Afghanistan

Floor Speech

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Mr. HAWLEY. Mr. President, following my submission yesterday, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the next part of an investigation directed by the U.S. Central Command concerning the Abbey Gate bombing in Afghanistan in August 2021.

Forces Conducting NEO at Hamid Karzai International Airport on 26 August 2021

(e) Abbey Gate was structured from North to South, with the inner Abbey Gate at the north end opening to the actual airfield. There was a 265-meter corridor between the inner gate and the outer gate, to the south, known as the inner corridor. This area served as a sally port for searching and processing vehicles. Two lanes divided by jersey barriers were beyond the outer gate. The egress lane from the Barron Hotel, which joined the gate road from the southeast, was approximately 120 meters south of the outer gate. The Chevron obstacle was approximately 155 meters south of the outer gate. The area between the outer gate and the Chevron was known as the outer corridor. A sewage canal ran generally east to west parallel to the inner and outer corridors, on the east side of the perimeter wall and fence. During operations of Abbey Gate, 2/1 established a holding area in the outer corridor lanes, a search and DoS processing location in the inner corridor, and security/crowd control positions at the canal and Chevron. Additionally, the sniper section established an overwatch position in the tower at the outer gate. Marines escorted evacuees through a break in the canal fence or around the Chevron, and ushered them into the outer corridor holding area for an initial search. Outside the Chevron, the Taliban conducted crowd control and initial screening. U.K. Forces processed their evacuees at the Barron Hotel and drove them through the outer corridor lanes, through the Abbey Gate, to the airfield (see all exhibits from 2/1 Marines, Echo Company, Golf Company, and enclosure 11- 13). Companies rotated responsibility for gate operations, with Golf Company initially taking the canal security positions, Fox Company taking the Chevron area, and dividing the inner gate search and escort duties (exhibits 53, 76, 77, 79, 81, 89). Echo Company rotated into gate operations later in the NEO to enable a rest cycle for all companies (exhibits 53, 56, 76).

(f) Between 20 and 25 August, gate operations took on a structured and predictable battle rhythm. Crowds were desperate but manageable, able to be kept calm at Abbey Gate because Marines interacted with the people continuously and used the PSYOP capability to communicate (exhibits 57, 79, 80, 83, 85, 88). Early in the NEO, crowds at Abbey Gate numbered around 1500 between the canal and the Chevron entrance, and another 500-1000 in the outer gate holding area. There was a concern throughout 2/1 that the crowds could riot and force the gate open at any time {exhibits 57, 83). The JTF-CR J2 described the crowd as the greatest threat to mission, because at any time they could have forced their way past Marines and onto the airfield, stopping air operations, and ultimately the evacuation (exhibit 15). Several factors undermined the Marines' and U.K. Forces' efforts to keep the crowds calm.

(i) The Taliban used excessive force outside the Chevron, which created the incentive for civilians to avoid the main road entrance and move to Abbey Gate via the canal (exhibits 53, 77, 79, 80). Over time, the canal became extremely crowded and people were being crushed and injured (exhibits 53, 77, 79, 80, 214, 220).

(ii) DoS Consular officers provided inconsistent support at Abbey Gate, and the required documentation for evacuation changed hourly (exhibits 53, 77, 79, 80, 81, 83, 85, 88). Marines often had to halt gate processing and flow, because the Consular officers were not present to screen and approve evacuees for movement to the PAX Terminal (exhibits 53, 77, 79, 80, 81, 83, 85, 88). It is possible Consular officers were absent from the gate because of threat reporting and to better meter the flow of evacuees and not overcrowd the airfield (exhibit 146). However, the crowd would eventually notice the halt in processing and become highly agitated (exhibits 53, 77, 79, 80, 81, 83, 85, 88).

(iii) Partner nation representatives/forces consistently conducted uncoordinated evacuee extractions at Abbey Gate. Partner nation forces frequently left potential evacuees unsecured within 2/1 Marines' perimeter, or relied upon Marines to escort their rejected evacuees back to the canal (exhibits 53, 77, 83, 88). Partner nation representatives/ forces often pulled out large groups of people, usually families (exhibits 53, 77, 83, 88). The crowd would see the disparate treatment of select personnel and become agitated (exhibits 53, 77, 83, 88).

