Defending Education Transparency and Ending Rogue Regimes Engaging in Nefarious Transactions Act
Floor Speech
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Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to H.R. 1048, the DETERRENT Act.
Let's acknowledge, first of all, the elephant in the room. Just this month, the Secretary of Education fired one-half of the Department's staff, and last week, President Trump signed an executive order aimed at dismantling the entire Department. This administration is actively working to eliminate an agency that has long been the cornerstone of ensuring that every child in America has access to a quality education.
Today, we are discussing a bill that would add even more responsibility to the very Department that they are trying to destroy. It is almost as if they are trying to dismantle the agency, but at the same time, they recognize how critical its role is and are piling on additional duties. This is not only nonsensical but also reckless. Republicans can't argue that the Department of Education is unnecessary and then hand it more work, expecting it to function without the staff, resources, or the leadership that it needs.
This Congress has a responsibility to address the many pressing issues that students face such as closing the achievement gaps, improving college affordability, and ending gun violence in schools. Instead, we find ourselves considering bills that target vulnerable groups, and now this bill, which risks isolating America from global partnerships in research and education.
Instead of requiring institutions to report foreign gifts or contracts large enough to exert any influence, the bill before us would require institutions to report gifts of any value from people who are not U.S. citizens if they are from a list of countries of concern, a list that is difficult to find and will be very difficult to keep track of because it is subject to change.
The Department of Education has already lost one-half of its staff, and if this bill passes, it will have to process an exponentially larger number of reports than it has to process already.
Now, how can we place these new responsibilities on an agency that is being hollowed out, and how can we expect it to manage these complex issues when the institution is being dismantled?
H.R. 1048 will also impose burdensome and unnecessary penalties on institutions for working with international scholars and organizations. Since faculty really don't know their colleagues' citizenship status, it is reasonable to believe that discrimination will follow and institutions will be disincentivized from hiring talented international faculty.
Mr. Chair, present law already requires reporting of any gift large enough to exert any influence over a university. This bill requires the reporting of gifts of any value, whether it be a cup of coffee or a doughnut, from people who are from so-called countries of concern and requires the Department of Education to process all of those reports, the same Department of Education that just lost one-half of its staff.
If the problem is millions of dollars in unreported gifts, then requiring the reporting of free doughnuts cannot be the answer.
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Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Chu).
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Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chair, I include in the Record a letter from the American Council on Education on behalf of the American Association of Community Colleges, American Association of State Colleges and Universities, American Council on Education, Association of American Universities, Association of Public and Land-Grant Universities, and the National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities, which says in part: `` . . . as currently proposed, the DETERRENT Act would significantly impede critical research activities; duplicate existing interagency efforts; and put in place a problematic expansion of data collection by the Department of Education without ensuring that actual national security or foreign malign influence threats, including those which espouse support for actions that run counter to American foreign policy, are addressed.'' American Council on Education, Washington, DC, March 25, 2025. Hon. Mike Johnson, House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Hon. Hakeem Jeffries, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Speaker Johnson and Minority Leader Jeffries: On behalf of the American Council on Education and the undersigned higher education associations, I write in opposition to H.R. 1048, the ``Defending Education Transparency and Ending Rogue Regimes Engaging in Nefarious Transactions (DETERRENT)'' Act. We appreciate and take very seriously the concerns raised around research security and foreign malign influence, at institutions of higher education. However, as currently proposed, the DETERRENT Act would significantly impede critical research activities; duplicate existing interagency efforts; and put in place a problematic expansion of data collection by the Department of Education without ensuring that actual national security or foreign malign influence threats, including those which espouse support for actions that run counter to American foreign policy, are addressed.
Over the past several years, we have worked with our members to encourage full compliance with reporting obligations in Section 117 of the Higher Education Act, as well as working with the national security agencies, research agencies, and the Department of Education to clarify and improve foreign gift and contract reporting. As a result, since issues with foreign gift reporting were raised by Congress and policymakers in 2018, there has been a substantial increase in Section 117 reporting. Our associations and member institutions have continued to work with the federal research agencies to implement a range of new reporting requirements under NSPM-33, the CHIPS and Science Act, and numerous National Defense Authorization Act provisions. Since 2023, when the DETERRENT Act was first marked up, federal research agencies have now fully implemented common disclosure forms that require more details on foreign affiliations, relationships, and financial interests; started implementing requirements for institutions to maintain research security programs; and created new processes for assessing and mitigating risks prior to award.
