Commerce, Justice, Science; Energy and Water Development; and Interior and Environment Appropriations Act, 2026

Floor Speech

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Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, for years, the most pressing concern about the future of NATO was whether and when European allies would take the obligations of collective defense more seriously.

But today, the biggest questions about the most successful military alliance in the history of the world would have to do with us, the United States: whether America still recognizes our country as an anchor of transatlantic security, an arsenal of democracy, and a global leader, not just a regional power.

I need to make a number of points here, and it would be useful to talk a little bit about its history.

The Second World War claimed tens of millions of lives, displaced tens of millions more, and left the old world crippled by food shortages and hyperinflation.

After defeating Hitler's genocidal bid for world domination, American leaders understood that our interests and those of our European allies were linked, whether we liked it or not. As George Marshall put it, back in 1947, ``the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace.''

American security and stability depended on European security and stability, not least because conflict with Nazi Germany was succeeded immediately by the threat of conflict with the Soviet Union. Millions in Eastern Europe had gone from living under Nazi tyranny to living under Soviet tyranny.

The American people understood the stakes. Back in 1947, more than three-quarters of Americans rejected the idea that the Soviet Union was merely building its defenses against future attack. Instead, they thought that Russia was bent on conquest.

In 1948, two-thirds of Americans said America and Western European friends should join together for a mutual defense pact. By 1949, with the North Atlantic Treaty in the works, the question actually got more specific: Would the American people support ``a promise of mutual aid from all the members of the alliance if any single member nation is attacked''--``if any single member is attacked''?

That was a higher bar--the commitment that would become article 5-- and yet an even bigger majority of recipients again said yes.

Of course, there was some controversy and opposition. There were still isolationists ignoring lessons of the decade. But after years of neglect for the national defense, after the folly of appeasement and the failure of deterrence, after pouring the equivalent of 37 percent of America's GDP into the ``Arsenal of Democracy'' and burying 400,000 Americans, the American people still knew the costs of war, and they knew they would rather preserve the peace.

Of course, they didn't intend to do it alone. Americans told pollsters that their early skepticism toward post-war alliance commitments stemmed from a fear that allies would rely too heavily on American leadership.

This would be a recurring theme. But, importantly, for much of NATO's history, the U.S. leaders most concerned about burden-sharing were also fierce defenders of the alliance. They criticized allies because they wanted NATO to work, not because they wanted to score political points here at home.

Let's just take, for example, our former colleague Sam Nunn. On multiple occasions, including the 1974 and 1985 NDAAs, he pushed to force allies to carry more of the costs of U.S. forward deployment.

And yet, when a majority leader of his own party tried to force a phaseout of U.S. troops from Europe, our former colleague from Georgia fought back because he understood the value of American leadership and the importance of European security to our own.

The strength of the transatlantic alliance is contingent on its leaders taking collective defense seriously--taking collective defense seriously. That is why I have always called out laggards and urged European allies to share more of the burden.

But I have also given credit where it is due, and the simple truth is that our allies have undertaken a profound--profound--transformation. This year, Poland will spend 4.8 percent of its GDP on defense. Estonia and Lithuania will spend 5 percent, and Latvia will hit that goal in 2027.

Alongside Nordic neighbors like Norway and Denmark, which have deployed to harm's way alongside their American comrades, NATO's newest members, Sweden and Finland, are each on track to meet the alliance's new spending target years ahead of schedule.

Germany has dramatically increased defense spending, and the Germans have even amended their Constitution--amended their Constitution--to allow for deficit spending on defense. Whether Europe's largest economy is serious about its defense transformation is really no longer up for debate. That debate is over.

Not every ally is making such impressive progress, but no one can claim ignorance of what is at stake. As Poland's Prime Minister put it bluntly, the choice facing Europe is this: ``money today or blood tomorrow''--``money today or blood tomorrow.''

Perhaps that is why, in addition to investing heavily in their own defenses, European allies are continuing to dwarf America's assistance to Ukraine by a factor of 10 to 1. Let me repeat that. European allies are continuing to dwarf--dwarf--America's assistance to Ukraine by a factor of 10 to 1.

Our allies' long holiday from history is over. That is good news, and it must continue.

Well, what about us--the Americans?

European allies continue to grow their defense budgets, but ours have stayed flat across successive administrations. We are the ones leaving capacity unused and political will untapped. We are talking, but we are not doing--talking but not doing.

The President was right to call for a major increase in defense spending, but the annual defense budget request from OMB this year doesn't even keep up with inflation. The fiscal year 2026 top line won't come close--close--to covering growing costs and requirements, like the multiyear munitions contracts the Department of Defense rightly wants to actually sign.

We should keep the cost and value of America's own commitment to the transatlantic alliance actually in perspective. Take the year 1982-- right in the thick of the Reagan buildup that won the Cold War. In fiscal 1982, sustaining U.S. military operations in Europe accounted for less than 6.5 percent of defense outlays.

