Main Street Capital Access Act

Floor Speech

Mr. Speaker, let me start by saying that we all care about community banks and credit unions.

For that reason, I was pleased to work with Chair Hill on a package of community bank provisions included in our landmark housing bill, the 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act.

Now, even though Trump refused to sign it, that legislation has become the law of the land. That law not only will get America back in the business of building housing, but it will help community lenders provide mortgages and other types of financing to support the American Dream of homeownership.

Importantly, that bill did not have handouts. It did not have handouts for megabanks, Big Tech, payday lenders, debt collectors, or credit bureaus. That is not the case for the bill that is before us today.

H.R. 6955 is Wall Street deregulation--that is what it is--hiding as a community bank bill. This package is made up of 24 Republican bills with just two Democratic bills.

Today, we mark the 16th anniversary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act being signed into law. That is the law that bears the name of the late great and former Chairman Barney Frank. Unlike President Trump, President Obama knew when to sign a good bill when he saw it.

That law was passed in response to the 2008 financial crisis when, in case my Republican colleagues have forgotten, millions of Americans lost their jobs, their homes, and their life savings.

Yet, H.R. 6955 ignores these lessons and rolls back a long list of safeguards and oversight of the largest banks. Importantly, the Nation is grappling with an affordability crisis and surge in financial scams and fraud, costing consumers tens of billions of dollars. This was all made worse when Trump shut down the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.

Voting for H.R. 6955 would add insult to injury by thwarting a future CFPB from issuing rules, such as fixing credit reporting or reining in debt collectors or abusive medical debt practices. Maybe that is the point.

Interestingly, Rules Committee Chairwoman Foxx said the quiet part out loud yesterday. She confessed that Republicans love deregulation. That is what this bill is all about. It is not affordability and not protecting consumers. It is about deregulation for Wall Street's megabanks.

Mr. Speaker, what is more is that this bill ignores lessons from the failures of Silicon Valley Bank and other regional banks just 3 years ago. Those large regional banks failed after Congress rolled back capital, liquidity, and other rules specifically for those banks.

Nevertheless, this bill allows even more of these large banks to escape critical safeguards, which risks even more failures and harm to Americans and small businesses.

If H.R. 6955 were to become law, it would be the most sweeping deregulation of Wall Street since the 2008 financial crisis.

Two sections of the bill, sections 203 and 204, amend 15 different banking and consumer protection laws and would increase more than 40 different regulatory thresholds. There are so many laws being rolled back. The committee report for this bill is over 600 pages long, mostly to show how all these different laws are amended.

In fact, the sponsors of this bill were so zealous to raise thresholds that they increased two thresholds that will aid bad actors who commit fraud against a bank or a large financial institution.

You can't make this up. There is a provision that will increase the amount that individuals can defraud a bank or future AIG by and then get government money to buy those failed assets for their own benefit.

The largest labor union in the U.S., the AFL-CIO, and consumer advocates like Americans for Financial Reform and others wrote a letter saying that taken together, these changes would be more damaging than the sum of their parts, leaving the financial system dramatically weaker and more vulnerable to instability and crisis.

Now, Republicans made some technical changes at the request of Trump regulators, but let me give you another example of what they didn't fix.

Wells Fargo, which many of you may remember created millions of fake consumer accounts and has been the subject of countless enforcement actions for consumer harm, like discrimination and anti-money- laundering deficiency, would have a new tool to delay future enforcement actions when consumers have been harmed.

Mr. Speaker, instead of letting Wall Street put Americans and our economy at risk again, we should be addressing the affordability crisis caused by Trump's failed economic policies and endless war with Iran.

Mr. Speaker, I urge Members to oppose this bill, and I reserve the balance of my time.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

Ms. WATERS. Velazquez), the ranking member of the Committee on Small Business.

Let me be clear: Dodd-Frank has not led to bank consolidation. That trend began when Congress repealed Glass-Steagall almost 30 years ago. What Dodd-Frank has done is ensure the longest stretch of economic growth in a generation. The threat to community banks is not Dodd- Frank, but it is to repeal it and return to their needless days, reckless days that led to the 2008 financial crisis.

Just last week, we passed my bill as part of the 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act. My bill eased the requirements on new banks. H.R. 6955, however, would set new banks up for failure. In fact, the bill undermines much of what we were trying to accomplish when we worked together in a bipartisan way.

What we have to do at this point in time is understand a provision of the housing bill that was carefully negotiated. Mr. Speaker, I thought we all were supposed to be in support of the housing bill. Everybody raved about the greatness of it. Now, 10 days after it became law, now some on the opposite side of the aisle are already trying to undo the bill.