Proponents of this bill have also asserted that it may be helpful in deterring antisemitic activity linked to foreign actors on colleges campuses. To be very clear, our institutions take seriously the rise of antisemitic activity across the country, and there is no question that more needs to be done to address it. We continue to work with major Jewish organizations and institutions with a shared conviction that Jewish students, staff, and faculty deserve to study and work without threat of harassment or discrimination. However, the DETERRENT Act is unlikely to solve the societal problem of antisemitism. Instead, it will result in more duplicative reporting, confusion on campuses and among faculty, and an increase in the overall costs of compliance.
We appreciate that the DETERRENT Act would make Section 117 an annual report, rather than the current biannual requirements, which would better align it with the National Science Foundation (NSF) foreign gift reporting requirement. We also appreciate that the legislation exempts tuition payments and certain outgoing contracts from institutions used to purchase goods from foreign companies. Exempting tuition is especially important since the DETERRENT Act would lower the reporting threshold from $250,000 to $50,000 for some gifts and contracts and to $0 for certain countries of concern and foreign entities of concern.
Additionally, we appreciate the alignment of definitions (i.e. ``countries of concern'' and ``foreign entities of concern'') with definitions already in use at Department of Defense and NSF to help guide our institutions efforts to address research security concerns. We also support the language clarifying record retention and translations of gift and contract agreements, which provides important guidance to our institutions regarding retention of records.
However, we are concerned that the version of the bill being considered on the floor includes significant changes whose impact on institutions we have not had time to fully understand. This includes the addition of ``intellectual property'' to the definition of foreign gifts and contracts, as well as adding organizations such as the United Nations, to the definition of foreign sources. We remain concerned regarding the expansion of Section 117 into areas where it is unclear how additional and often burdensome reporting will help to address national security concerns, beyond the new requirements created and implemented over the past few years. Additionally, the proposed expansion and creation of new reports under Section 117 could increase national security concerns by exposing information to malign foreign efforts.
The proposed bill includes several sections with detrimental impacts, and we urge you to strike these sections:
The new Section ll7a, ``Prohibition on Contracts with Certain Foreign Entities and Countries,'' would require institutions to receive a waiver from the Department of Education before beginning or continuing a contract with a country of concern or a foreign entity of concern. This provision is particularly concerning because the definition of a ``contract'' is incredibly broad and therefore will likely capture not only all research agreements, but also student exchange programs and other joint cultural and education programs. This is especially concerning, given the fact that the U.S. Department of State has paused federal efforts around exchange programs, such as Fulbright and Gilman Scholars, at a time when the United States needs more students to study the Chinese language.
In addition, the Department of Education does not currently have the expertise to carry out the review of contracts, many of which will likely focus on scientific research not under the jurisdiction of the Department. And given the recent reduction in force actions, which greatly reduced staff including at Federal Student Aid, it is unclear how this additional work would be carried out in a timely manner by the Department. Our institutions abide by the regulations and requirements maintained by the U.S. Department of Commerce, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, and the U.S. Department of State regarding U.S. partnerships, export controls, and purchases from foreign entities. There are no indications that expanded Department of Education reviews are necessary; no other industry or government entity, including states, localities, and other nonprofit organizations, must undertake this type of review of an agreement before they can enter into a contract with a country or foreign entity.
Section ll7b, ``Institutional Policy Regarding Foreign Gifts and Contracts to Faculty and Staff,'' would require institutions of higher education that receive more than $50 million in federal research and development funding or any Title VI funding to develop a policy to compel research faculty and staff, including those at ``affiliated entities'' to report any foreign gifts valued over $480 and contracts over $5,000, as well as creating and maintaining a searchable, public database with that information. This requirement is unnecessary given other existing federal statutory mandates that require researchers to disclose all sources of foreign, domestic, current, and pending support for their research to federal research agencies as they apply for research awards and contracts.
While the bill attempts to make the names of the reporting faculty and staff private, this provision raises both privacy and security concerns regarding personal financial transactions of relatively small amounts, including for example an inheritance from a foreign family member. This could also provide our foreign adversaries with a roadmap for targeting our top-notch U.S. researchers. Section 117b will likely result in the collection of an ocean of data, much of it trivial and inconsequential, and do little to address the fundamental concerns regarding research security and foreign influence.