(g) Threat reporting during the NEO was continuous and generally non-specific. The USFOR-A FWD and JTF-CR staffs estimated the threat streams to be credible reports during the 10-day NEO (exhibits 13, 15, 18, 21). The threats varied from VBIED attacks and Suicide Vest Improvised Explosive Devices (SVIEDs) against gates, to bags in the crowds or aircraft hijackings with evacuees concealing bombs and weapons on flights (exhibits 13, 15, 18, 21, 102, 115). 2/1 Marines believed their only means to counter these threats, without degrading the mission, was to increase overwatch and actively search for civilians meeting the descriptions provided (exhibits 15, 53, 56, 57, 77, 80). 2/1 Marines attempted to balance the need to continue to interact with the crowd to pull potential evacuees into the outer gate and increase force protection (exhibits 53, 56, 77). On several occasions, both prior to and throughout 26 August, 2/1 Marines providing security along the canal pulled back from the crowd, took a knee behind jersey barriers, and stopped the flow of processing based on reports indicating specific times of attack (exhibits 53, 77, 89).

(h) By 25 August, Abbey Gate was the Main Effort for Gate Operations at HKIA. The terrain and infrastructure at East and North Gates, coupled with threats to force and large, unruly crowds, made these gates untenable for evacuation operations (exhibits 15, 18, 100, 102, 104). Both gates were effectively closed between 20-25 August (exhibits 15, 18, 100, 102, 104). The West and South Gates were still operational, but both were used for coordinated arrivals and openings (exhibits 125, 126). The decreased access to evacuation processing points at HKIA forced DoS and partner nations to direct most small groups and individual evacuees to Abbey Gate (exhibit 15, 125, 126, 127, 146). The canal at Abbey Gate facilitated crowd control and provided some standoff, and the Chevron minimized the VBIED threat (exhibits 53, 56, 76, 77, 83, 84). There were effective overwatch positions, and the Taliban screened the main approach (exhibits 53, 56, 76, 77, 83, 84). Over time, crowds bypassed Taliban checkpoints to get to the canal and seek access to HKIA (exhibits 77-88).

(i) On 25 August, the crowd in the canal outside Abbey Gate was noticeably larger than the days prior, numbering around 2000-3000 (exhibits 53, 55, 77, 80). In addition to the Taliban activity at the Chevron, Marines attributed this swell in civilians at the canal to the closure of many of the other gates at HKIA and the impending withdrawal date of 31 August (exhibits 53, 55, 77, 80). The 2 PARA Commander observed the efficiency and accessibility of Abbey Gate had become publicly known, drawing more people (exhibit 127). The crowd was also noticeably more desperate (exhibits 53, 55, 77, 80). Echo Company operated the gate during the day on 25 August, and conducted a RIP at 1600 with Golf Company (exhibits 56, 77). During Echo Company's time on the gate, they pushed the crowd back from the sniper tower and jersey barriers on the nearside of the canal to create standoff (exhibit 56). With the assistance of U.K. Forces, Echo Company pushed the crowds 150-meters down the nearside of the canal, and Marines maintained control of the terrain between the jersey barriers and newly established perimeter (exhibits 56, 59, 60, 61). After conducting his RIP, (TEXT REDACTED) Golf Company (TEXT REDACTED) was concerned the Marines and U.K. Forces were overextended based on recent threat reporting, and decided to collapse the position back to the base of the sniper tower at the outer gate (exhibit 77).

(j) During the evening of 25 August and into the morning of 26 August, the crowds in the canal continued to grow and became increasingly desperate (exhibits 53, 77, 80, 89). Threat reporting on 25 and 26 August indicated Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan (ISIS-K) would execute an attack at a gate using a SVIED (exhibits 13, 15, 76, 77). Nearly every Marine interviewed in 2/1 was aware of the reported threat, but did not find the information to be out of the ordinary compared to other earlier threats (exhibits 57, 59, 60, 61, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 86, 89). Many noted the information was more specific, but changed regularly (different bags and descriptions of the bomber) (exhibit 88). At approximately 2330 on 25 August, after collapsing the nearside canal security down to the sniper tower, (TEXT REDACTED) had all Marines take a knee and reduce their posture behind the canal wall and jersey barriers. This lasted until daylight on 26 August (exhibits 77, 88). (TEXT REDACTED) had the unit take the same force posture at approximately 1400 for 30 minutes, based on additional threat reporting (exhibits 77, 88, 89). After the brief stand-down, 2/1 Marines continued to process evacuees, having what some considered to be their most productive day on 26 August (exhibit 80).

