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Floor Speech
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Mr. MARKEY. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss S. 870. I am a passionately strong supporter of the effort to reauthorize the U.S. Fire Administration, the Assistance to Firefighters Grants Program, and the Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response Grant Program. It is essential.
I voted in favor of all of that legislation to reauthorize these key programs on April 20 of last year, and I remain strongly and staunchly in support of these efforts to support our first responders. Those who run into danger must know that we in Congress have their back. They keep our community safe, and we must keep their resources safe in return.
Unfortunately, the vote today is not just for the lifesaving programs that I am staunchly on record as supporting. On the coattails of this noncontroversial bill to protect our heroes, our colleagues in the House tacked on a dangerous additional 90-page package of provisions that merge the Senate's ADVANCE Act and the House's Atomic Energy Advancement Act.
Well, because of this airdropped provision into the fire bill, I will be opposing final passage of this bill.
So let me go now to what is the ADVANCE Act and why they would try to attach it to something that is absolutely essential. Why would they not just bring it out, try to have a big debate on it? Well, I will tell you why.
The original version of the ADVANCE Act, which I voted against in the committee, was weakened further and watered down further in negotiations with the House. The new language attempts to water down the duties of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; it puts communities on the back burner; and it dilutes existing protocols that keep our Nation safe from the threat of nuclear war. That is what we are talking about today, nuclear war.
It puts promotion over protection and corporate profits over community cleanup. Notably, the provisions from the Senate bill that would have provided a much needed $225 million for communities affected by nuclear closures and $100 million to clean up contaminated Tribal communities are not in the legislation anymore as it came back from the House of Representatives. But the provisions to prop up the nuclear industry, they remain.
I entered office just a year after the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was established in 1975. Why did we create a Nuclear Regulatory Commission? Very simple. Because there was an identification of a need for an independent oversight of nuclear domestic powerplants in the United States and nuclear activity, generally. And there was a decision, looking at the Atomic Energy Commission which existed, to say, That Agency is responsible for regulating nuclear power, but it is also responsible for promoting nuclear power here and around the world. And that was a fundamental conflict of interest. You promote something by minimizing the problems or ignoring the problems, and that was becoming a big problem--that they weren't dealing with the very real issues of safety that had been raised about nuclear power in our country.
This was before Three Mile Island. It was before Chernobyl. But it was anticipating the safety issues that were going to be growing and growing and growing.
So the NRC's current mission, before this bill passes, reflects this critical responsibility to the American public: regulation and licensing free from the influence of industry and that puts health and safety above all else.
So we have a separate Agency. It is called the Department of Commerce. They can go and promote anything they want. They can try to sell whatever they want, domestically or internationally. But the Agency in charge of safety is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. They have got to make sure that anything that the Department of Commerce is pushing doesn't wind up being a danger.
So we create this dynamic tension inside of the government. Ultimately, that goal of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that puts health and safety above all else is what protects us against nuclear accidents here or overseas, wherever we are selling nuclear powerplants.
The ADVANCE ACT, as attached to the Fire Grants and Safety Act-- completely unrelated subject; one deals with the resources we are giving to firefighters, the resources we are giving to local fire departments in order to fight fires as they pop up in our local communities. That is something we all support. But what they did was they added to that bill language that would require--underline that-- require the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to rewrite its mission, to state that its regulation and oversight should--and this is a quote-- ``not unnecessarily limit'' civilian nuclear activity regardless of whether it is beneficial or detrimental to public safety and national security.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission shouldn't be the ``Nuclear Retail Commission.'' The Commission's duty is to regulate, not to facilitate. Their job is to ask all of the safety questions; to make sure the design is OK; to make sure that the waste is being stored properly; to make sure that an accident can't happen; to make sure that climate change, as the tides rise, doesn't swamp a nuclear powerplant near a river, near the ocean. That is their job; it is to protect all of the people who live in communities.
We have got other Agencies that are funded, able, and willing to fulfill the role of promoting nuclear power. But this legislation does nothing to assure communities at the frontline of nuclear infrastructure that nuclear expansion won't come at their expense in local communities. It compels the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to identify how it can improve efficiency in its oversight and inspection programs without asking it how it can also improve safety or public engagement so that the public can go in and ask questions about this nuclear powerplant in their neighborhood, force the CEO of the company to answer questions about concerns that people who live near a nuclear powerplant might have. It provides no redress for families living near abandoned uranium mines and unsafe nuclear waste sites.
At the very least, a rapid expansion of nuclear activity should be accompanied by rapid expansion of the resources and regulators that help protect community health and safety. If we do it, we should do it all together, one big package.
