Dhs Restrictions on Confucius Institutes and Chinese Entities of Concern Act

Floor Speech

Mr. Speaker, H.R. 881, the DHS Restrictions on Confucius Institutes and Chinese Entities of Concern Act seeks to help address the threat posed to U.S. colleges and universities by the People's Republic of China and Chinese Communist Party.

The People's Republic of China and the CCP have poured hundreds of millions of dollars into U.S. universities through Confucius Institutes and other programs. These programs have given China, a strategic competitor, a platform to potentially interfere with academic freedom and free speech as well as greater access to sensitive intellectual property and national security information.

To curtail these efforts, H.R. 881 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to ensure that U.S. institutions of higher education that have relationships with Confucius Institutes, Thousand Talents Program, or vaguely defined Chinese entities of concern do not receive any funds from the Department of Homeland Security.

This funding prohibition is similar to those found for the Department of Defense in the 2019 and 2021 National Defense Authorization Acts and the National Science Foundation in the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022. However, the restrictions in those measures were limited to universities with Confucius Institutes only, and the ban was so successful there are only a handful of Confucius Institutes remaining on U.S. campuses.

That is why H.R. 881 includes a new category of banned relationships: those between U.S. institutions of higher education and so-called Chinese entities of concern. In the bill, a Chinese entity of concern is any university or college in the People's Republic of China that meets at least one of nine very broad criteria. As a result, H.R. 881 has the possibility to prohibit any DHS funding from going to any U.S. university that has any relationship with virtually any Chinese university.

That is why Democrats on the House Homeland Security Committee have worked to bring H.R. 881 more in line with the funding bans found in previous legislation by including a waiver for the Secretary of Homeland Security like those the past legislation had for the Secretary of Defense and National Science Foundation Director.

Now, H.R. 881 contains a waiver provision that allows the Secretary of Homeland Security to permit Department funding to go to U.S. institutions of higher education that maintain a relationship with programs and entities in China if the relationship is either in the national security interests of the United States or has no bearing on the national security interests of the United States or its allies.

This is critical, as the bill's language could encompass all sorts of agreements between academic institutions in the United States and China, including student exchange programs and other cultural programs that benefit American students, and ultimately our country.

Along those same lines, the bill now also includes a provision that requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to provide outreach and, upon request, technical assistance to U.S. institutions of higher education relating to compliance with the bill.

I appreciate Representative Pfluger's willingness to work with us to improve his bill by including the waiver and technical assistance language.

Mr. Speaker, House Democrats share concerns that Chinese Communist Party interference with U.S. colleges and universities could lead to a wide variety of negative outcomes. That said, House Democrats do not want to see legitimate academic activity between the United States and China hindered.

The compromise language recognizes the spirit of the bill--the need to protect America's intellectual property and academic freedom--and takes steps to mitigate the risk of going too far and denying critical Homeland Security funding to U.S. universities for any relationship with virtually any Chinese university.

I do not support creating another pretext for the Trump administration to deny U.S. universities Federal funding, but I also do not want to see our greatest strategic competitor gain a greater foothold on college campuses that could put our national security at risk, either.

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Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Chu).

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Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, we must carefully balance potential risks to homeland security posed by the CCP with the benefits of educational and cultural exchange programs.

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