Now, this bill will actually make it easier for more, not less consolidation. The bill is bad for new banks but great for megabanks.

Let me just say this: We all talk about loving community banks. I want you to know it is not the talk about loving community banks, it is action and what we do for or against them. I want you to know the big megabanks don't even want them in their doors. They don't even want to have those working behind the counter serving us. They have you serving from outside the bank.

When you can get in touch with them, I want you to know, you have got to go through a hell of a menu to try to talk with someone that maybe in a community bank you can talk to.

Do you know why we love community banks? It is because they understand the community. They know the people in the community. They work with you when you have a problem.

The megabanks don't know you, don't care about you, don't do anything to assist you, and hope you can't get through their menus in order to speak with anybody.

I say, it is not a lot of talk about loving community banks. It is action and what you do.

Now, then you come in here talking about how much you love the community banks, yet you know that you can't get the deregulation that you are doing unless you hid behind the community banks. If you love the community banks, all you have got to do is work with us to separate the regulations in a way that it does not undermine the community banks.

If you want to be fair, charge all your big friends and all the big banks everything they should be charged with regulation.

This is about whether or not you are going to use your power to literally undo what we have worked so hard to do to give the average person a decent chance with a bank, and that is community banks.

Mr. Speaker, I am asking for a ``no'' vote on this bill because, in the final analysis, I know that if you get away with these deregulations, we are going to have consolidation. It will only be five banks, almost only five big banks in the country that control everything. I am asking for a ``no'' vote, and I reserve the balance of my time.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

Ms. WATERS. Garcia), who is a big supporter of community banks.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire how much time for each side is remaining.

Mr. Speaker, I will mention again one of the atrocities that I have been able to experience working on these issues.

Again, Wells Fargo was fined $3.7 billion just a few years ago for widespread mismanagement of automobile loans and mortgages. Their actions included unlawful fees and even repossession of cars.

Now, someone would say, $3.7 billion, well, I want you to know they make so much money that is just a cost of doing business. They will keep doing it if we keep allowing them to get away with what they are trying to get away with today.

If my friend wants a guarantee that this bill helps Wells Fargo, then he should support Ms. Garcia's amendment that says that megabanks can't benefit from this bill, but I guess he won't.

After all, my friend knows that today is Dodd-Frank's birthday, and he is the skunk at the party. There is so much that we could point out that the average citizen knows in dealing with their banks. The average citizen is tired of being treated in the way that they are treated by their banks.

I tell my friend that he is correct in the support that he did for the big bill that Mr. Hill and I worked so hard on. We have a lot in that bill.

But let me point out one of the things in that bill that gives us cause to be concerned. Right now, Mr. Speaker, if you find a residence that you would like to buy, particularly if you are in a rural community, or you may be a low-income community, but you work every day and you can afford a house for maybe $90,000 to $100,000, the bank doesn't want to be bothered with you. The bank wants the big loans. The bank wants the million-dollar loans. They want the half-billion-dollar mortgages. They don't want the small mortgages.

Guess what, Mr. Speaker. They don't do them.

As a matter of fact, many communities where there are residents who could afford the houses in their community are sold out to private equity firms and others who come and buy these houses for pennies on the dollar, but they won't sell them to you, Mr. Speaker, because you don't look like a big profitmaker for them.

I am so pleased I worked with Mr. Hill, and we have done something to change that to encourage the banks to pay attention to those who can afford that $90,000 house, that $100,000 house, that $150,000 house, that $200,000 house. They are working every day. They can afford it, but the banks are not interested.

My friend tells me that we should not be concerned about deregulation that puts these banks in a position where they are not only moving toward consolidation, but they are taking over banking in ways that will help them to get richer and richer.

Guess what, Mr. Speaker. They will keep paying the fines, the big banks will, because that is the cost of doing business, and they still make money. This is outrageous. This is ridiculous.

No more deregulation. No more looking at how you can frame it in such a way, Mr. Speaker, that you are saving the community banks. Mr. Speaker, you are not saving the community banks. As a matter of fact, you are putting them out of business.

Mr. Speaker, proponents say this bill is just for community banks, but here we have another example of the Big Banks sneaking in their rollbacks.

I have four postings from the Bank Policy Institute, which represents all of the largest banks, like Wells Fargo. These postings advocate for indexing regulatory thresholds to nominal GDP instead of inflation. Why? It allows more and more banks to escape regulatory scrutiny.

