Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act

Floor Speech

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Mr. BIGGS. Mr. Chairman, to hear the administration tell it, having to get a warrant is the end of the world.

Well, guess what? In literally any other context in which law enforcement or intelligence agencies want to read an American's communications, they have to get a warrant. That has been the rule for over 200 years, and for 46 years the government has had to get a FISA title I order to read Americans' communications in a foreign intelligence investigation.

These are investigations in which Americans are suspected of terrorism, espionage, cybercrimes--you name it.

Somehow, a warrant or title I requirement is completely consistent with national security in those high-stakes cases, yet the administration and those who are opposed to this amendment allege it will plunge us into a dystopian nightmare if we apply this same basic longstanding protection to section 702 queries where the American often isn't even suspected of any wrongdoing at the time of the query.

I don't buy it, and neither should you.

Over a decade ago, as my friend Mr. Nadler said just a moment ago, a group of intelligence experts unanimously recommended requiring a warrant for U.S. person queries of section 702 data.

That group included Michael Morell, former Acting Director of the CIA, and Richard A. Clarke, former Chief Counterterrorism Adviser to President George W. Bush--bipartisan--recommended the same thing that we have today.

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Mr. BIGGS. Mr. Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler), the cosponsor of this amendment.

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Mr. BIGGS. Mr. Chairman, so let's just consider that the Second Circuit has said that a Fourth Amendment warrant is appropriate, and they haven't finished concluding it. I don't know why Mr. Himes is going to just keep riding off on that, but the Second Circuit is still considering that.

Let's take a look at something else. The U.S. person queries designed to search for communications between Americans and foreigners who happen to be U.S. person targets. That is what we are hearing.

So Mr. Turner says the law already requires a warrant to surveil an American. When he says ``surveil'' what he is talking about is collecting all of an American's communications. In that case, under title I a warrant is required.

A U.S. person query is an attempt to access some of an American's communications, namely, those that are incidentally collected under section 702 and to do so without a warrant. They can do it right now without a warrant.

That is the distinction that we are getting at.

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Mr. BIGGS. Mr. Chair, may I inquire how much time I have remaining.

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Mr. BIGGS. Mr. Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Jordan), the chairman of the Judiciary Committee.

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Mr. BIGGS. Mr. Chair, I want to just dovetail on that because my friend from the Intelligence Committee keeps talking about us not being able to look at Hamas or any of these nefarious actors. That is simply inaccurate.

The administration cites multiple examples where using section 702 to monitor foreign targets has provided critical intelligence, but when it comes to warrantless searches for Americans, they can't provide any examples of where they have provided any useful information. Yet, they want to continue to look at U.S. persons' information without a warrant.

Mr. Chair, I urge support of my amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

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Mr. BIGGS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chair, like all the amendments offered by HPSCI, this amendment drastically expands the scope of FISA. This amendment will actually change the definition of ``electronic communication service provider'' to require a whole new class of businesses and other entities to assist in FISA section 702 surveillance.

When the amendment first came out 1\1/2\ months ago, it caused a massive commotion, as can be imagined. One of the FISA amici did something highly unusual. He went public with a warning. He confirmed that the amendment originally was exactly as broad as it looked, in that it could force hotels, libraries, and coffee shops to serve as surrogate spies because, of course, customers in those establishments might well be engaging in international communications, which would transit over the WiFi equipment in those locations. That was the original.

Therefore, the amendment sponsors threw in an exemption for hotels, libraries, coffee shops and a handful of other establishments, but that hardly solves the problem because the vast majority of U.S. businesses are not exempted. Hence, the amendment would still apply to grocery stores, department stores, hardware stores, barber shops, laundromats, fitness centers, nail salons.

Perhaps most worrisome of all, it would apply to business landlords who rent out office space and provide WiFi for their building. That would include the offices that many of us in this room go to when we are back in our districts, as well as the offices of tens of millions of Americans across the country, offices for lawyers, journalists, nonprofits, and others.

That is how expansive this amendment is. That is why we should defeat this amendment.

Mr. Chair, I have enjoyed all the attention the Biggs-Jayapal-Jordan- Nadler-Davidson-Lofgren amendment has received. It has been flattering that, on every other amendment and the underlying bill, we don't talk about any of that other stuff, and we talk about the warrants.

That gets to the reality of the situation. The intelligence community wants control. They want to continue to have control without any checks.

The Biggs amendment does not require a warrant for the government to surveil foreigners in foreign countries or to incidentally collect the communication of Americans under section 702.

Let me repeat that. The amendment does not require a warrant for the government to surveil foreigners in foreign countries, nor does it require a warrant for incidentally collecting the communications of Americans under section 702. It just doesn't, but that is what was heard.

Instead, it requires that the Federal Government and the spying and surveillance apparatus get a warrant if they want to read an American's communications or query them in the 702 database. That is what the essence of this is.

They don't want to have to get a warrant. They are okay with getting a warrant under title I of FISA, but not under 702 for some reason. It is very odd.

Additionally, not only do they not want to get a warrant, but they want to expand the database and the scope of the Americans that they can scoop up in that database to include, in this particular amendment, virtually every retail outlet in the country, virtually every commercial enterprise in the country, virtually every commercial property in this country, but we don't want to have a warrant if we are going to look into U.S. persons' information. We don't want to do that. After all, that might cause them to actually develop information and investigate further.

Let me tell you something. This underlying bill loses its quality if the Biggs amendment on the warrant amendment doesn't pass.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

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