Now, remember: Winning World War II meant surging defense spending to 37 percent of our GDP. But at the climax of the Cold War, when we were spending only 6 percent, sustaining a deterrent military presence in Russia's backyard took up less than 6.5 percent of our annual defense budget. Now, that sounds a lot less like an entangling alliance than a smart investment in preventing catastrophic war.

Well, what did the American people say? How did they feel about that?

In 1989, with the Soviets on the ropes, 75 percent said that NATO ought to be maintained beyond victory--maintained beyond victory. Thirty years later, in 2019, an even greater majority gave the very same response, even before Putin's escalation in Ukraine.

What about now? With Russia waging a war of conquest and with China, Iran, and North Korea pitching in to help them, has NATO outlived its useful life?

Is the notion of U.S. interests in Europe just a relic from the Cold War?

Or, to paraphrase some of Moscow's most useful idiots, has NATO's existence and growth provoked Putin's aggression?

Let's get a few things straight.

For decades, America and our allies bent over backward to welcome Russian participation at NATO, including through the Partnership for Peace program, and to integrate Russia into the global economy. America sent billions of dollars in economic assistance and encouraged massive investment of private capital in the hopes that Russia would choose to live in peace with the nations it formerly enslaved and with the West.

In other words, the invitation was open to join us and be a part in what we were doing. Putin has repeatedly rejected such peaceful coexistence. Instead, what he has done is he has chosen bloody, neo- Soviet empire-building instead.

To the extent that NATO has grown, it has been in response to Russian aggression. If Putin is looking for someone to blame for Sweden's and Finland's accessions to the alliance, he can simply look in the mirror. His own brutality has validated the decisions of sovereign nations to join NATO and align with the West.

As for the utility of the alliance for our interests, America's adversaries are choosing to work together. Responding by going it alone would be strategic malpractice.

We are courting Russia and its GDP of $2.5 trillion at the expense of longstanding bonds with Europe and its GDP of--listen to this--$27 trillion? Europe collectively has a GDP of $27 trillion. Russia's is only $2.5 trillion. That doesn't even align with U.S. economic interests, let alone our values.

Last year, Europe invested $3.5 trillion directly in the United States--here. In recent years, two-thirds of our European allies' growing investments in foreign military technologies have been in American-made systems. Together, we make up nearly half of the global economy. Europe plus America make up about half of the global economy.

If we are serious about global competition with China, these are relationships worth tending. These are allies we ought to be working with, not against, which brings me to the matter of Greenland.

The President is right that Arctic security is a central concern in our strategic competition with major adversaries, and he will find similar interest in Arctic security among allies like Denmark, which is investing billions of dollars in its own capabilities in the region.

America's recognition of Denmark's political and economic interests in Greenland dates all the way back to World War I. The Danes have been close partners in the Arctic since World War II, and brave Danish soldiers fought and died in America's wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. There is no ambiguity here--no ambiguity. Close ties with our northernmost allies are what make America's extensive reach in the Arctic actually possible. And I have yet to hear from this administration a single thing we need from Greenland that this sovereign people is not already willing to grant us.

Unless and until the President can demonstrate otherwise, then the proposition at hand today is very straightforward: incinerating the hard-won trust of loyal allies in exchange for no meaningful change in U.S. access to the Arctic.

That is the definition of ``allies''--plural--because this is about more than Greenland. It is about more than America's relationship with its highly capable Nordic allies. It is about whether the United States intends to face a constellation of strategic adversaries with capable friends or to commit an unprecedented act of strategic self-harm if we choose to go it alone.

So let's make no mistake. All of the good progress the President has made in pushing allies to spend more on defense, the increased burden- sharing, the demand for American-made capabilities--all of it would be for nothing if his administration's ill-advised threats about Greenland were to shatter the trust of our allies. Following through on this provocation would be more disastrous for the President's legacy than withdrawing from Afghanistan was for his predecessor.

The American people know this. Just 17 percent think trying to take control of Greenland is a good idea. Seventeen percent think our taking Greenland is a good idea. Instead, they understand intuitively that strong alliances make America more secure--more secure.

The Reagan National Defense Survey, conducted late last year, found that 68 percent of Americans hold a favorable view of the transatlantic alliance--68 percent--and 76 percent support article 5 and a U.S. military response in the event of an attack on a NATO ally. In just 6 months, that measure grew by 5 percent.

Here is the most interesting finding. Among Americans who initially said they would support a U.S. withdrawal from NATO, nearly one in five changed their mind when they learned how our European allies are stepping up their commitments to collective defense.

I am happy to provide these findings to anyone in Washington who still bets against the future of the transatlantic alliance, but the American people, who already understand the stakes, may not be so patient. They are telling anyone who will listen that when they say ``peace through strength''--when the American people say ``peace through strength,'' they mean what President Reagan meant: leading with moral clarity, distinguishing clearly between aggressors and victims, investing in the arsenal of democracy, equipping friends--friends--who fight for themselves, preparing to win wars, and upholding the alliances that deter them.

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