This bill will give Trump's regulators--and only Trump's regulators-- the opportunity to index 40 different thresholds to let large banks off the hook. Wall Street is making record profits while they are helping them.

Mr. Speaker, for those of us who really care about community banks, we want to keep them because they service their communities in a more profound way. Again, I will repeat: They know and understand when you have a problem, you can call a big bank and you will find nobody. You will go through different menus that they have, but you will not be able to walk into the bank and talk to somebody sitting at a desk who will help you with your problem. Do I have to say more?

Mr. Speaker, a wide variety of labor, consumer, and civil rights groups are strongly opposed to this bill. Let me read from one of the letters we received: ``The National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC) and our network of 700+ community organizations urge Members to oppose H.R. 6955, the Main Street Capital Access Act and vote no on the House floor.''

That is what we are being urged to do by our supporters.

``H.R. 6955 is a broad bank deregulation package that would weaken fair lending transparency, community accountability, bank supervision, and merger review. The bill would reduce the tools regulators and communities rely on to detect redlining, monitor access to credit, evaluate bank mergers, prevent harmful consolidation, and hold financial institutions accountable to the people they serve.''

The signers of the letters don't just come from blue States but from all over the United States of America. This includes Build WyCo from the great State of Kansas. We also have Building Neighborhoods Together in Pennsylvania, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, and Freedom Equity in Ohio. More signers include Georgia Advancing Communities Together, the Neighborhood Recovery Community Development Corporation in Texas, and the United States Broadway Corporation in New Mexico.

I could go on and on, but there is no time for that.

Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record the letter from NCRC. National Community Reinvestment Coalition July 21, 2026. Re Oppose H.R. 6955, the Main Street Capital Access Act. Hon. Hakeem Jeffries, Democratic Leader, House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Hon. Katherine Clark, Democratic Whip, House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Hon. Pete Aguilar, Chair, House Democratic Caucus, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

Dear Leader Jeffries, Whip Clark, Chair Aguilar, and Members of Democratic Leadership: The National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC) and our network of 700+ community organizations urge Members to oppose H.R. 6955, the Main Street Capital Access Act and vote no on the House floor.

H.R. 6955 is a broad bank deregulation package that would weaken fair lending transparency, community accountability, bank supervision and merger review. The bill would reduce the tools regulators and communities rely on to detect redlining, monitor access to credit, evaluate bank mergers, prevent harmful consolidation and hold financial institutions accountable to the people they serve.

NCRC appreciates the inclusion of CDFI-related provisions, including CDFI Fund transparency and CDFI Bond Guarantee Program improvements. However, those revisions do not fix the bill's core problem: H.R. 6955 moves federal banking policy in the wrong direction by weakening community accountability, fair-lending transparency, merger review and supervisory safeguards.

Earlier this year, NCRC urged a no vote when H.R. 6955 was considered in committee. All Democratic members who were present voted no in Committee: We urge you to continue that opposition and vote no on the House floor. 1. H.R. 6955 would sharply limit monopoly and competition review for mergers involving roughly 96 percent of all banks.

Section 601 would prohibit federal banking regulators when evaluating many mergers resulting in institutions below $10 billion in assets from engaging in a competition review and thus they cannot consider whether the mergers would create monopolies or substantially lessen competition. The latest floor version preserves competition review where a transaction would leave only one insured depository institution with a physical presence in the area. This narrow exception does not solve the problem and protects only against the most extreme case, while preventing regulators from reviewing many mergers that could still substantially reduce competition, reduce branch access, or weaken small- business, agricultural and consumer credit options in local markets.

Because roughly 4,129 of the nation's 4,287 insured banks (or approximately 96 percent) hold under $10 billion in assets, this carveout would cover a large share of community and regional bank merger activity. The problem is especially acute in rural counties and smaller local markets. A merger between two banks that are not nationally large can still have significant local consequences. In many communities, the loss of one local institution can mean fewer branches, reduced small-business lending, less agricultural credit, weaker customer service, and fewer banking choices.

NCRC conducted an analysis of every US county to assess the impact of potential mergers between the two largest banks in each county, with their combined assets being under $10 billion. NCRC found that 641 counties, predominantly rural, would shift from competitive markets to highly concentrated markets. In ten counties, one bank would control 100 percent of all local deposits. According to the FDIC's Merger Decisions Annual Report to Congress (2024), regulators approved 61 regular bank-merger applications in 2023. Of those, 57 out of the 61 would have resulted in institutions less than $10 billion. Under H.R. 6955, many comparable transactions would fall within the bill's competition-review safe harbor, unless the narrow one-physical-depository- institution MSA exception applied. 2. H.R. 6955 would weaken CRA, HMDA and fair lending accountability

Section 204 would substantially reduce the tools communities rely on to ensure fair access to credit and hold banks accountable to local needs. The floor version no longer uses the same mechanics as the committee-reported bill, but the core concern remains: Section 204 would create an automatic increase for statutory thresholds across consumer and community-focused laws, including the Community Reinvestment Act and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act.

