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Mr. MAGAZINER. Madam Chair, I thank the ranking member for yielding.
Madam Chair, while the bill before us attempts to address a real and serious issue, I must oppose it in its current form because it is drafted in a way that is unnecessarily broad and would have a chilling effect on research and scholarship at American universities.
Let's be clear: Intellectual property theft by the Chinese Communist Party is a serious problem that costs United States companies billions of dollars and threatens our national security. We should be working together on a bipartisan basis to address this matter as was done in the Homeland Security Committee in the 117th Congress under then- Chairman Thompson's leadership.
However, unlike the bill that passed through the committee last Congress, this bill before us today would essentially prohibit any collaboration between U.S. and Chinese universities even when that collaboration has no national security or commercial significance; for example, creative writing programs, history, anthropology, or researching lifesaving cures for diseases.
I know that is not the intent of this bill and that is why the bill needs more work.
Let me clarify. This bill uses a definition of ``Chinese entity of concern'' that is so broad that it would include any Chinese university or college that has a relationship with the Chinese Government, which is basically all of them.
By definition, ``Chinese entity of concern'' in this bill is defined as virtually any university in China. U.S. universities that collaborate with these Chinese universities, including on cultural exchange programs or engagements on subjects like history or creative writing, not related to national security, not related to U.S. commercial interests, would still be punished under this bill.
My colleagues on the other side might point out that the definition of Chinese entities of concern in this bill is the same as the bipartisan bill in the last Congress, and this is true, but, importantly, the version in the last Congress had a waiver provision to allow the Department of Homeland Security to provide exceptions to allow collaborations between American and Chinese universities that bear no risk to our country's security or commercial interests.
Crucially, the version of the bill we are being presented with today has no waiver provision.
By the way, my colleague, Mr. Pfluger, mentioned that a similar law is in effect for the Department of Defense. That is true, but guess what? That law has a waiver provision. This bill does not.
In effect, any collaboration between American and Chinese universities would be prohibited under this bill with no possibility for exceptions.
For this reason, at the appropriate time, I will offer a motion to recommit this bill back to committee so that it can be refined and improved to strike the right balance between protecting America from CCP surveillance and IP theft without stifling research and learning opportunities for American students that pose no threat.
If the House rules permitted, I would have offered this motion with this important amendment to this bill.
This amendment will include a waiver provision for DHS to waive, on a case-by-case basis, restrictions on institutions of higher education if the Secretary determines that the activities are of a benign nature, while still restricting research and development funding from going to institutions of higher education that have Confucius Institutes or other relationships with the CCP that are at risk of compromising U.S. interests.
We can strike the right balance between protecting America's security and allowing research and innovation at American universities to be competitive with the rest of the world.
Madam Chair, I include in the Record the text of the amendment. Motion to Recommit Offered by Mr. Magaziner of Rhode Island
Mr. Magaziner of Rhode Island moves to recommit the bill H.R. 1516 to the Committee on Homeland Security with instructions to report the same back to the House forthwith, with the following amendment:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``DHS Restrictions on Confucius Institutes and Chinese Entities of Concern Act''. SEC. 2. LIMITATIONS ON CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES' HOST SCHOOLS.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Chinese entity of concern.--The term ``Chinese entity of concern'' means any university or college in the People's Republic of China that--
(A) is involved in the implementation of military-civil fusion;
(B) participates in the Chinese defense industrial base;
(C) is affiliated with the Chinese State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for the National Defense;
(D) receives funding from any organization subordinate to the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party; or
(E) provides support to any security, defense, police, or intelligence organization of the Government of the People's Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party.
(2) Confucius institute.--The term ``Confucius Institute'' means a cultural institute funded by the Government of the People's Republic of China.
(3) Institution of higher education.--The term ``institution of higher education'' has the meaning given such term in section 102 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C.1002)
(4) Relationship.--The term ``relationship'' means, with respect to an institution of higher education, any contract awarded, or agreement entered into, as well as any in-kind donation or gift, received from a Confucius Institute or Chinese entity of concern.
(b) Restrictions on Institutions of Higher Education.-- Beginning with the first fiscal year that begins after the date that is 12 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall ensure that an institution of higher education (referred to in this section as an ``institution'') which has a relationship with a Confucius Institute is ineligible to receive any Science and Technology or Research and Development funds from the Department of Homeland Security, unless the institution terminates the relationship between the institution and such Confucius Institute. Upon the termination of such a relationship, the institution at issue shall be eligible to receive Science and Technology or Research and Development funds from the Department of Homeland Security.
(c) Chinese Entities of Concern Relationship Disclosures.-- Beginning on the date that is 12 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall require each institution which has a relationship with a Chinese entity of concern that is seeking or receives Science and Technology or Research and Development funds from the Department of Homeland Security to notify the Secretary of such relationship. Such notification shall include the following with respect to such relationship:
(1) An identification of the Chinese entity of concern.
(2) Information relating to the length of such relationship.
(3) A description of the nature of such institution's relationship with such Chinese entity of concern, including the monetary value of any contract awarded, or agreement entered into, as well as any in-kind donation or gift, from such Chinese entity of concern.
(d) Assistance.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide outreach and, upon request, technical assistance to institutions relating to compliance with this Act. In carrying out this subsection, the Secretary shall provide particular attention to institutions assisting historically Black colleges and universities (as such term is defined in part B of section 322(2) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (22 U.S.C. 1061 (2)), Hispanic serving institutions (as such term is defined in section 502 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1101a)), Tribal colleges and universities (as such term is defined in section 316(b) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059c(b)), and other minority serving institutions (as such defined in section 371(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(a))).
(e) Waiver.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security may waive, on a case-by-case basis, and for a period of not more than one year, the application of subsection (b) to an institution if the Secretary determines such is in the national security interests of the United States.
(2) Renewal.--The Secretary of Homeland Security may annually renew a waiver issued pursuant to paragraph (1) if the Secretary determines such is in the national security interests of the United States.
(3) Notification.--If the Secretary of Homeland Security issues or renews a waiver pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2), respectively, not later than 30 days after such issuance or renewal, as the case may be, the Secretary shall provide written notification to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate regarding such issuance or renewal, including a justification relating thereto.
(f) Reports.--Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall report to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate regarding implementation of this Act during the immediately preceding 12 month period. Each such report shall include information relating to--
(1) the implementation of subsections (b) and (c), including the information disclosed pursuant to such subsection (c); and
(2) outreach and the provision of technical assistance pursuant to subsection (d).
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Mr. MAGAZINER. Madam Chair, I hope my colleagues will join me in voting for the motion to recommit.
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