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Floor Speech

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Mr. HAWLEY. Mr. President.
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Mr. HAWLEY. Mr. President.

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Mr. HAWLEY. I would like to say a word, if I could, about the nature of my objection.

It has been now almost a year since the attack at Abbey Gate in Kabul in Afghanistan, almost a year since we lost 13 American servicemembers in that tragic attack, almost a year since hundreds of American civilians were left behind enemy lines, abandoned by this administration to fend for themselves against our enemies. And that attack claimed the lives, among the 13, of CPL Jared Schmitz, from Wentzville, MO.

I was thinking of Corporal Schmitz again just the other day when I was driving past the bridge in Wentzville that will soon be named for him. I am glad that Corporal Schmitz is getting some of the honor that he deserves, but let's be honest. As his father said to me just hours after we learned of his death: What would be far better--far better, indeed--would be for Corporal Schmitz, who is a very young man, to be with us. He was just at the beginning of his service, just at the beginning of his life. And while he was proud, I am sure, to give his life for his country--it is what he volunteered to do--we owe it to him, I owe it to him, to try and find out why--why--this attack at Abbey Gate happened. How was it that a civilian evacuation was not ordered in time? Why was it that this administration ignored repeated warnings from military commanders on the ground about the dangers that were mounting in Kabul in Afghanistan? Why was the withdrawal a debacle?

Now, I want to give central command some credit. They have commissioned an investigation on this point and issued a report, and I have some of it here with me. This is just the unclassified portion. It is 6,000 pages long. I will tell you, having been through all of it with my team, it is very exhaustive. It took them months to do. They interviewed commanders on the ground. They interviewed military members who were there at the time. They interviewed State Department officials and DOD officials.

Their conclusions that are set out here in this report are truly, truly stunning. What they found is that military commanders repeatedly warned the White House--repeatedly--that the situation in Afghanistan was deteriorating rapidly, that the danger to American troops were high, that the danger to American civilians was high and, indeed, potentially lethal. And what did the administration do? It ignored these warnings.

The CENTCOM investigation shows that Tony Blinken's State Department and Jake Sullivan's National Security Council dragged their feet for weeks and, indeed, months on end. It shows the State Department wouldn't even talk about an evacuation--wouldn't even speak of it-- until it was too late. And the worst of it is, after this botched withdrawal, after this tragic loss of life, the administration took efforts to cover up what had happened. And we are still in the midst of this coverup.

Just last November, Homeland Security Secretary Mayorkas testified-- testified--that--and I am quoting him now:

Biometric and biographic information was collected from every individual evacuated from Afghanistan.

Every individual, that is his statement.

He testified that the administration--I am quoting him now:

(T)ook a whole-of-government approach, ensuring that Afghans arriving in the United States have been thoroughly screened and vetted.

That simply is not true, and we know it isn't true because the DOD inspector general just released a report debunking it, finding that U.S. Agencies did not use available data when vetting Afghan evacuees, finding that some evacuees with derogatory information could not be located, including individuals whose latent fingerprints have been found on improvised explosive devices and are known or suspected terrorists.

Here is my point: Almost a year after this tragedy, almost a year after this debacle, there has still been no accountability.

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Mr. HAWLEY. No accountability. There has been no one fired. There has been no one relieved of command. This administration has stonewalled. They have dragged their feet. They have refused to cooperate. Oh, we have had hearings, and they have had briefings almost entirely behind closed doors.

Here is my request. It is what I promised Corporal Schmitz's father I would do on the morning that I spoke to him, that I would seek accountability for what happened in Afghanistan, and that is exactly what I intend to do. It is what I have been doing, many a time have I been on the floor for the last 11 months seeking accountability. And I have been stonewalled at every single turn.

What I have asked for months on end is that the Armed Services Committee hold a public hearing on this investigation--a public hearing--not behind closed doors, not without the press, not cut off from the American people--a public hearing, and I have been denied every time.

So what I am going to do today is I am going to enter this report into the Record so that the American people can see what U.S. Central Command found. And until we have that accountability in public, I will continue to ask that the Senate observe regular order and actually vote on these nominees.

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Mr. HAWLEY. A parliamentary question, Mr. President: Do I have the floor when I respond?

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Mr. HAWLEY. But I am not asking the question. He is asking me the question.

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Mr. HAWLEY. No, I have yielded the floor. My remarks were concluded. So the Senator has the floor. I am happy to respond.

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Mr. HAWLEY. Say it one more time, Senator. I can answer.