Beginning in 2031 and every five years after that, Section 204 would require the Federal Reserve to raise the dollar cutoffs in laws like CRA and HMDA that determine which banks are subject to stronger reporting, examination and accountability rules. The Fed would decide whether to base those increases on nominal GDP or inflation.

That is the wrong test for community accountability. Nominal GDP measures the size of the overall economy, while CPI measures inflation. Neither one measures whether banks are serving communities fairly, the rates of redlining, the extent of market concentration, have sufficient data to detect discrimination, and whether credit needs in LMI communities are being met. A larger economy does not mean community needs are being met.

The same problem applies to inflation indexing. Adjusting thresholds for CPI may sound technical or even routine, but in this context, this approach would still cause fair-lending transparency to shrink automatically over time without any finding that communities are being served fairly.

For NCRC and our members, the HMDA and CRA implications are especially serious. HMDA data is one of the primary tools used to detect redlining, evaluate whether lenders are serving borrowers and neighborhoods fairly, and identify gaps in mortgage access. CRA examinations are one of the few mechanisms that require banks to demonstrate that they are meeting the credit needs of their entire communities, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. 3. H.R. 6955 would compress merger review and sideline community evidence

Section 604 would set a fixed 120-day clock for certain applications, beginning at the time of filing even if the submission is incomplete. If the Federal Reserve fails to act within that period, the application would be deemed granted.

That is a dangerous standard for complex bank transactions. Merger review should focus on whether a transaction will serve the convenience and needs of affected communities, preserve access to banking services, protect consumers and avoid harmful concentration. It should not be driven by an artificial clock that rewards incomplete applications and pressures regulators to approve deals quickly.

Section 604 would also restrict how regulators treat information from outside parties when determining whether an application is complete, potentially discounting community and consumer evidence that is often essential to understanding a transaction's real-world impact. Community groups, local officials, small businesses and affected residents are often able to identify branch closure risks, fair lending concerns, weak CRA performance or service gaps that are not evident from the applicant's own submission. 4. H.R. 6955 focuses on how long merger approval takes, instead of whether mergers benefit local economies.

Section 603 directs the Inspector General of each Federal depository institution regulatory agency to conduct a study every three years on the ``timeliness and efficiency'' of merger approvals, including number of days it takes to process merger applications and the identification of ``sources of delay.'' Merger applications warrant scrutiny to evaluate their effect on each of the statutorily required factors of review, including how a proposed combination will serve the convenience and needs of the affected communities. Studies show signs of decreased small business lending after mergers, as well as lower rates paid to customers for deposits. However, despite this evidence, practically all merger applications are currently approved. Local economic needs would be much better served by directing the agencies to study the actual impacts of mergers and bank consolidation, instead of counting days to pressure regulators to make decisions faster.

Furthermore, concerns about the timeliness of merger reviews appear to be unfounded. NCRC analyzed the approval times of 18 merger applications submitted to the OCC in 2024. As shown in the table below, we found that the median days for approval after receipt of an application was 60 days, and that the average was 84 days. In other words, about half of these applications were approved 30 days after the end of a 30-day public comment period. 5. H.R. 6955 would pressure regulators to ignore reputational risk

Section 304 would pressure federal banking agencies to remove reputational risk from supervision. This provision is framed as preventing regulators from using vague concepts to pressure banks, but the practical effect would be to create blind spots.

Reputational risk is not simply ``bad press.'' It can be a warning sign of deeper institutional failures: predatory lending, discriminatory treatment, abusive fees, money laundering, fraud, weak compliance systems or repeated consumer complaints. Regulators should not be forced to ignore patterns of harm merely because those patterns also damage a bank's reputation.

Communities often experience these harms before they show up as capital problems. If regulators are barred from considering reputational risk, they may lose an important early-warning tool for identifying conduct that threatens consumers, communities and the institution itself. Congress should reject H.R. 6955

The bill's supporters argue that H.R. 6955 will help local banks. What the bill actually does is weaken fair lending transparency, reduce CRA and HMDA accountability, make bank mergers easier, limit meaningful community input, and make supervision more difficult.

