National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027

Floor Speech

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Mr. HILL of Arkansas. Mr. Chair, I rise in support of Amendment No. 158.

Amendment No. 158 is extremely important to the Arkansas National Guard. That is why I am grateful to have the support of my Arkansas colleagues, Rep. Steve Womack and Rep. Rick Crawford.

This amendment supports the Arkansas National Guard by seeking to codify the proposed land exchange between the Arkansas National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve on Camp Robinson in North Little Rock.

Currently, there is a strategic mismatch in facility use for the Arkansas National Guard and the USAR on Camp Robinson.

The land exchange will include a two-star division headquarters at Camp Pike, currently occupied by a drilling unit with minimal full-time staff, a unit whose needs would be far better served by an armory.

The second is the Chappell Armory in Arkansas, which was built for traditional drilling units but currently operates as a full-time headquarters.

Amendment No. 158 seeks a no-cost land exchange between the Arkansas National Guard and USAR. This would result in a mutually beneficial outcome and ensure better stewardship of taxpayer dollars.

The Arkansas National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve support the conveyance.

I am pleased that there has been a signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between Brigadier General Bridges of the Arkansas Guard and Brigadier General Cook of the Army Reserves.

Amendment No. 158 directly relates to the signed MOA, and it ensures the necessary continuity and stability for the proposed land exchange.

I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.

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Mr. HILL of Arkansas. Mr. Chair, I rise to speak in support of Amendment No. 156.

My amendment directs the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to conduct a review of the quality and effectiveness of the Department of Defense's cyber intelligence sharing with state, local, Tribal, territorial, and private-sector partners.

I drafted this amendment with the Arkansas National Guard to ensure we analyze cyber information sharing to learn how to stop and mitigate cyber threats for homeland defense.

As you may know, the National Guard is uniquely positioned by its capabilities, geography, and manpower to add resilience to integrated critical infrastructure dependencies.

That is why it is critical for the GAO to conduct this review, as it can inform and better unify efforts among federal partners, state-level defenders, and other critical stakeholders to ensure faster warning, mitigation, incident response, and better defense of our critical infrastructure.

This amendment is extremely important to central Arkansas and the Arkansas National Guard. It is also extremely important to our national security and cyber health.

I urge my colleagues to support Amendment No. 156.

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Mr. HILL of Arkansas. Mr. Chair, I rise in support of Rep. Steve Womack's Amendment No. 311, that I am proud to cosponsor.

Amendment No. 311 seeks to maximize taxpayer value by directing the Department of Defense to conduct and publish a cost comparison study for future F-35 basing locations for aircraft receiving first delivery between Fiscal Year 2030 and Fiscal Year 2035. As you may know, the next round of F-35 basing decisions is expected in the next 24 months.

This study is critical to arm military decision-makers with objective, data-driven analysis before that decision is made.

The Arkansas National Guard believes that this study is critical to ensuring a complete understanding of the current mission and personnel before future F-35 basing decisions are made.

I agree with the Arkansas National Guard and that is why I urge my colleagues to support Amendment No. 311.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chair, my amendment addresses a stark and increasing threat to our Nation's critical infrastructure, the malicious use of drones, especially their use around critical military installations and law enforcement vessels.

Amendment No. 283 requires the Inspector General of the Department of War to produce a report to Congress regarding Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) activity around military installations in the United States and abroad, sensitive national security sites, military and law enforcement vessels, and the capabilities possessed by installations to counter this activity, protocols in place to coordinate with state and local law enforcement, and the sufficiency of legal authorities provided to installation commanders to address threats both inside and outside the wire.

Over the last several years, there has been persistent unauthorized drone activity around military installations. In 2024, for 17 days a fleet of unidentified drones penetrated the airspace over Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, home to advance jet fighters including F-22s, continuing on to the airspace over Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek and Naval Station Norfolk.

Also in 2024, the Department of War confirmed a number of drone sightings over multiple installations in my state of New Jersey, including Picatinny Arsenal and Naval Weapons Station Earle in my district. Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, also in my district, has seen significant unauthorized drone activity including attempts to smuggle contraband in FCI Dix and other drones whose intent was not clear. Additionally, a Coast Guard Commanding Officer told me more than a dozen drones, in formation, followed a 47-foot rescue boat a mere 100 feet off the stern, as it made maneuvers in the ocean off Ocean County.

Earlier this year, Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana--home to B- 52 bombers who play a critical role in America's nuclear triad--was forced to issue a shelter in place order due to reports of unauthorized drone activity. And just months ago, here in Washington D.C., Fort McNair saw unauthorized drone overflights. In testimony last year before the Senate Armed Services Committee, NORTHCOM Commander General Gregory M. Guillot expressed concern over what he called the ``rapidly evolving strategic environment'' and ``the emergence of small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) as a threat to infrastructure and personnel in the homeland.'' He went on to describe the threat as ``widespread'' as ``there were 350 detections reported'' on military installations in 2024.

At the same time, we have seen adversaries--notably Russia and Iran-- make significant investments in drone technology and seen its impact on the battlefield, both in Ukraine and in the Middle East. Communist China is a global leader in drone technology and continues to integrate these capabilities into its military doctrine and exercises. It is vital we gain a thorough understanding of adversary capabilities, and their will deploy these technologies to threaten American interests.

Congress has taken steps to address these threats, both the Armed Services Committee and Transportation and Infrastructure Committee have methodically strengthened military and law enforcements authority and ability to deploy counter-drone technology in recent reauthorization bills to, yet a further accounting of how widespread this threat is and what, if any shortfalls remain is needed.

Make no mistake, it is imperative Congress ensure that those on the ground and charged with the safety of military installations and the lives of servicemembers and the community at large have the authority and technology necessary to effectively mitigate and overcome these threats to protect the homeland.

I thank the Committee on Rules for finding this amendment in order, and I urge my colleagues to support this amendment with a yes vote.

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