I'll ask Mr. Wiley this question first and then go to Secretary England. Why was the decision made to locate the new center under the supervision of the director of Central Intelligence rather than the Secretary of Homeland Security?

WILEY:

Senator, I think that the key feature of having the threat integration center report directly to the Director of Central Intelligence is that it is doing precisely the fusion of intelligence, whether it's foreign intelligence or domestically collected foreign intelligence and law enforcement information. And the Director of Central Intelligence both has the responsibility for assessment of foreign intelligence and the intelligence community has the overwhelming share of people with experience in doing that. With due respect to Mr. Steinberg, I think that doing the analysis and assessment part under the leadership of the Director or Central Intelligence and providing that to the Department of Homeland Security to merge with the vulnerability assessments and to have a responsibility for taking action is the right model.

I think that asking the department to also take on the intelligence assessment capability, as well as the vulnerability work, is asking it to do more than it needs to. And I think that that's the rationale between the two.

COLLINS:

My concern is how are we going to prevent the new center from just becoming a creature of the CIA? The House Intelligence Committee issued a staff report that found that oftentimes the DCI intelligence centers, including the counter- terrorism center, become solely CIA centers and whenever you locate an agency or a new entity on the grounds of the CIA, which is the initial plan and report to the CIA direct, how's that going to overcome the cultural differences that have impeded the relationship between the CIA in the FBI? If it were located in the new Department of Homeland Security, wouldn't that send the right signal as far as overcoming these historic barriers?

WILEY:

Well, without making...

COLLINS:

If I could just add one thing. In your comments you referred to the brute force approach to sharing and said it's working. But, it still is requiring brute force.

WILEY:

And, whether a new department—just on the brute force issue, whether a new department is located at DHS, at CIA, at FBI or anyplace else, if you're collocating people and you're institutionalizing a process, it will reduce the amount of brute force that's required. So, I don't think the location, the particular location makes a difference on the issue of brute force.

I think, on the issue of its physical location, in order to get started quickly you really need it to be, I believe, in one of two places where there is already a framework of analysts working the counter-terrorism problem to support that. That, in my view, left it to either the CIA compound or the FBI building downtown. There you have a framework to be able to get started quickly. The institutionally, and this chart that you provided us, reflects that the TTIC does not report to the director in his capacity as head of the CIA, but in his capacity as the head of the intelligence community, as I do, frankly.

That itself sets it apart from CIA. CTC is a center that reports to the DCI through the director of operations. This is a direct report to the DCI. Its physical location at the CIA headquarters' compound, it can't be denied. But, it will not be collocated with CTC and there are other non-CIA elements that are resident in that building, the National Intelligence Council, the Community Management Staff, large portions of NIMA, the Imagery Mapping Agency are located in that building. Certainly, the majority of the building is a CIA building, but it is not exclusively a CIA building. And, while it presents a challenge, I think strong leadership and the commitment of all the partners to put people and contribute to the leadership will mitigate against that. In the long run the point of collocation where CTC, the FBI's counter terrorist division and TTIC are collocated in a third—in an offsite facility I think mitigates that problem completely.

COLLINS:

Secretary England, what's your response to those experts who believe that this new center would be most effective if it were located within the new Department of Homeland Security?

ENGLAND:

Senator, I would not recommend that. I mean my own experience with large organizations, first of all TTIC is for threat data. So, this is threat analysis, I mean the expert piece of threat analysis lies with other agencies, not with the Department of Homeland Security. I mean we will not be the dominant organization in the TTIC. We will have representation there. So, while we will be able to participate in some of the source threat analysis, that's not our key mission. Our key mission is to make sure that the threats are analyzed appropriately, that data is available to us. That we can then do additional analysis if we have to, want to, et cetera, but it is to do vulnerable analysis, understand the infrastructure and how those threats may relate to vulnerability of our infrastructure and our people across the country.

So, I frankly think it would be very, very difficult for the Department of Homeland Security to take on a task as large as threat analysis that would come into this center and be able to assess all that appropriately. I mean that would be a very, very large organizational step for us to take, particularly at this time and probably for years to come. So, I frankly do not feel that would be appropriate for us to do.