NCRC is especially concerned that fair lending, CRA, HMDA and consumer protection requirements are recast as regulatory burdens rather than public accountability tools. These laws exist because markets have not reliably served all communities fairly. They help identify discrimination, credit gaps, support enforcement, and ensure that banks receiving public benefits meet public obligations.

For these reasons, we urge Members to oppose H.R. 6955 and vote ``no'' on final passage. Sincerely, Jesse Van Tol, President and CEO, National Community Reinvestment Coalition. Sign On Organizations and States

ACHD--Washington, ASIAN, Inc.--California, Brighton Park Neighborhood Council--Illinois, Build WyCo--Kansas, Building Neighborhoods Together, Inc.--Pennsylvania, California Coalition for Rural Housing--California, CASA of Oregon-- Oregon, Ceiba--Pennsylvania, Community Development Network of Maryland--Maryland, Community Housing Development Corporation--California, Delaware Community Reinvestment Action Council Inc.--Delaware, Development Finance Authority of Summit County--Ohio, Economic Action Maryland Fund-- Maryland, Fair Finance Watch--New York, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama--Alabama, Freedom Equity Inc.--Ohio, Georgia Advancing Communities Together, Inc.--Georgia.

Help The People Programs, Inc--Georgia, Homes on the Hill CDC--Ohio, Housing Education and Economic Development (HEED)--Mississippi, Impact Hub Baltimore Inc.--Maryland, Long Island Housing Services, Inc.--New York, Neighborhood Recovery Community Development Corporation--Texas, New Jersey Citizen Action--New Jersey, People's Opportunity Fund-- California, Philadelphia Association of Community Development Corporations--Pennsylvania, Proud Ground--Oregon, Rural Housing Coalition of New York--New York, South Dallas Fair Park Innercity Community Development Corporation--Texas, Southwest Community Development Corporation--Pennsylvania, TCH Development Inc--Texas, United Ballot--Louisiana, United South Broadway Corporation--New Mexico, Utah Housing Coalition--Utah, Women's Economic Ventures--California.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

Ms. WATERS. Members have a choice today. Whose side are you on? Do you want to advance Donald Trump's deregulatory agenda to help out his wealthy friends on Wall Street, or are you on the side of working families, labor unions, consumers, and civil rights groups like those all over the country who just want equal and fair access to affordable financial products and services?

For many of you who have been in this struggle with banks, where you have tried to get help with all kinds of issues, I want you to, again, go to your bank where you have a problem--don't go because they are only available on the phone--and state your problem. See who you can get to talk to. See if you can get an appointment. See if you can get some answers to the questions that you have.

You can't do this with these big mega banks. They don't have time for you. They don't have time to listen to you talking about how you only have $200,000 and you want to buy this House around the corner. They are not interested in that.

They are interested in the big money. They are interested in not only providing the loans for those who are spending a half million or so on a bank that they are trying to use to get a house.

It is clear: The Big Banks are sick and tired of the way that they are being treated. They know they have a lot of power and a lot of friends in the Congress of the United States of America.

They don't know a new day is coming and a new way is coming. People are learning more and more why they have a right to be disturbed about the way that they are being treated.

I tell people: Don't be afraid to confront those Big Banks. Call us. Get your legislator to help you out. That is what we are supposed to do. Sometimes they can't find us.

Mr. Speaker, I have another letter that says: ``This dangerous bank deregulation package would undermine core safeguards and supervision, push risk into the shadows, and make the next publicly financed bailout more likely. Further deregulation is especially alarming at a time when financial regulatory agencies are under political attack, pursuing industry-friendly agendas, and starved of resources, and when there is effectively no oversight of financial markets.''

It was signed by the AFL-CIO, Americans for Financial Reform, and dozens of others.

Mr. Speaker, I include this letter in the Record. July 21, 2026. Re Oppose bank deregulation package H.R. 6955, the Main Street Capital Access Act or the Main Street Act. Hon. Member of Congress, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

Dear Representative: The 28 undersigned labor, civil rights, democracy, consumer, housing, economic justice, and public interest advocacy organizations are writing to oppose H.R. 6955, the Main Street Capital Access Act or the Main Street Act. This dangerous bank deregulation package would undermine core safeguards and supervision, push risk into the shadows, and make the next publicly financed bailout more likely. Further deregulation is especially alarming at a time when financial regulatory agencies are under political attack, pursuing industry-friendly agendas, and starved of resources, and when there is effectively no oversight of financial markets.

H.R. 6955 treats bank rules as burdens to be minimized rather than what they are: essential safeguards that reduce the likelihood and severity of systemic risk, bank failures, and publicly financed bailouts, while protecting consumers from predatory practices, redlining, and other forms of racial discrimination in lending.