(k) Throughout the evening of 25 August, into the morning of 26 August, units prepared for the planned closure of Abbey Gate to enable the JTE of Marine forces (exhibits 15, 18, 53, 56, 57, 76, 77). The U.K. Forces were unable to meet the planned closure time of 1800 on 25 August, and subsequently were unable to meet the new time of 0700 on 26 August (exhibits 15, 18, 53, 56, 76, 77). During the afternoon of 25 August, the U.K. PARA units operating from the Barron Hotel had near1y 1000 evacuees to process (exhibit 127). The 2 PARA Commander on the ground received two timelines for completion of evacuation operations, with the initial completion date of 25 August and the adjusted timeline of period of darkness 27 August (exhibit 127). The U.K. met this second completion time (exhibits 124, 127). A higher authority within the U.K. Forces, not present at HKIA, was responsible for the change in the timeline, not the 2 PARA Commander (exhibit 127).

(l) On 26 August, at approximately 1600, Golf Company rotated the platoons on the line an hour early due to 4th Platoon growing fatigued, and 1st Platoon took over canal security (exhibits 77, 89). Most of Golf Company worked the outer gate because the crowds were growing desperate (exhibit 77). People were being crushed and injured at the jersey barriers at the base of the sniper tower (exhibits 77, 83, 88, 89). Echo Company was working the inner gate, as of 1200-1300, to provide additional manpower at the gate area and prepare for the closing of Abbey Gate that night (exhibits 56, 77). (TEXT REDACTED) was concerned with the threat reporting and ordered all 1stSgts and Corpsmen to remain in the inner corridor area for force protection (exhibit 77). However, some corpsmen were called forward because of heat and trauma injuries suffered by civilians in the crowd (exhibits 77, 92). At approximately 1600, (TEXT REDACTED) attended a meeting with (TEXT REDACTED) 2/ 501 PIR (TEXT REDACTED) the 2 PARA (TEXT REDACTED) and the Taliban to discuss U.K. passage of lines from Barron Hotel, handover of security of the outer gate to the Taliban, and responsibility of the inner gate transitioning to 2/501 PIR (exhibits 53, 77). At approximately 1700, BGen Sullivan visited Abbey Gate and discussed the closure timeline with (TEXT REDACTED) exhibits 15, 17, 18, 53, 77). BGen Sullivan departed at approximately 1715 (exhibits 15, 17, 18). At approximately 1725, (TEXT REDACTED) 24th MEU (TEXT REDACTED) convinced an Afghan civilian to speak to the crowd through a non- standard loud speaker for 10 minutes (exhibit 105). The messaging pleaded with the crowed to stop pushing, and stated that women and children were being crushed to death (exhibit 105). Three snipers from the 2/1 Marines Sniper section, attached to Echo Company, but in direct support of units at Abbey Gate, were in the tower at the outer gate (exhibit 62). The snipers in the tower were (TEXT REDACTED) was at the base of the tower near the fence (exhibits 62, 63). They were well aware of the reported threats and scanned the large and unruly crowd in the canal for individuals ``out of baseline'' or demonstrating hostile intent (exhibit 62).

(m) At approximately 1730 on 26 August, the crowds at Abbey Gate were desperate and growing agitated (exhibits 76, 77, 80, 84, 89). First Platoon, Golf Company, led by (TEXT REDACTED) were consolidated at the jersey barriers beneath the tower at the outer gate (exhibits 77, 88, 89, 91, 92). The platoon was forced to move nearly all personnel into the corner to hold back the massive and largely recalcitrant crowd from coming over the barriers and breaching the gate (exhibits 89, 91). Three members of the FST, Sgt Nicole Gee, Sgt Johanny Rosario Pichardo, and (TEXT REDACTED) were operating slightly behind the platoon (exhibits 89, 91, 92, 106, 107). (TEXT REDACTED) 2/1's (TEXT REDACTED) were standing to the North of the PSYOP vehicle in the outer corridor (exhibits 53, 76). (TEXT REDACTED) was near the canal, approximately 30-40 meters from the sniper tower (exhibits 77, 89, 92). Several members of Echo Company were in the outer corridor area, escorting civilians or looking for specific potential evacuees (exhibits 61, 62, 63). SSgt Darin Hoover was near the fence at the base of the outer gate tower (exhibit 63). (TEXT REDACTED) was escorting an interpreter to the canal to look for his father in the crowd (exhibit 63). Two corpsmen were also in the outer corridor. HM3 Maxton Soviak was called forward to treat a civilian heat causality and was rendering aid near the canal, but up against the fence (exhibit 92). (TEXT REDACTED) came forward from the inner gate to bring water to the 1st Platoon Marines on the canal wall (exhibit 92). At approximately 1736 local time, 26 August 2021, a single explosion occurred at Abbey Gate (exhibits 66, 98, 72, 121, 236). Overhead persistent infrared systems captured the time of the explosion at precisely 13:06:52Z, or 17:36:52 local (exhibit 236). The STP OIC received notification of the attack from 2/1 Marines by radio at 1738, and used the Signal Application to warn the North HKIA Role II-E of potential casualties at 1739 (exhibit 66, 98).