This new language also fails to ensure continued American leadership on nuclear nonproliferation overseas. It fails to do anything to strengthen our current regime, and export licenses for nuclear materials and technology could be issued to countries that do not meet our own standards for nuclear safety and cooperation. The only requirement--that is what this law now says--it will only require a notification to Congress after that nuclear license is issued in another country and exempting even this after-the-fact notification for exports of up to 20 percent enriched uranium.
And you are right. Whenever you hear the words ``uranium'' or ``plutonium,'' your ears should perk up.
Because in many countries they see a nuclear powerplant as a generator of electricity that has this side effect of uranium and plutonium, but in the eyes of some countries--and we saw that in Iran, in Iraq, in North Korea--as they got nuclear powerplants, they saw it as a place where they can get uranium and plutonium that has this wonderful byproduct of electricity that it also generates.
So we should be concerned because we have already been forewarned by our experiences over the last 20 or 30 years. We can see what happens if there isn't a proper recognition of how all of this material can, in fact, be diverted.
We shouldn't get a heads-up about the fact that Saudi Arabia now has American nuclear material. That shouldn't happen after the fact; that should happen before the fact. We should know that this is going to happen.
The bill also pushes the Secretary of Energy to identify generally authorized countries for exports beyond those with existing 123 agreements.
So what are 123 agreements in the Atomic Energy Act? Well, 123 agreements lay the foundation for the responsible exchange of nuclear materials and technology with countries that share common guardrails for nuclear safety--that is the diversion of uranium or plutonium and other nuclear materials in a way that ultimately could wind up in a bomb-making program somewhere in the world. We should not be looking for ways to work around or weaken our export standards even further.
Throughout my career, I have seen nuclear safety and nonproliferation undermined in the interest of the short-term geopolitical concerns of a particular administration or industry at the expense of the longer term nuclear nonproliferation goals, which we say are our highest foreign policy objectives.
They get compromised in the short term because one administration or another just wants to use nuclear powerplants as a way of ingratiating the United States into the good favor of a particular country--it could be Saudi Arabia soon; it could be another country right after that--but without all the safeguards that should be there in order to protect against diversion of these materials.
So the United States is supposed to be the leader in the global arena, and as a nation with nuclear capabilities, we have a duty to set the strongest possible standards for domestic and international nuclear activities as an example to the rest of the world. We also have to clean up our existing messes--particularly in Tribal and environmental justice communities--before investing in anything that might make those messes worse.
As a result, despite my strong and continued support for the fire safety grants and my respect for my colleagues working on this issue, I must vote no.
In 1982, I wrote a book about nuclear proliferation and about domestic nuclear powerplants. The book was entitled ``Nuclear Peril: The Politics of Proliferation,'' and it is what happens when there is a shortchanging of the safety, the security measures which should be put in place. It also dealt with the issues domestically of a reduction in the generalized supervision of nuclear powerplants in terms of having the highest possible safety standards.
There are many in this institution who want to see a vast expansion of nuclear power using plutonium and uranium in the United States. They also support a vast expansion of nuclear powerplants around the world using uranium and plutonium. I appreciate the fact that they want to do that, and many want to see that happen in the name of climate change because it reduces greenhouse gases, but it has its own problems. It brings its own problems.
We still don't have a solution to where we are going to bury all the nuclear waste in the United States. The Yucca Mountain facility in Nevada still hasn't been completed, and in my opinion, it will never be complete. We are now up to 35 years working on it.
Similarly, overseas, if we get into a race with other countries-- Russia, China--in the export of nuclear power, we should not lower the standards; we should ensure that we are in as the responsible provider of nuclear power around the world so that we reduce dramatically the threat of proliferation.
So my book in 1982 is directly relevant to this subject right here, because whether it be North Korea that converted a civilian nuclear powerplant over to a bomb-making factory, whether it be in Iraq with Saddam Hussein, whether it be in Iran--you name it--the story is the same.
So we have to be very responsible and ensure we have the highest standards, and that is my goal in coming out here. I am going to vote no because I think if we are going to be encouraging a brandnew era of nuclear power here domestically and internationally, we should have that discussion. It shouldn't be attached to the fire safety bill to make sure that firefighters can put out the fire in the house that is next door to us. We all agree on that. On this issue, however--the issue of nuclear nonproliferation and the domestic safety of powerplants in our country--that is a different subject.
But, honestly, my great friend Chairman Carper, who is just such an incredible leader on clean energy, the chairman of the committee that produced the most important climate bill in 2022 in a generation, he is my friend, and I thank him for engaging in a colloquy with me to clarify in detail the legislative intent of some of these provisions. I look forward to continuing to work on efforts to protect communities, clean up toxic waste, and create a consent-based pathway to nuclear waste storage in our country.