I was delighted with this approach to have this fusion center put in place because it does enable us to do our mission much better. So, again, as I said in my first comment to you, we endorse this approach.

ENGLAND:

It makes us an equal player in this arena of threat analysis, but I certainly don't feel like we could actually manage that operation.

COLLINS:

Senator Coleman?

COLLINS:

I would second as the chairman of the committee, Senator Levin's request in this regard. I do think we need more definition on who is going to do what. I mean, the Department of Homeland Security's underlying law calls for it to analyze, that is part of the law. And, so, I do believe we need more definition. And I do recognize that the center is a work in progress. But, I would ask the witnesses to come back to us with a document that would define more—with more specificity the responsibilities of the components, and the existing, the counter-terrorism division at the FBI, the counter-terrorism center at the CIA, the information analysis director at homeland security. I would like to see more definition in the defining the responsibilities of those three units and how the new center interacts.

The goal is fusion, not confusion. But, when I look at the chart and plop the new center I'm concerned about duplication, accountability and responsibility. So, I hope, as you further work out the details of the center, you would get back to us.
Senator Levin, did you have any more on that?

Senator Coleman?

Before I adjourn the hearing, I just want to bring up one final issue that I alluded to in my opening statement and that is the dangers to privacy rights of combining law enforcement functions with intelligence gathering and analysis. Several, or some of our witnesses at our previous hearing raised the issue of whether this new center poses a threat to the privacy rights. We have seen the controversy over the total information awareness program at the Department of Defense. The new center, potentially, will have access to huge databases of its component agencies and for the first time—the good news is for the first time, will be bringing all this information together. The bad news is for the first time, we'll be bringing all this information together.

Mr. Wiley, as the chair of this working group, how is the group going to ensure that the creation of this new center with its access to unprecedented amounts of information will not infringe upon the privacy rights of law-abiding citizens?

WILEY:

Madam Chair, from the beginning the concerns you've expressed were an explicit part of our discussions in making sure that the lines of responsibility, the lines of authority, the separation of the authority for conducting collection operations, whether overseas or domestic, remain separate from the authorities that vested in the TTIC. And, I can only tell you that, you know, from day one and we will continue, you know, at the agency, at the bureau, at homeland security, to make sure that the structures we put together are in compliance with the laws, the executives orders and sensitive to the issues of making sure that privacy rights and civil rights of law abiding citizens are not violated. You know, it's a fundamental concern right from the beginning. And the very structure of the center recognizes that by separating it from the operational components of both the FBI and the CIA.

COLLINS:

Mr. D'Amuro?

D'AMURO:

Senator, Winston's correct. The TTIC is the analysis of information that has been collected. The information that we will be collecting domestically will be overseen by the Inspector General from the Department of Justice. It will be overseen by the FISA court. We have numerous attorney general guidelines and directions that protect the civil liberties of the citizens of this country. The collection process will not change. We will use those guidelines. We will use those laws for our collection domestically. TTIC is simply the analysis of that collection. It is not an instrument that will go out operationally and collect on its own.

COLLINS:

There's no new collection authority, is that correct?

D'AMURO:

That's correct.

COLLINS:

Secretary England?

ENGLAND:

In addition, Senator, let me add, Madam Chair, that we also have a statutory obligation in terms of privacy. We do have, will have, a privacy officer as part of this. That privacy officer will have a role. So, we will have at least some degree of oversight to allay those concerns. But, I don't believe that there'll be a real concern there, but nonetheless, we will have that oversight function within the Department of Homeland Security.

And, if I could add one more thing since before we leave...

COLLINS:

Certainly.

ENGLAND:

I know you have a very complex chart here, but I'd like to comment there's actually more arrows below on this chart. And, Senator, only because of your comment, it turns out that the source data is available here at the information analysis, it goes directly, the analysis charts, so rather than linking here at the secretary level, it really does link the IA, IP organization directly with the TTIC. And, I think, perhaps, that'll clarify some of the issues we discussed earlier.

COLLINS:

Thank you.

I want to thank our witnesses for appearing today. Your contributions are very valuable. We look forward to hearing back from you as you continue to refine the president's plan. The record will remain open for 15 days for the submission of any additional questions. I want to thank my staff for its hard work on this, these series of hearings and this hearing is now adjourned.