Sections 201-204 would raise statutory thresholds, extend ``tailoring'' well beyond genuinely small and simple banks, and hard-wire automatic future threshold increases. As a result, fewer institutions, activities, and risks would remain within baseline guardrails even as the financial system grows more complex and interconnected. The combined effect would be higher leverage and risk-taking, thinner cushions against losses, and weaker prudential standards. It would return the financial system to a pre-2008 pattern in which risk migrates out of view, problems build for years at midsize and large institutions, and the public is left holding the bag when those institutions fail.

Sections 201-204 would raise statutory thresholds, expand ``tailoring'' well beyond genuinely small and simple banks, and hard-wire automatic future threshold increases. As a result, fewer institutions, activities, and risks would remain inside baseline guardrails even as the system grows more complex and interconnected. The combined effect is to encourage higher leverage and risk-taking, thinner cushions of safety, and looser prudential standards. It would return the financial system to a pre-2008 pattern where risk migrates out of view, problems build for years at midsize and large institutions, and the public is left holding the bag when things break.

The supervision and governance provisions in Sections 301- 304 and 401-403 would tie regulators' hands by narrowing what examiners may consider, slowing supervisory action, and giving banks more opportunities to appeal, contest, and delay findings. At the same time, the bill would weaken transparency and accountability, making it harder to detect problems early and intervene before they turn into crises.

The competition and merchant banking provisions in Sections 601, 604, and 801 would add new stress points by accelerating bank-fintech/crypto arrangements, and making it easier to rubber stamp mergers and concentration--while expanding merchant banking des that blur the line between banking and commerce and increase conflicts of interest and complexity.

This radical legislation would compound an already aggressive deregulatory spree at the Federal Reserve and other banking agencies. Taken together, these changes would be more damaging than the sum of their parts, leaving the financial system dramatically weaker and more vulnerable to instability and crisis. The provisions discussed below show how H.R. 6955 would magnify ongoing agency deregulation and dismantle safeguards needed to identify and contain risks before they harm families, the financial system, and the broader economy. Section by section concerns Sec. 201. Taking Account of Institutions with Low Operation Risk.

This section would significantly weaken financial regulation by mandating that agencies prioritize reducing compliance costs for financial institutions over protecting consumers and ensuring financial stability. The section would create fertile ground for even large banks to challenge regulations in court by claiming undue burden, potentially overturning existing Dodd-Frank rules and hindering future regulatory actions. Regulators already tailor rules based on institution size and risk, which makes this legislation unnecessary and potentially harmful by creating additional legal and procedural barriers to effective oversight. Sec. 202. Small Bank Holding Company Relief.

This section would double title consolidated asset threshold under the Small Bank Holding Company and Savings and Loan Holding Company Policy Statement from $3 billion to $6 billion, posing risks to subsidiary small banks and the financial system. This change would allow a broader range of bank holding companies to operate with higher levels of debt and be exempt from certain capital and leverage requirements, particularly in order to facilitate mergers. The Federal Reserve has long recognized that bank holding companies should ``serve as a source of strength for their subsidiary banks.'' Allowing parent holding companies to operate with higher levels of debt would undermine that principle and, instead of ``a source of strength,'' holding companies may even drain the resources of the subsidiary banks in order to service excessive debt. By allowing larger institutions to operate under looser standards, this section could dangerously incentivize increased leverage, reduce bank safety and soundness, and accelerate bank consolidation. Additionally, this threshold has already been eroded over the past decade, raising it from $500 million to $1 billion in 2014, and again to $3 billion in 2018. Sec. 203. Tailoring and Indexing Enhanced Regulations.

This section would establish automatic increases to asset thresholds for enhanced prudential oversight every five years, allowing problems to fester unaddressed in increasingly large institutions that could have significant systemic implications. The failures of Silicon Valley Bank and First Republic demonstrate the danger of mechanically raising asset thresholds--the last round of tailoring reduced scrutiny of institutions whose failures ultimately required extraordinary government intervention. Sec. 204. Community Bank Regulatory Tailoring.