The decision to put all of the nuclear waste in our country in Yucca Mountain was a political decision. I was in the room when it was made. The National Academy of Sciences said that the Yucca Mountain facility was at the bottom of the places in our country. It is near a river. It is near an earthquake fault. No wonder we haven't finished it. The safety questions were never answered at the beginning. And that is all I ask. If we are going to move into a new era of nuclear power here and around the world, let's ask the questions upfront. Let's make sure we put the safeguards in place. Let's make sure we avoid having to look back and say: How in the world did we ever allow something like that to ever occur again?
I thank you for the opportunity to be out here.
First is the provision regarding the mission statement of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, referenced in section 501. The current mission statement of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission--the independent regulatory Agency responsible for the safe use of nuclear energy and nuclear materials--is based upon Congress' action in the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. That landmark legislation recognized and addressed the need to separate nuclear regulatory and safety functions. In doing so, Congress strongly declared that this separation was in the public interest. Since then, the Commission has adopted Principles of Good Regulation and organizational values that underscore its responsibility towards evidence-based, independent regulation and licensing activities.
Today, I rise to discuss the implications of the language in the ADVANCE Act regarding the mission statement of the NRC. This language, which did not move through the Senate and was not debated in the Committee on Environment and Public Works, would require the NRC to ``update the mission statement of the Commission to include that licensing and regulation of the civilian use of radioactive materials and nuclear energy be conducted in a manner that is efficient and does not unnecessarily limit the civilian use of radioactive materials and deployment of nuclear energy, or the benefits of civilian use of radioactive materials and nuclear energy technology to society.''
As the chair of the Environment and Public Works Subcommittee on Nuclear Safety, I see NRC's safety mission as the primary responsibility of the Agency--not the protection of its relationship to the nuclear industry.
Chairman Carper, can you confirm that it is not the intent, nor the direction, of the new section 501 to in any way change the Agency's safety focus?
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Mr. MARKEY. I thank you, Chairman Carper, for your unequivocal statement that, under this bill, the NRC will still be required to implement a safety-first mission.
I would also like to note my concern over language directing that regulatory activities ``not unnecessarily limit'' civilian nuclear activity. We do not need to enable any new lines of argument for industry to protest necessary safety updates required by the NRC that may require additional investments for licensees to implement and thus ``unnecessarily limit'' their activity.
Chairman Carper, can you confirm that this language should not be interpreted to suggest that the NRC should adopt a new, cost-benefit approach to decisions affecting public safety?
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Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Chairman Carper. I will continue to hold the Commission accountable to its primary safety responsibilities as outlined in the Energy Reorganization Act.
Chairman Carper, section 103 under division B of the Fire Grants and Safety Act requires the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to notify the appropriate committees of Congress if an export license is issued for a covered country, defined as a country that has not ratified an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency or has not acceded to the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
Chairman Carper, am I correct in my understanding that these notifications occur after an export license is already issued?
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Mr. MARKEY. Chairman Carper, is the intent of requiring congressional notification to facilitate a better understanding of the extent and nature of export licensing activity?
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Mr. MARKEY. Chairman Carper, how will a congressional notification requirement work to address proliferation concerns, if there is no explicit direction for the Commission to deny a license for nations that do not have the strongest possible nonproliferation standards?
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Mr. MARKEY. I commend Chairman Carper for his efforts to maintain adequate guardrails against proliferation during negotiations with our House colleagues. But we must not export nuclear material and technology to countries that do not meet the same safety standards to which we hold ourselves, and we cannot afford to compromise decades of nonproliferation efforts to advance short-term geopolitical interests.
In addition to my concerns over the export license provision, I would like to raise my concerns over section 105 under division B of the Fire Grants and Safety Act. This section directs the Secretaries of Energy and State to assess factors beyond 123 agreements to determine a country's Generally Authorized Destination status under part 810 of title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, which facilitates the export and transfer of certain nuclear material and technology as ``general activities.'' 123 agreements refer to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, which sets out specific requirements for the United States to engage in significant civilian nuclear cooperation with another country. 123 agreements are critical to the nonproliferation apparatus. These agreements require congressional approval, include a list of nine safety criteria, and set out clear procedures governing cooperation under the agreement.
This provision provides no definition or guidance on what ``other factors'' qualify as adequate criteria for Generally Authorized Destination status.
Chairman Carper, is it the intent of this provision to allow the Secretaries of Energy and State to grant Generally Authorized Destination status to countries that do not meet our own standards for nuclear safety and proliferation?
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Mr. MARKEY. I thank the Senator from Delaware for his comments on these issues and his leadership.
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