Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of S. 1318, the Foreign Intelligence Accountability Act. This legislation makes further reforms to section 702, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and reauthorizes the authority for 3 years.
Originally authorized in 2008, section 702 allows the intelligence community to gather foreign intelligence on foreign targets based overseas. Targets of 702 are terrorists, hackers, and spies living abroad. No U.S. citizen anywhere in the world can be targeted under section 702.
I want to be very clear on this point. Section 702 is not a backdoor surveillance tool that allows the government to collect and review an American's emails or other electronic communications. The only U.S. person data collected is if the terrorist, spy, or hacker targeted under 702 is talking to an American or about an American. In that case, only the communications held in the foreign target's accounts are collected.
For the government to collect that American's communications, current law already requires the government to get a warrant under different FISA authorities.
Section 702 is one of our country's most important foreign intelligence authorities.
In 2025, 100 percent of the President's intelligence priorities reported on by the NSA were supported by section 702, and more than one-quarter of all NSA reporting contains 702 information; 90 percent of synthetic drug disruptions enabled by the CIA were supported by section 702; and 63 percent of the intelligence products in the President's daily brief contained section 702 information.
Reauthorizing FISA 702 is essential. In 2024, Congress reauthorized section 702 through legislation known as RISAA. This legislation included 56 reform measures that restricted FBI U.S. person queries, implemented greater FBI accountability for any noncompliance, mandated greater transparency across the IC and FISC, and included key reforms to address abuses related to traditional FISA like we all witnessed in the FBI's Crossfire Hurricane investigation.
The RISAA reforms resulted in a 94 percent drop in the number of FBI U.S. person queries from 2022 to 2025, 119,300 down to 7,400. At the same time, the FBI's compliance rate increased to 99 percent, equivalent to other IC agencies.
Despite the efforts of FBI Director Patel to implement the reforms and accountability, rebuilding trust will not happen quickly. For that reason, working with Chairman Jordan and House leadership, I have met with all unique groups across the Republican Conference over the past several months to identify additional key reforms and to develop a consensus product.
The reality is that no reauthorization effort would be likely to be perfect in everyone's eyes, but this bill makes measurable reforms to strengthen accountability and safeguards while maintaining the criticality of the foreign intelligence tool.
Specifically, the bill before us: clarifies that no U.S. person can be a target of 702 collection, and any targeting of a U.S. person requires a warrant; establishes criminal penalties for intentional abuse of FISA 702 queries and any false statements to the FISC; mandates new procedures to allow Members to observe FISC hearings; requires an FBI attorney review all FBI U.S. person queries; orders an independent audit by the Government Accountability Office on 702 targeting procedures; and establishes an outside review and authentication process of all FBI U.S. person queries by mandating the ODNI Civil Liberties Protection Officer review FBI query justifications.
With these important reforms, the bill includes a 3-year reauthorization for FISA 702. The bottom line is that the importance of this tool to U.S. national security cannot be overstated, and for that reason, it is essential for Congress to reauthorize this authority.
On a 24/7 basis, we face the threat of cyberattacks from our adversaries. We have U.S. military personnel and citizens being targeted overseas. We have foreign terrorist organizations recruiting Americans and plotting attacks on the homeland.
FISA 702 is a vital national security authority that enables the intelligence community and military to mitigate and defeat these threats. In fact, if the 702 tool had existed prior to 2001, we may have been able to prevent September 11 from happening.
I urge all my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on S. 1318. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
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Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to the time remaining.
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Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to how much time is remaining.
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Mr. CRAWFORD. Tenney).
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Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, I have no further speakers.
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Mr. CRAWFORD. I thank the ranking member, my friend from Connecticut, for his comments.
FISA 702 is a critical foreign intelligence tool. There is no other authority that can replicate the value, speed, and agility of this authority.
Two years ago, Congress enacted 56 reform measures focused on section 702, U.S. person queries and other FISA transparency and accountability measures. These measures have forced meaningful change at the FBI. The bill before us continues the 2024 reforms and includes additional privacy and civil liberty protections and transparency measures.
Before closing, I want to express my appreciation to Chairman Jordan for working with me on this effort over the last several months. I thank the members of the House Intelligence Committee, many of whom have spoken today on behalf of this bill, for their oversight on section 702 and other foreign intelligence authorities.
I also thank the fantastic staff in the Office of House Legislative Counsel, especially Philip Bayer, Toby Dorsey, and Tony Sciascia.
I thank the HPSCI majority staff, including Griffin Decker, Ryan Breitenbach, Jonah Shumate, Laura Casulli, and Mandy Bowers.
I thank the Members who dedicated countless hours to the process of hammering this out who attended the meetings, whose input we heard and whose input we value. I thank them, and I urge a ``yes'' vote on S. 1318.
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