Under the pretext of relief for community banks, this section would rewrite a wide swath of federal banking, consumer financial protection, and fair lending laws by mandating automatic increases of a broad range of statutory thresholds every five years based on inflation or nominal economic growth. The practical effect would be to steadily and broadly expand the number and size of banks that are excluded from regulatory oversight. The threshold increases would inappropriately reduce compliance under statutes that were designed for genuinely smaller and simpler banking institutions with limited systemic footprint, and would happen without any determination as to whether the affected exemptions remain appropriate, whether the institutions have become more complex or interconnected, or whether raising the thresholds would create new supervisory gaps. Over time, this section would reduce the number of institutions and activities subject to baseline guardrails, weaken transparency, increase conflicts of interest, and blunt early warning and accountability tools embedded in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) framework. At a time of overlapping risks, this kind of across-the-board threshold inflation is likely to lead to supervisory and regulatory gaps and obscure risk from view until it is too late--all simply because the economy has grown or prices increased. The result would be a banking system that is more opaque and less resilient when conditions worsen--increasing financial fragility and the probability that losses will need to be socialized through emergency interventions or outright bailouts.

Importantly, the automatic increases of supervisory thresholds would include--and thus periodically erode--Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) coverage and Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) applicability, undermining fair lending accountability and weakening critical tools that help detect and deter redlining and other forms of racial discrimination in mortgage and small business lending. Sec. 301. Halting Uncertain Methods and Practices in Supervision.

This section would undermine effective bank supervision by restricting the CAMELS rating system to ``objective'' criteria only, sidelining important qualitative factors like management quality and reputational risk. These factors are essential in identifying and deterring harmful practices, such as predatory lending, money laundering, and risky environmental exposures. While not easily quantifiable, sound management and public confidence have repeatedly proven vital to bank stability, as evidenced by failures like Riggs Bank, SVB, and Credit Suisse. The proposed changes would not eliminate risk but would instead conceal real risks from regulators, making supervision more mechanical and increasing the likelihood of future financial crises. Sec. 302. Fair Audits and Inspections for Regulators' Exams.

This section would significantly weaken bank supervision by allowing bank to appeal any supervisory determination to a new external ``Office of Independent Examination Review,'' which would conduct a de novo review without deference to the original findings. This additional appeals process, layered atop existing mechanisms, would enable banks, especially large banks, to challenge numerous supervisory findings, thereby impeding effective oversight. Such changes would undermine the post-2008 financial crisis regulatory framework, increasing systemic risks and exposing the public to potential abuses. Robust supervision is necessary to maintain financial stability and protect consumers, and this section undermines it.

Addidonally, this section now includes new language that would also allow banks, credit unions, executives, and other institution-affiliated parties to move certain enforcement and civil penalty proceedings from the appropriate regulator to federal district court. This would give regulated firms another avenue to delay and complicate enforcement, increasing litigation costs and weakening regulators' ability to address misconduct and unsafe practices promptly. Sec. 304. Financial Integrity and Regulation Management.

This section would open the door and pressure regulators to remove reputational risk considerations when assessing a bank's safety and soundness. Reputational damage has historically contributed to instability in major banks. Eliminating consideration of reputational risk would hinder regulators' ability to identify and mitigate risks, potentially increasing the incidence of money laundering, financial fraud and exploitation, national security threats, and bank failures. Please also see this letter signed by 25 public interest organizations opposing the FIRM Act (H.R. 2702). Sec. 401. FDIC Board Accountability.

This section would alter the criteria for serving on the FDIC, reduce the consideration of consumer protection and enforcement of consumer protection and consideration of regulatory compliance. Sec. 402. Stop Agency Fiat Enforcement of Guidance.

This section would require financial regulators to emphasize that supervisory guidance is not legally binding and that failure to follow guidance does not itself establish a violation of law. Guidance is an important tool for communicating supervisory expectations, identifying emerging risks, and encouraging institutions to correct unsafe practices before they become violations or crises. The mandated disclaimer could encourage regulated firms to disregard prudent supervisory expectations unless every standard is first imposed through a lengthy formal rulemaking or enforcement action, weakening regulators' ability to respond quickly to developing risks. Sec. 403. Regulatory Efficiency, Verification, Itemization, and Enhanced Workflow.

This section would require financial regulators to conduct more frequent reviews of existing rules and place greater emphasis on cumulative compliance costs and regulatory burdens. This would still institutionalize a recurring deregulatory process that treats longstanding safeguards as burdens to be minimized. These reviews could divert limited agency resources from supervision and enforcement while creating repeated opportunities for industry to weaken or eliminate protections that remain necessary. Sec. 601. Bank Competition Modernization.

This section would weaken scrutiny of bank mergers involving institutions with less than $10 billion in assets by directing regulators not to consider whether qualifying transactions would substantially reduce competition or restrain trade. This would permit greater consolidation in many local and rural markets without a meaningful assessment of the effects on prices, service quality, branch access, or the availability of small-business and agricultural credit. These anticompetitive problems will be more acute for those with limited transportation and for services that are more commonly received at community banks, like small business loans and farm loans. Sec. 604. Bank Failure Prevention.