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Mr. HAWLEY. That is incorrect, Senator. I reported as a no.

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Mr. HAWLEY. Yes, sir.

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Mr. HAWLEY. I do object to them, Senator. Are you asking me if I object to having a vote on them?

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Mr. HAWLEY. Yes.

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Mr. HAWLEY. Yes. A vote, I would like, Senator, but there are other Republican Members who have objections to all three nominees, and I am not authorized to consent for them.

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Mr. HAWLEY. I would like to have a recorded vote. Are you asking me if I would vitiate cloture, Senator?

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Mr. HAWLEY. I would like to have a cloture vote and a recorded vote. I would like to observe regular order on each of these, unless we can make some progress on having a public hearing on this report. That is my position at this time. Again, I am not authorized to negotiate for anybody else.

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Mr. HAWLEY. Central Command concerning the Abbey Gate bombing in Afghanistan in August 2021.

Memorandum for Commander, United States Army Central From: Vice Admiral James J. Malloy, Deputy Commander, United States Central Command. Subject: Memo Directing U.S. Army Central (USARCENT) to Conduct an Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation into the Facts and Circumstances Surrounding the Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) on 26 August 2021.

I am directing the Commander, USARCENT to appoint an AR 15- 6 investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack upon U.S. forces located at the Abbey Gate at HKIA, Kabul, Afghanistan on 26 August 2021. This AR 15-6 investigation will be a holistic review of the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack. USARCENT is directed to conduct an in-depth examination of all relevant aspects which gave rise to the attack. The AR 15-6 should closely examine tactical-level actions of U.S. personnel, gate operations, force protection and posture, readiness, leadership, and all other actions before, during and after the attack. BACKGROUND

Recently the Commander, USCENTCOM directed his staff, Component Commands, and relevant supporting commands to conduct an after-action review (AAR) of the Afghanistan non- combatant evacuation operation (NEO). This AR 15-6 is a separate requirement from that AAR. DISCUSSION

This AR 15-6 will be conducted in accordance with Service regulations. USARCENT will provide the completed AR 15-6 to Headquarters, USCENTCOM no later than 1 October 2021. If additional time is required, this request must be approved by the Commander.

Finally, to thoroughly examine the facts and circumstances of this attack, Component Commands, subordinate commands and other supporting commands are directed to assist USARCENT investigators during the course of this AR 15-6 as applicable. ____ Department of the Army, 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command, ACTS-SCK-DO, 22 October 2021.

Memorandum for LTG Ronald P. Clark, Commander, Third Army/U.S. Army Central, Shaw Air Force Base, SC Subject: Findings and Recommendations--Attack Against U.S. Forces Conducting NEO at Hamid Karzai International Airport on 26 August 2021.

1. BLUF. See EXSUM at enclosure 7.

2. Background: On 26 August 2021, U.S. Marines were conducting a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) at the Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) as part of a larger joint force operation to conclude U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan. Eleven Marines, one Navy Corpsman, and one Army PSYOP Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) were killed in an attack at the entry control point (ECP) known as Abbey Gate. As a result of the deaths of U.S. Service Members in combat, LTG Ronald P. Clark, Commander, Third Army/U.S. Army Central, at the direction of Gen McKenzie, Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), appointed me to investigate the surrounding facts and circumstances.

a. Scope. In accordance with (IAW) AR 15-6, I was appointed to investigate the facts and circumstances and address the following matters:

(1) Actions before, during, and after the attack;

(2) Force Protection, specifically including pertinent issues associated with:

(a) Force Posture, and

(b) Gate Operations.

(3) Readiness;

(4) Leadership;

(5) Medical Considerations;

(6) Chronology/Timeline of Events.

b. Time Extensions. My initial appointment order, dated 17 September 2021, required me to complete my investigation no later than 1 October 2021 (enclosure 1).

After careful analysis, I requested an extension to 22 October 2021 to ensure I could conduct sufficient interviews of widely dispersed forces and collect important products and documents to provide a complete investigation. You granted me the requested extension on 22 September 2021 (enclosure 2).

c. Methodology. The investigation follows the procedures in AR 15-6 and the appointment memorandum, with one exception. After consulting with my legal advisor, I determined the use of memorandums for record (MFRs) to capture interviews was a more appropriate method, given the subject matter and personnel involved. I spoke with my legal advisor and also resolved conflicts in the evidence, and discussed the use of any self-serving statement that I relied upon.