Section 117c, ``Investment Disclosure Report,'' would create new reports for certain institutions of higher education (private institutions with endowments over $6 billion or with ``investments of concern'' above $250 million). These institutions would need to report those investments with a country of concern or a foreign entity of concern on an annual basis to the Department of Education, which would then be made public on a searchable database. Similar to our concerns with l17a and 117b, it is unclear what national security or foreign malign influence threat this provision is trying to address. Our institutions are in compliance with Treasury rules regulating our investments, regarding outbound investments in certain sensitive technologies in countries of concern. It is unclear how this will address additional issues of national security, beyond existing federal requirements. It is also unclear why endowments at certain private institutions of higher education would be specifically called out as a national security concern when investments made by other entities that are not institutions of higher education, such as other nonprofits, government grantees and private government contractors are not made public.
Section 117d, ``Enforcement; Single Point of Contract; Institutional Requirements,'' establishes new fines regarding compliance with Section 117 reporting and the new subsections of Section 117. The legislation would put into statute the tie between Section 117 and an institution's program participation agreement. By tying the new proposed fines to Title IV, this would punish students for compliance issues at institutions, specifically compliance with foreign gift reporting, which is not likely impacting individual students.
In addition to these recommendations, we strongly encourage the final bill to also include language that requires the Department of Education to carry out negotiated rulemaking on Section 117, in order to ensure that the Department engages fully with the stakeholder community and clarifies important questions around definitions to ensure the reports are completed in the most useful way possible for policymakers, interested public parties, and the national security agencies.
We appreciate the efforts in the DETERRENT Act to clarify Section 117 and codify compliance rules the Department of Education has previously used sub-regulatory guidance to explain. However, we urge you to consider the potentially detrimental impacts of Sections 117a, 117b, 117c, and 117d, and strike those sections. This significant expansion of Department authority and responsibility is especially problematic given the recent reduction in force implemented at the Department of Education, as well as the Administration's efforts to dismantle the Department. We look forward to working with you on this important legislation as it moves forward in Congress. However, if the bill includes those problematic provisions as it moves forward, we will continue to oppose the legislation as drafted. There are better approaches to address the concerns of policymakers and we welcome the opportunity to work with lawmakers on the right solutions. Sincerely, Ted Mitchell, President.
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Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chair, we received a letter from the Association of Public and Land-Grant Universities which says in part that Federal agencies since 2023 ``have significantly expanded research security efforts'' and outlines those efforts and then says: ``Rather than advance transparency and meaningfully contribute to the plethora of actions taken by Congress and the Trump and Biden administrations over the last 10 years, the DETERRENT Act will impede important international collaborations and be duplicative of other Federal research agencies' efforts to appropriately strengthen research security and foreign partnership reporting requirements.''
Then they outline some specific concerns by saying: ``The bill would inappropriately create a new and highly unusual role for the U.S. Department of Education in making determinations about the suitability of international research, education, and cultural partnerships, despite its lack of expertise in scientific research.''
It also says: ``The bill would require institutions to create new public databases for the disclosure of international gifts to faculty and staff members. This reporting would include the disclosure of non- work-related gifts from any country that grantees receive from family, for example, even when there are no connections to their work. Records of such gifts would be required to be in a searchable database maintained by institutions, and for public universities, such reporting would potentially be subject to open records requests that could allow foreign actors to identify leading researchers to target for influence operations.''
Finally, it says: ``The bill would create duplicative disclosure requirements for foreign gift disclosures as Federal research grant applicants already must disclose all sources of support--whether foreign or domestic--for the research activities.''
Mr. Chair, I include this letter in the Record. Association of Public and Land-grant Universities, Washington, DC, March 24, 2025. Hon. Mike Johnson, House of Representatives, Washington DC. Hon. Hakeem Jeffries, House of Representatives, Washington DC.
