No Technology for Terror Act

Floor Speech

Date: April 16, 2024
Location: Washington, DC

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Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 6603) to apply foreign-direct product rules to Iran, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows: H.R. 6603

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``No Technology for Terror Act''. SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF FOREIGN-DIRECT PRODUCT RULES TO IRAN.

(a) In General.--Beginning on the date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, a foreign- produced item shall be subject to the Export Administration Regulations (pursuant to the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.)) if the item--

(1) meets--

(A) the product scope requirements described in subsection (b); and

(B) the destination scope requirements described in subsection (c); and

(2) is exported, reexported, or in-country transferred to Iran from abroad or involves the Government of Iran.

(b) Product Scope Requirements.--A foreign-produced item meets the product scope requirements of this subsection if the item--

(1) is a direct product of United States-origin technology or software subject to the Export Administration Regulations that is specified in a covered Export Control Classification Number or is identified in supplement no. 7 to part 746 of the Export Administration Regulations; or

(2) is produced by any plant or major component of a plant that is located outside the United States, if the plant or major component of a plant, whether made in the United States or a foreign country, itself is a direct product of United States-origin technology or software subject to the Export Administration Regulations that is specified in a covered Export Control Classification Number.

(c) Destination Scope Requirements.--A foreign-produced item meets the destination scope requirements of this subsection if there is knowledge that the foreign-produced item is destined to Iran or will be incorporated into or used in the production or development of any part, component, or equipment subject to the Export Administration Regulations and produced in or destined to Iran.

(d) License Requirements.--

(1) In general.--A license shall be required to export, reexport, or in-country transfer a foreign-produced item from abroad that meets the product scope requirements described in subsection (b) and the destination scope requirements described in subsection (c) and is subject to the Export Administration Regulations pursuant to this section.

(2) Exceptions.--The license requirements of paragraph (1) shall not apply to--

(A) food, medicine, or medical devices that are--

(i) designated as EAR99; or

(ii) not designated under or listed on the Commerce Control List; or

(B) services, software, or hardware (other than services, software, or hardware for end-users owned or controlled by the Government of Iran) that are--

(i) necessarily and ordinarily incident to communications; or

(ii) designated as--

(I) EAR99; or

(II) Export Control Classification Number 5A992.c or 5D992.c, and classified in accordance with section 740.17 of title 15 Code of Federal Regulations; and

(iii) subject to a general license issued by the Department of Commerce or Department of Treasury.

(e) National Interest Waiver.--The Secretary of Commerce may waive the requirements imposed under this section if the Secretary--

(1) determines that the waiver is in the national interests of the United States; and

(2) submits to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate a report explaining which requirements are being waived and the reasons for the waiver.

(f) Sunset.--The authority provided under this section shall terminate on the date that is 7 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(g) Definitions.--In this section--

(1) the term ``Commerce Control List'' means the list maintained pursuant to part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations;

(2) the term ``covered Export Control Classification Number'' means an Export Control Classification Number in product group D or E of Category 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 of the Commerce Control List;

(3) the terms ``Export Administration Regulations'', ``export'', ``reexport'', and ``in-country transfer'' have the meanings given those terms in section 1742 of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801); and

(4) the terms ``direct product'', ``technology'', ``software'', ``major component'', ``knowledge'', ``production'', ``development'', ``part'', ``component'', ``equipment'', and ``government end users'' have the meanings given those terms in section 734.9 or part 772 of the Export Administration Regulations, as the case may be.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of my bill, H.R. 6603, the No Technology for Terror Act, and thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr. McCaul) and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Moskowitz) for their support in co-leading this important bipartisan legislation.

This bill would codify recently expanded export control sanctions on Iran, restricting their ability to manufacture missiles and drones using U.S. material and technology.

This weekend, Iran unleashed an unprecedented direct attack on Israel, launching over 350 missiles and drones. Thankfully, 99 percent of these were intercepted by Israel, the United States, and other partners. Were it not for our incredible, capable militaries, this could have been an absolute catastrophe.

Iran has the largest missile arsenal in the Middle East, and it is increasingly supplying malign actors around the world with missiles and drones as a merchant of death. Iran's weapons are spreading death and destruction around the world.

The Iran-backed Houthis use drones to fuel their attacks on global ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Iran's proxies in Iraq and Syria have launched over 170 attacks on U.S. troops in the last 6 months. Iran-backed Hezbollah is aggressively firing on Israel's northern border.

Russia uses these weapons to target civilians and civilian infrastructure in its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. In fact, reports have found that components recovered in the Iranian-made drones used against the people of Ukraine have included more than 50 American-made components.

Other reports have found that out of roughly 500 components identified in a recovered Iranian drone, 82 percent were manufactured by United States companies.

These reports are backed by a June 2023 report released by the State Department where they acknowledged that Iran relies on foreign procurement and that Iran even prefers American-made sourcing to manufacture its lethal weapons. This is unacceptable.

Urgent action is needed to combat Iran's longstanding missile and drone proliferation. That includes doing more to prevent them from accessing and benefiting from U.S. parts and technology.

In addition to robust sanctions enforcement to cut off its key sources of financial and military support to proxies like Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Hamas, we must make full use of our export controls to limit the export or re-export of U.S. goods and technology to Iran.

The No Technology for Terror Act will do just that. The limitations set forth in my bill would make it harder for Iran to produce missiles and drones that are used against American troops and our allies and will make it more difficult to transfer these weapons to Russia and other proxies.

American equipment, technology, and other know-how under no circumstance should be transferred to Iran. The Iranian regime is relentlessly evil and seeks to become the superpower in the Middle East, which means eliminating America and its allies at all costs.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all my colleagues to support this bill as it extends the foreign-direct product rule to Iran, which restricts the re-export or transfer of U.S.-originated items from one foreign country to Iran.

Iran and its terrorist proxies continue to sow instability on a global scale. We must take urgent action to restrict Iran's access to technology that it uses to manufacture lethal missiles and drones.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this measure, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, first, I thank the ranking member for his support and his work on this bill as well.

Mr. Speaker, we must continue to work together to do all that we can to address Iran's ongoing proliferation of lethal drones and missiles. From Israel to Ukraine, we see the devastating impacts of failing to do so.

In order to safeguard our national security and innocent civilians around the world, we need to make sure that U.S.-origin goods are not helping Iran manufacture deadly weapons. That is what this bill, the No Technology for Terror Act, does.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this bill, H.R. 6603, the No Technology for Terror Act, to stop supplying goods to Iran that are used against us.

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Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

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