(1) The Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command (MARCENT), MajGen Paul Rock, assigned two Marine Corps Officers, (TEXT REDACTED) to perform duties as both subject matter experts and assistant investigating officers (enclosures 3 and 4).

(2) Additionally, I requested appointment of my Command Judge Advocate, (TEXT REDACTED) investigating officers (enclosures 4 and 5).

3. Findings of facts.

a. Task Organization. Before addressing the directed matters, it is of extreme importance to describe and clarify the task organization and command relationships (COMREL) between units executing operations at HKIA from 1-31 August 2021. The below descriptions are also enclosed in block and line charts (enclosure 8).

(1) 1-16 August 202l.

(a) RADM Pete Vasely, Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (Forward) (USFOR-A FWD), was the overall commander throughout the execution of operations in Afghanistan during the month of August. USFOR-A FWD was chartered as a Diplomatic Assurance Platform (DAP) and Joint Task Force (JTF) for operations in Afghanistan (exhibits 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 21). USFOR-A FWD was also Special Operations Joint Task Force- Afghanistan (SOJTF-A). Elements of the 3/10 Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) augmented USFOR-A FWD staff and security forces at the Embassy (exhibits 126, 247). The Commander of 3/10 IBCT, (TEXT REDACTED) also served as Chief of Staff for USFOR-A FWD, and commander of two ground forces, Task Force (TF) Polar Bear and TF Wild Boar, which supported the Embassy and HKIA (exhibits 21, 22, 126, 247).

(b) JTF-Crisis Response (CR), commanded by BGen Farrell Sullivan, arrived at HKIA on 20 July 2021, to prepare for a potential NEO. Beginning in May 2021, USFOR-A FWD had tactical control (TACON) of JTF-CR for planning, and then for NEO execution in August (exhibits 10, 11, 15, 18).

(c) The 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), (TEXT REDACTED) sent its Command Element (CE) and Battalion Landing Team (BLT), 1/8 Marines to HKIA on 14 August 2021 to set conditions for NEO (exhibits 15, 100, 102, 104). JTF-CR had TACON of the 24th MEU, which had TACON of 1/8 Marines (exhibits 100, 102, 104).

(d) Elements of 1/82 IBCT arrived at HKIA throughout 15-16 August 2021. JTF-CR initially had TACON of the 1/82 elements, received them at the flight line, and put them into defensive positions (exhibits 15, 100, 102, 121, 125).

(e) 2/1 Marines, the ground combat element (GCE) for the CENTCOM Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF), began arriving at HKIA in the early morning of 16 August 2021 (exhibits 53, 54, 55, 76, 77). The 24th MEU had TACON of 2/1 Marines (exhibits 10, 11, 53, 54, 76, 77, 100, 102).

(2) 17-28 August 2021. The Tactical Command Post (TAC) for the 82nd Airborne Division, commanded by MG Christopher Donahue, arrived to HKIA in the early morning hours of 19 August 2021 (exhibits 13, 21, 125). With the TAC's arrival, Gen McKenzie altered the task organization, granted USFOR-A FWD TACON of the 82nd Airborne Division, and gave the 82nd TACON of JTF-CR (exhibits 10, 11, 238). JTF-CR retained TACON of Marine forces until departure, while 82nd Airborne Division retained TACON of 1/82, and additional Army combat formations. However, USFOR-A FWD retained TACON of JTF-CR for NEO. and JTF-CR coordinated with 82nd Airborne Division (exhibits 125, 40). Marine units also executed an alternate COMREL, as 2/1 Marines reported directly to JTF-CR, despite the fact the 24th MEU had TACON of 2/1 (exhibits 18, 53, 100). 1/82 IBCT assumed TACON of TF Polar Bear and TF Wild Boar (exhibits 10, 126, 247).

(3) 28-30 August 2021.

(a) USFOR-A FWD departed HKIA in the early morning hours of 28 August 2021. MG Donahue, 82nd Airborne Division Commander, assumed command of all operations at HKIA until his departure at 0002 on 31 August 2021 (exhibits 131 21, 125, 246).

(b) JTF-CR and all Marine forces departed by the morning of 30 August 2021 (exhibits 15, 18). No Marine forces subordinate to JT-FCR were task organized under the 82nd Airborne Division during the last two days of the NEO.

(4) Adjacent Forces.