Dear Speaker Johnson and Minority Leader Jeffries: As president of the Association of Public and Land-grant Universities (APLU), a membership association of more than 230 public research universities and systems in all 50 states, I write to share concerns on the DETERRENT Act, H.R. 1048. Regrettably, APLU must oppose this bill as currently constructed as it would ultimately impede innovation that is essential to U.S. competitiveness and add substantial costs to institutions that drive growth in administrative compliance and bureaucracy rather than support for students and science. APLU strongly believes a better approach to address policymaker concerns is possible and welcomes the opportunity to work together to achieve common goals.
In recent years, the public university community has worked with Congress and the intelligence and law enforcement community to bolster research security to prevent undue foreign influence. Congress has already passed numerous bills that have significantly altered U.S. universities treatment of international partnerships. In fact, since the DETERRENT Act was last considered in 2023, federal agencies have significantly expanded research security efforts including:
the Department of Defense issued a policy for risk-based security reviews of fundamental research to prevent partnerships with entities and countries of concern;
the Department of Energy established a new framework for risk-based decisions and ensure transparency;
the National Science Foundation (NSF) launched a new reporting system for institutions receiving funding, requiring grantees to report all foreign gifts and contracts over $50,000;
NSF launched a risk mitigation process to prevent potential national security risks;
NSF launched a new center to share information and reports on research security;
the National Institutes of Health created a decision matrix to assess the potential for foreign interference; and
the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy launched uniform guidelines about foreign talent programs.
While expansive, this is not even a comprehensive list of new federal actions advancing research security just since 2023.
Rather than enhance transparency and meaningfully contribute to the plethora of actions taken by Congress and the Trump and Biden administrations over the last ten years, the DETERRENT Act will impede important international collaborations and be duplicative of other federal research agencies' efforts to appropriately strengthen research security and foreign partnership reporting requirements. Below, I outline public research universities' most significant concerns with the legislation as currently formulated:
The bill would inappropriately create a new and highly unusual role for the U.S. Department of Education in making determinations about the suitability of international research, education, and cultural partnerships, despite its lack of expertise in scientific research. The Department is ill-equipped to take on such work as it is well outside its responsibility and expertise. Additionally, U.S. universities' partnerships with foreign entities are already regulated by the Departments of Commerce, State, and Treasury, among others.
The bill would require institutions to create new public databases for the disclosure of international gifts to faculty and staff members. This reporting would include the disclosure of non-work related gifts from any country that grantees receive from family, for example, even when there are no connections to their work. Records of such gifts would be required to be in a searchable database maintained by institutions, and for public universities, such reporting would potentially be subject to open records requests that could allow foreign actors to identify leading researchers to target for influence operations.
The bill would create duplicative disclosure requirements for foreign gift disclosures as federal research grant applicants already must disclose all sources of support-- whether foreign or domestic--for the research activities. Additionally, NSF established a new reporting portal in 2024 for all gifts or contracts from countries of concern. NSF's newly-created reporting portal is more user friendly and does not have the technical challenges of the Department of Education's currently outdated reporting system. An alternative approach to the DETERRENT Act could build upon rather than duplicate the NSF system.
The bill contains several provisions that APLU supports including unifying definitions across federal agencies, codifying compliance rules the Department of Education has previously used sub-regulatory guidance to explain, providing clarity on the treatment of tuition payments, and requiring the Department of Education to maintain a single point of contact to respond to inquiries and provide technical assistance to institutions. However, concerns about the role and capacities of the Department of Education, which were already significant, are further exacerbated given recent administration announcements on the future mission and staffing of the Department.
Public research universities remain committed to working with policymakers to appropriately enhance research security. APLU strongly believes this can be done without unnecessarily burdening institutions with additional regulations that are overly broad, misdirected, and would further bureaucracy both of schools and the federal government. We welcome the opportunity to work with lawmakers on better balanced solutions. Sincerely, Mark Becker, President, APLU.
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Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, we received a letter from the Association of American Universities, which says, in part: `` . . . as currently proposed, sections 117a, 117b, 117c, and 117d in the bill are unhelpful to advancing the national and research security interests of the United States. Indeed, the new faculty and staff gift reporting requirement for any and all countries is excessive, will prove counterproductive, and divert important university resources away from more valuable and focused efforts to address legitimate research security risks. Additionally, the bill's contract waiver requirement will prevent U.S. researchers and students from participating in important international scientific collaborations and exchange programs, ultimately harming-- not helping--the U.S. maintain its global leadership position in critical areas of scientific research.''
