Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2025

Floor Speech

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Mr. BEYER. Mr. Chair, as the designee of Mr. Garamendi, I have an amendment at the desk.

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Mr. BEYER. Mr. Chair, I rise today to bring forward this amendment pausing wasteful, unnecessary expenditures on the development of the W87-1 warhead.

We are spending billions, yes, billions with a b, on this modernization program, making this the most expensive program of its type. We have increased funding for this one weapon program for reasons that remain murky and unclear, even as the program remains plagued by planning and operational shortcomings.

For those not familiar, this warhead modification program will require building additional nonnuclear and nuclear assemblies to replace the W78 warhead. In what might be a warning as to the wisdom of this program, it was restarted in FY 2019 following a 4\1/2\ year pause in its development.

When the program was subjected to scrutiny, there were problems. In fact, both priority recommendations from the GAO, the Government Accountability Office, on this program remain open and unaddressed.

In 2020, the GAO found that the NNSA does not require the program to follow best practices and they lack an integrated master schedule sufficient to manage the program.

Mr. Chair, both failures remain true today. This integrated schedule is particularly important when we consider the challenge of building new facilities. The W87-1 is the first weapon since the end of the Cold War that requires new or remanufactured nuclear and nonnuclear components, so understanding what facilities can be built at what time should be the most basic of requirements.

As it stands, the first production unit for this program is not anticipated until 2029 at the earliest. For those who truly want this program to finish on time, taking a pause and reassessing must be our first step; otherwise, we will continue to watch as the program experiences delays, bloat, and cost overruns. A pause in funding will allow us to be conscientious stewards of the taxpayers' money, to evaluate the program and ensure we aren't getting stuck in another sunk-cost fallacy.

I understand the threats to our country. However unfortunate it may be, I know nuclear weapons are and will remain a reality of the world. I also know that we should be leaders for nonproliferation and for reducing the threat that nuclear weapons pose. That is why I, on behalf of Congressman John Garamendi, am proposing rational steps in our policy, which will demonstrate that we prioritize reason and judgment over hyperbole and haste.

We must demonstrate leadership by showing that we have the wisdom to reassess and readjust when we go astray. A pause would provide time for us to evaluate our nuclear policies and how to best support nuclear nonproliferation worldwide.

Mr. Chair, the bottom line is clear. To support our country's bottom line, we should support this amendment and pause funding on W87-1 so that we can conduct necessary and needed assessments before moving forward on this money pit of a weapon.

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Mr. BEYER. Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
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Mr. BEYER. Mr. Chair, I rise today to offer a critical amendment pausing wasteful, unnecessary spending on the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility.

I offer 12 different, brief reasons why I offer this amendment.

The first is that it is unnecessary for deterrence. While we recognize the need to preserve a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent, the current modernization plans are not required to maintain a capable deterrent against a nuclear attack on the United States or its allies for the foreseeable future.

The premise of modernizing the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility is to meet a requirement to produce 80 pits per year, a number not grounded in need. America already has more than 4,000 plutonium pits, and we lack scientific data to determine whether or when they need to be replaced without additional plutonium aging studies.

The estimated cost of the Savannah River facility has skyrocketed from $3.6 billion to nearly $25 billion since the start of the project. It will likely continue to increase as the program is not scheduled to be completed until 2035, and according to an August GAO report, could be delayed even further until 2038.

Continuing to fund this project without addressing its financial inefficiencies diverts crucial resources from other vital defense and domestic programs.

The project faces numerous technical and operational challenges, which have resulted in delays and increased costs. A July 2024 GAO report found, yet again, that the National Nuclear Security Administration lacks a comprehensive schedule or cost estimate that meets GAO best practices and has not identified all the activities or milestones to achieve an 80-pit-per-year production capability, recommendations that have remained opened and unaddressed.

Similar projects in the past faced similar issues, often resulting in cancellation after significant investments. Learning from these precedents, we should reconsider the current project's viability.

The project's history of delays and technical issues suggests a pattern that is unlikely to be resolved without substantial additional costs and time.

Robust oversight and accountability mechanisms are essential for managing such high-stakes projects. Unfortunately, this project has demonstrated a lack of effective oversight. The Under Secretary for Nuclear Security testified that Congress will not be able to meet the 80-pit production by 2030, highlighting the program's mismanagement.

The construction and operation of the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility poses significant environmental and safety risks. These concerns necessitate a thorough reevaluation of the project's potential impact on the environment and public health.

The project's strategic value should be critically assessed in the context of current and future defense needs. Given the evolving geopolitical landscape, alternative approaches to managing the plutonium stockpile may be more effective and less costly.

There are more cost-effective and technologically feasible alternatives to address the Nation's plutonium processing needs. Investing in these alternatives could achieve the same strategic objectives without the extensive costs and risks associated with the Savannah River project.

Halting this project could bolster U.S. leadership in nuclear nonproliferation efforts, demonstrating a commitment to reducing the global nuclear threat.

It provides an opportunity to redirect efforts for its international cooperation and nonproliferation initiatives. A pause in funding allows for a reevaluation of the project's necessity and fiscal prudence, ensuring taxpayer money is spent responsibly. Avoiding a sunk-cost fallacy is essential. Continuing to pour money into a troubled project does not make strategic or economic sense.

Ensuring national security does not necessitate continuing with flawed and costly projects.

In conclusion, Mr. Chair, this amendment pauses nuclear projects to address cost overruns and mismanagement. If we want responsible development and smart spending, we must pause funding and reassess our approach.

Mr. WILSON of South Carolina. Mr. Chair, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

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Mr. BEYER. Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. WILSON of South Carolina. Mr. Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Allen), my neighbor.

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