(a) Taliban. On 16 August 2021, RADM Vasely began to coordinate with Taliban forces for additional crowd control and security of HKIA (exhibits 13, 20, 21, 23). USFOR-A FWD's primary point of contact for coordination was local Taliban Commander, (TEXT REDACTED) (exhibits 13, 20, 21, 23). U.S. commanders and leaders at all echelons coordinated with Taliban forces to clarify security tasks and responsibilities (exhibits 53, 76).

(b) Turkish Military Forces. Turkish Forces were present on HKIA prior to the NEO and responsible for security of northern HKIA and working through Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) to secure the remaining perimeter (exhibits 15, 18). JTF-CR, and later USFOR-A FWD, coordinated with the Turkish Military Forces for security tasks and evacuation efforts (exhibits 15, 18).

(c) United Kingdom Forces. The U.K. had a large force presence, led by (TEXT REDACTED) on HKIA and at the adjoining Barron Hotel (exhibits 13, 15, 18, 21, 126). This force consisted of three companies from 2nd Battalion, Parachute Regiment (2 PARA) and two companies from 3 PARA, for a combined force of approximately 550 troops, (TEXT REDACTED) (exhibit 126). Commanders and leaders at all levels worked with the U.K. Forces at Abbey Gate, coordinating their security and evacuation efforts (exhibits 13, 15, 18, 21, 53, 56, 65, 76, 77).

(d) Afghan National Strike Unit (NSU). This organization was affiliated with U.S. interagency activities and integrated into the security of HKIA on 16-17 August 2021 (exhibits 13, 15, 18, 21). USFOR-A FWD worked through U.S. Embassy Kabul (USEK) personnel to coordinate with NSU (exhibits 18, 21).

b. Actions before, during, and after the attack.

(1) Key Findings.

(a) By 25 August, Abbey Gate was the Main Effort for Gate Operations at HKIA.

(b) At approximately 1736 local time, 26 August 2021, a single explosion occurred at Abbey Gate.

(c) There was no complex attack; it was a single suicide bomber not accompanied by enemy small arms fire.

(d) How the bomber bypassed Taliban checkpoints to get to the canal is unknown. There were multiple avenues of approach to the canal continuously used by Afghans to bypass Taliban checkpoints. The bomber likely used one of these avenues. No Marines at Abbey Gate recall any civilian using U.S. identification to get closer to their position at the time of the attack.

(e) The attack at Abbey Gate killed between 160-170 civilians. There is no evidence the Marines' response to the attack caused further harm to civilians or fratricide. A potential civilian casualty was reported during interviews with 2/1 Marines. A Platoon Commander reported the casualty occurred during initial gate operations on 20 August and the' injury, or possible death, was caused by a flash-bang grenade.

(2) USFOR-A FWD

(a) USFOR-A FWD was task organized to fill the command and staff billets of SOJTF-A specifically NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) (exhibits 20, 21). CENTCOM, after consulting with outgoing USFOR-A Commander, GEN Miller, established USFOR-A FWD as a DAP prior to its deployment to Afghanistan (exhibits 20, 21). The DAP's mission was to provide indications and warnings (I&W) for USEK, coordinate military activities in Afghanistan (security cooperation, targeting), and be prepared to command and control NEO (exhibits 20, 21). USFOR-A FWD developed a trigger matrix for preparation and execution of NEO, and shared it with USEK staff (exhibits 20, 21, 22). USFOR-A FWD used the trigger matrix as a tool to measure the Taliban's advancement and convince USEK staff to prepare for NEO (exhibits 20, 21, 22). However, USEK staff showed little interest in planning for NEO (exhibits 15, 18, 20, 21, 22). Despite the Taliban's rapid advance towards Kabul, on 12 August USEK only planned to evacuate 250 personnel by 31 August (exhibit 21 ). On 14 August. the Ambassador committed to evacuating the Embassy, but his personnel were unprepared and had taken few steps to reduce their footprint or destroy sensitive equipment/information (exhibits 20, 21, 22, 146). USEK security forces and the USFOR-A FWD (TEXT REDACTED) evacuated the final personnel from the Embassy to HKIA at 0100 on 16 August. Most USEK personnel departed Afghanistan shortly thereafter (exhibits 15, 18, 20, 21, 22).

(b) At HKIA, USFOR-A FWD was responsible for up and out coordination. They communicated daily with various elements of the interagency, to include Department of State (DoS) and the White House. They also coordinated with partner nations seeking support with evacuation, and coordinated with the Turkish Military, the Taliban, and the NSU to establish and maintain security of the airfield (exhibits 13, 15, 18, 20, 21, 22).

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