Mr. Chair, I include this letter in the Record, and I reserve the balance of my time. Association of American Universities, Washington, DC, March 24, 2025. Hon. Mike Johnson, House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Hon. Hakeem Jeffries, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Speaker Johnson and Minority Leader Jeffries: I write on behalf of the Association of American Universities (AAU) representing 69 leading U.S. research universities to urge your opposition to H.R. 1048, the ``Defending Education Transparency and Ending Rogue Regimes Engaging in Nefarious Transactions (DETERRENT)'' Act.
AAU supports some aspects of the bill to improve foreign gift reporting by institutions of higher education as required by Section 117 of the Higher Education Act, including establishing a single (point of contact at the department, exempting reporting for certain tuition payments, aligning some definitions, and establishing annual reporting. However, as currently proposed, section 117a, 117b, 117c, and 117d in the bill are unhelpful to advancing the national and research security interests of the United States. Indeed, the new faculty and staff gift reporting requirement for any and all countries is excessive, will prove counterproductive, and divert important university resources away from more valuable and focused efforts to address legitimate research security risks. Additionally, the bill's contract waiver requirement will prevent U.S. researchers and students from participating in important international scientific collaborations and exchange programs, ultimately harming--not helping--the U.S. maintain its global leadership position in critical areas of scientific research.
We are also concerned: (1) the version of the bill now being considered on the floor contains new language not included in the bill marked up by the House Education and Workforce Committee that raises additional concerns for which the impacts are not yet fully understood; and (2) given recent actions taken by the Trump administration to significantly reduce the staff of and dismantle the U.S. Department of Education, we do not believe it is sensible for Congress to now assign that department with new U.S. national and research security responsibilities. We also endorse separate comments opposing the Act made by the American Council on Education (ACE).
AAU's specific concerns are outlined in greater detail below: (1) Broad usage of waivers will restrict important international research collaborations and exchange programs
Section 117a of the DETERRENT Act requires academic institutions to apply for and obtain a waiver from the Department of Education before entering a contract with a country of concern or a foreign entity of concern. The waiver requirement would slow down and require unprecedented approval by the Department of Education for all contracted academic research collaborations and all student academic exchanges or joint cultural and education programs with countries such as China, including collaborations, exchanges, and programs that have minimal national security concern or connection to critical technologies.
Additionally, we are concerned that the Department of Education lacks the expertise necessary to assess national security risks associated with scientific research and related partnerships. These concerns are further heightened by the recent reductions to the department's workforce which raise questions about the department's ability to ever fully implement this new oversight requirement. With new and ongoing staffing constraints, we would expect waivers to go unanswered--effectively halting all activities requiring departmental approval and preventing any collaborations or academic exchanges from occurring.
A waiver requirement at the Department of Education is also unnecessary when universities are already working to ensure appropriate risk evaluation processes are in place. Since 2018, universities have stepped up their efforts to recognize, address, and mitigate research security concerns. Institutions have developed risk criteria, established risk management committees to review international engagements and collaborations, and have started to utilize the new NSF- funded SECURE Center to collaborate and inform their risk mitigation efforts. At a time of intense global competition for talent and knowledge, it would be unwise for the U.S. to slow down or halt productive research activities and other programs and therefore isolate and disadvantage U.S. faculty and students. (2) Requiring individual faculty and staff gift and contract disclosures from any country is excessive and will not protect or secure scientific research
Section 117b compels institutions of higher education receiving more than $50 million in federal research and development funding or any Title VI funding, to implement a policy requiring all research faculty and staff to individually report any foreign gift valued at over $480 and contracts over $5,000 and post that information to a publicly available and searchable database.
This provision represents extensive overreach by the U.S. government and would be an unprecedented expansion of oversight by the Department of Education under Section 117. Of particular concern, Section 117b provides unlimited scope and no exceptions so gifts from and contracts with all foreign countries would need to be reported, including even friendly and neighboring countries such as Canada, Mexico, and the UK. For research faculty and staff, this would mean that even personal gifts they receive from family members or family inheritance in excess of $480 dollars would need to be reported.