This section would weaken oversight of bank mergers by imposing a strict 120-day deadline--running from initial submission, regardless of whether the record was complete-- for regulators to approve or deny applications, regardless of whether the application is complete or all necessary information has been provided. This would limit regulators' ability to consider input from affected stakeholders and properly evaluate the risks of consolidation. Bank merger scrutiny needs to become more robust, and this section would move in the opposite direction--further enabling a pattern of rubber-stamping mergers, increasing costs for depositors, customers, and small businesses as well as heightening systemic risk. Sec. 801. Merchant Banking Modernization.

This section would extend the alliance between the megabanks and merchant banking that can create anticompetitive problems and complex combinations of banking and commerce, as happened when JPMorgan was charged with manipulating aluminum prices through its merchant bank affiliates' ownership of an aluminum warehouse. These merchant banking partnerships are more likely to run afoul of the mixing of banking and commerce and primarily benefit the biggest banks. There is no need to extend this by 50 percent. Moreover, it is deceptive to suggest that banks need merchant banks to make affordable housing and small business investments, because most banks can and do extend commercial credit for these purposes already.

For the reasons above, we urge you to oppose this dangerous deregulatory package and protect borrowers, small investors, retirees, and the integrity and stability of our financial system. Sincerely,

African Community Housing & Development (ACHD), AFL-CIO, Americans for Financial Reform, ASIAN. Inc., Communications Workers of America (CWA), Community Housing Development Corporation, Consumer Federation of America, Consumer Reports, Delaware Community Reinvestment Action Council Inc., Fair Finance Watch, Freedom Equity Inc., Georgia Advancing Communities Together, Inc., Indivisible, National Association of Consumer Advocates.

National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC), National Consumer Law Center (on behalf of its low-income clients), New Yorkers for Responsible Lending, Oregon Consumer Justice, Oregon Consumer League, Proud Ground, Public Citizen, Rise Economy, South Dallas Fair Park Innercity Community Development Corporation, Strong Economy For All Coalition, TCH Development, Inc, Transparency Task Force, Utah Housing Coalition, Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Speaker, we know how to support community banks and credit unions. We just did that with our landmark housing bill, and I was pleased to work with the chairman of that committee, Mr. Hill. It became law just a few days ago and included five Republican bills and four Democratic ones that were focused on supporting community banks.

Now, here come Republicans to push for what they and their allies want: financial deregulation. This bill has 24 Republican provisions compared to just 2 from Democrats.

In fact, I am disappointed that my friends on the other side of the aisle are advancing provisions that even contradict our carefully crafted bipartisan agreement in the housing bill.

There is a provision in this bill on de novo banks that goes beyond our bipartisan deal, allowing regulators to decide whether to make permanent reforms that really should be for Congress to decide.

We struck a compromise in passing the 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act, and I think everyone who voted for that should honor that compromise.

Ultimately, Mr. Speaker, this bill is a distraction from what Congress should be focusing on: ending the affordability crisis caused by Trump's failed policies.

Nothing in this bill will help consumers afford groceries or pay for gas. Do you know who is not suffering during the affordability crisis? Wall Street. This bill would loosen the guardrails on Wall Street mega banks even as they report record profits.

Even Chairwoman Foxx admitted that this bill is all about deregulation and rolling back Dodd-Frank, a law she said she strongly dislikes. Chairman Hill said they received drafting assistance from Trump's regulators and banks, but not from organizations that represent workers or consumers.

Mr. Speaker, we are not stupid. We understand that Trump controls all of his so-called organizations that are independent. He tells them what to do. We get that. He is in control. He is running this country. Those people who are selected to run these so-called independent agencies are those who will do nothing but what they are told to do.

That is probably because the groups who represent actual people oppose this bill. That is what they are told to do. That is the leadership they have.

Now is not the time to plant new seeds for the next crisis. Now is not the time to juice the mega banks' profit margins. Now is not the time to legitimize Trump's efforts to gut the CFPB, fair lending, and other consumer protections.

Again, I am so proud and pleased with the work we did in a bipartisan manner. I am so proud and pleased that we were able to negotiate through some very tough times. I am so proud to announce that we had to give some, and we took some. They gave some, and we worked it out.

I don't know exactly what they are being told by Trump, but I know Trump is in charge, and he is charging a lot of what is going on.

I urge my colleagues to please vote ``no'' on this bill, and support the citizens, support their constituents, not Wall Street.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

Source