(n) The blast at Abbey Gate killed thirteen Service Members total, to include eleven Marines, one Sailor, and one Soldier:

(i) SSgt Darin Hoover, USMC, Echo Company 2/1 Marines

(ii) Sgt Nicole Gee, USMC, CLB-24, 24th MEU

(iii) Sgt Johanny Rosario Pichardo, USMC, JTF-CR (TF 51-5th MEB)

(iv) Cpl Hunter Lopez, USMC, Golf Company, 2/1 Marines

(v) Cpl Daegan Page, USMC, Golf Company, 2/1 Marines

(vi) Cpl Humberto Sanchez, USMC, Golf Company, 2/1 Marines

(vii) LCpl David Espinoza, USMC, Golf Company, 2/1 Marines

(viii) LCpl Rylee McCollum, USMC, Golf Company, 2/1 Marines

(ix) LCpl Dylan Merola, USMC, Golf Company, 2/1 Marines

(x) LCpl Kareem Nikoui, USMC, Golf Company, 2/1 Marines

(xi) LCpl Jared Schmitz, USMC, Golf Company, 2/1 Marines

(xii) HM3 Maxton Soviak, USN, Golf Company, 2/1 Marines

(xiii) SSG Ryan Knauss, USA, Bravo Company, 9th Psychological Operations Battalion (A)

(o) Those killed in action were all located in vicinity of the tower at the outer gate standing a security position at the edge of the canal or jersey barriers, with the exception of SSG Knauss and SSgt Hoover (exhibits 63, 91, 92, 105, 129). Three of the 1st Platoon Marines who were killed in the blast were elevated on the canal wall, helping pull potential evacuees into the outer gate: LCpl Rylee McCollum, LCpl Dylan Merola, and LCpl Kareem Nikoui. SSgt Hoover was in the outer corridor area, on the inside of the fence, near the tower (exhibits 63, 91, 92). SSG Knauss was in the outer corridor area with the PSYOP vehicle, on the passenger's side, to the rear of the vehicle (exhibits 105, 129). The vehicle front was pointed at the jersey barrier and canal intersection below the tower where 1st Platoon was providing crowd control and security. Autopsy summaries provided by the Armed Forces Medical Examiner's Office confirmed all Service Members who were KIA died of blast and ballistic injuries (exhibit 145). There were no gunshot wounds on any of the KIA, but significant penetrating ball bearing injuries (exhibit 145). Injuries sustained to those KIA were primarily lacerations, ruptures, and bruising to the head, torso, and pelvis (exhibits 138, 145). Of the protective gear examined by Joint Trauma Analysis and Prevention of Injury in Combat (JTAPIC), small arms protective insert (SAPI) plates and helmets were effective at stopping fragmentation and ball bearings (exhibit 138).

(p) Those interviewed during the investigation could not provide a number of civilian casualties caused by the attack. Most were only aware of open source reporting and concurred the number would be substantial. Open source reporting estimates casualties at 160-170 (exhibits 251, 252).

(q) Numerous Marines were wounded because of the attack, with most being part of 1st Platoon, Golf Company or members of 2/1 Marines positioned in the canal or in the outer corridor area, near the physical gate and PSYOP vehicle (exhibits 63, 91, 92, 105, 129, 224). The initial list of wounded is best captured by the 2/1 S2 blast and injury analysis, sketches from Echo and Golf Company NCOs, and Aeromedical Evacuation Critical Care Air Transport Team (AE-CCATT) TRANSCOM Regulating and Command and Control Evacuation System (TRAC2ES) flight data (exhibits 92, 137, 236). There appear to be 27 service members reported as initially wounded during the attack, but eight were not medically evacuated and instead redeployed with the unit (exhibits 68, 92, 93, 95, 131). The remaining nineteen were redeployed due to their wounds (exhibit 68). However, since redeploying, units have reported additional TBI and concussion related wounds for 12 more Marines, for a total of 39 Service Members wounded in the attack (exhibits 68, 92, 93, 95, 164). This new number does not include members of the 82nd Airborne who were conducting a leader's recon at Abbey Gate for the RIP, and 24th MEU personnel, who were also in the outer corridor area (exhibits 107, 124, 129). The number of wounded from the attack at Abbey Gate will almost certainly continue to grow.

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