While Section 117b now includes language to protect some private information, it still raises privacy concerns for researchers who may be required to report personal, private financial transactions that could be made public through the Freedom of Information Act or other efforts. As a result of this requirement, university researchers and staff would have to report and university administrators would have to collect, record, and publicly post inconsequential data that does nothing to address legitimate research security risks or foreign influence concerns. Some researchers may ultimately decide participating in federal research programs carries too much burden and familial scrutiny, which will only stand to further weaken the talent pool for U.S. research.
AAU supports ironclad enforcement of university and agency disclosure requirements which Congress provided in Section 223 of the FY21 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Both the previous Trump and Biden administrations have also updated agency disclosure requirements as required by National Security Presidential Memorandum 33 (NSPM-33). Common disclosure forms were finalized at the end of 2023 and federal research agencies have now adopted or are in the process of final adoption of the harmonized common disclosure form, which requests more details on foreign affiliations, relationships, and financial interests from researchers applying for federal research funding. (3) New requirements that duplicate existing requirements will be counterproductive
AAU sees no need for Congress to impose additional excessive and unnecessary disclosure requirements on university faculty and staff included in the DETERRENT Act. Since December 2023, when the Act was last considered on the House floor, Congress and the federal agencies have taken multiple actions to address research security concerns and help mitigate risks. This includes Section 226 and Section 238 of the FY 2025 NDAA which require DOD to conduct periodic examinations of research awards to ensure compliance with current DOD research security policy and prohibits DOD funding to institutions of higher education that conduct fundamental research in collaboration with covered entities on the Section 1286 list. Additionally, the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Defense all have announced or already begun implementing new processes to consider risk factors prior to awarding a grant. If a risk is identified, mitigation measures are added to the conditions of the award. The DETERRENT Act piles on additional requirements that are likely to conflict, duplicate, and create confusion with existing requirements.
In conclusion, AAU opposes the DETERRENT Act, as many of the bill provisions will not effectively address U.S. national and research security concerns. They will instead needlessly divert important university resources away from more effective methods of safeguarding and securing research conducted on behalf of American taxpayers, protecting it from undue foreign influence and other international threats.
We urge the House to vote ``no'' on the legislation unless section 117a, 117b, 117c, and 117d are all removed from the bill. Thank you for your consideration. Sincerely, Barbara R. Snyder, President.
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Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to oppose H.R. 1048 as currently drafted. The bill not only targets our Nation's educational institutions but also undermines the very Department we rely on to enforce these very complex policies.
Mr. Chair, you can't effectively dismantle an agency and then demand more from it. You can't ignore the fact that half of the Department's employees have been fired, and these cuts will make it even more difficult for the Department to carry out these increased responsibilities effectively. The contradiction is clear: How can you demand more reporting and enforcement from an agency that has half of its staff?
Furthermore, the bill does not really address any alleged problem. Present law already requires reporting of gifts large enough to exert any influence, and requiring the reporting of free doughnuts will not do anything to add to national security.
What it will do is add to a feeling of problems with researchers from other countries. The National Academy of Science did a survey of 1,300 Asian-American faculty and found that, although a majority, 89 percent, of these faculty desired to contribute to the United States' advancements in science and technology, many, 72 percent, feel unsafe in conducting research in the United States.
Instead of adding unnecessary burdens and penalties to our educational institutions and adding the feeling of ``unsafe'' and discrimination against minorities, we need to focus on meaningful reforms to protect the integrity of the education system and promote collaboration around the world.
We also need to use the limited resources left to the Department of Education to focus on things like academic achievement and achievement gaps; violence in schools, especially gun violence; access to college; and things like that. We need to safeguard the Department of Education, not destroy it.
Mr. Chair, I ask my colleagues to reject this bill and support the policies that strengthen, rather than dismantle, the systems that serve our students and workforce.
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Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
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Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, parliamentary inquiry.
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Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, what is the amendment that we are considering? Could the Chair give the page and line number?
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Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
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Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, the intent of this amendment, as I understand it, is to ensure that special administrative regions, such as Hong Kong, are listed as a foreign country of concern if they are within a country of concern.
As I have discussed already, we don't need to fuel xenophobia by targeting citizens in foreign countries. This amendment goes further by singling out residents of certain special administrative regions and requires people to know what that means so they will know who they can accept doughnuts from.
This amendment does nothing to thoughtfully protect our national security, and, therefore, I urge my colleagues to vote ``no.''
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Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, as I read the amendment, it says: ``insert the following before the period: `[comma] including any special administrative region within such a covered nation or any other territory that the United States recognizes as being under the control of such a covered nation on or after the date of the enactment of this subsection,' '' as to who is going to be a nation of concern.
Like I said, this is a question of whether or not you have to figure out what that means so you will know whether or not you can accept a doughnut from somebody from whatever that language means they come from. I don't know how that has anything to do with national security.
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Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Chair, just to say that everyone from a foreign country, even a foreign country of concern, is not here for malign purposes. Some are here to do research. The idea that people are here with malign purposes that are going to use coffee and doughnuts to advance that agenda I think is not necessary for our national defense.
Mr. Chair, I hope we defeat the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
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Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
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Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, this amendment would add Chinese military companies to the definition of ``foreign entity of concern.'' It seems to me that if it is a Chinese military company, it would already be considered under the definition of an ``entity of concern'' because they are subject to the jurisdiction or direction of China, which is a foreign country of concern.
I don't know if this adds anything. I think it would be duplicative language. Therefore, I would recommend a ``no'' vote.
Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
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Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, I am pleased to offer the Democrat amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 1048.
As I have mentioned, universities collaborate with various international entities to advance complex research inquiries that contribute to the advancement of our knowledge of many issues. These international partnerships allow for a diverse range of perspectives and resources that help our Nation make significant strides in health, science, and technology.
As I have mentioned before, my Democratic colleagues and I remain committed to ensuring that universities and colleges have the resources to safeguard their work from undue foreign influence. However, I appreciate the majority's interest in addressing this important issue, but I will emphasize, again, that their proposal is far too extreme and would not promote compliance but rather deter universities from conducting collaborative research.
Specifically, with such harsh fines and limited opportunities for universities to receive guidance from the Department of Education, I am concerned that these changes to section 117 of the Higher Education Act would discourage universities from collaborating with international entities, including our strong allies, that are essential in solving important global issues.
At a time when President Trump is already illegally halting vital research across the country through disruptions to USAID and NIH funding, this international collaboration is now more essential than ever.
I am concerned that we still see language that targets individual faculty members for their collaborations with foreign entities, including their own colleagues on campus. This kind of targeting easily leads to hurtful consequences rooted in xenophobia for innocent scholars and students. We have a responsibility to strike a balance between enforcing the law and fostering safe campuses for students, scholars, and faculty.
Unlike the DETERRENT Act, our Democratic substitute takes a thoughtful approach to section 117 compliance to support universities as they evaluate and implement their research integrity and foreign influence policies.
In addition to requiring the filing of annual reports for gifts and contracts from foreign entities, our amendment would create a robust database at the Department of Education to hold these reports. It establishes commonsense sanctions for noncompliance and allows for room to help universities that need support scaling up their compliance efforts rather than punishing them by pursuing civil penalties. It establishes a single point of contact at the Department, who can't be some unverified DOGE staffer, to coordinate section 117 compliance.
The substitute also builds on the robust work done through implementation of the CHIPS and Science Act and the subsequent interagency work of the Biden administration to protect federally funded research and development from foreign influence. Our amendment would align reporting requirements to those of other Federal agencies and require the Secretary of Education to go through negotiated rulemaking to address key implementation aspects of section 117 with relevant higher education and national security stakeholders.
Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues to support the Democratic substitute, rather than the underlying bill, to enhance the ability of our Nation's universities to protect against undue foreign influence while supporting international partnerships that enhance groundbreaking scientific research, build relationships across cultures, and increase our national competitiveness.
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Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, I think the gentleman from Michigan had the right to close, so I yield back the balance of my time.
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Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
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Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, I rise in opposition to the amendment and yield myself such time as I may consume.
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Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I understand the gentleman has yielded back?
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Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, by lowering the reporting threshold to $1, universities would be required to report every single gift from any country if the person is not a citizen of the United States. That would mean every cup of coffee, every doughnut, every ride home would have to be reported. This would create an unworkable increase in reporting requirements for universities and individual faculty members, which would undoubtedly lead to a significant backlog at the Department of Education when trying to review the reports and adhering to tight disclosure guidelines and timetables.
This doesn't have anything to do with national security. I think it is just an administrative nightmare, and therefore I would ask for a ``no'' vote.
Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
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Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
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