Amendments to National Defense Authorization Act

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the Warner amendment and support of the underlying amendment which I proposed. I will make several points.

First, the notion of low-yield nuclear weapons is something of a misnomer. Indeed, it is misleading. These are nuclear weapons with horrific blasts and radiation effects. As I said yesterday, it is probably more accurate to say not low yield but small Apocalypses because, when we use nuclear weapons, we go beyond—except for one occasion in the history of warfare—what most military people contemplate as the appropriate use of force.

There is no military requirement for these weapons. Ambassador Brooks, the head of NNSA was asked, Is there a requirement? His answer succinctly and conclusively: No. Yet we are eliminating the ban on the research, development, production, and testing of these low-yield nuclear weapons.

Once again, low yield is a misnomer. These weapons are 5 kilotons or less. The weapons used against Japan in World War II were 14 to 21 kilotons with devastating effects. These small weapons are a third that size—still horrendous weapons.

Now, unless we act today, this approach will not simply result in research. It will result inevitably, inexorably, in the development and the testing and the fielding of these weapons. That is essentially what was said by Ambassador Brooks when he testified before the committee. His words: I have a bias in favor of something that is the minimum destruction. That means I have a bias in favor of that which might be usable.

This is not just research. This is creating weapons that will be used. His comments were echoed with respect particularly to the robust nuclear earth penetrator when Fred Celec, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, is quoted: If we can develop a system that can crack through the rock and detonate a hydrogen weapon, in his words, it will ultimately get fielded.

To field an atomic weapon it first must be tested. And we are walking down a path of testing and fielding that I think we will all regret.

There is a presumption that arms control does not matter, it does not work. Why did three nations—Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—turn over voluntarily their nuclear weapon and join the nonproliferation regime? Why? Because there is an international norm that nuclear weapons should not be used. In fact, there should be efforts to eliminate their existence. These efforts and these norms are being undermined by the abolition of this ban.

This ban is more powerful than simply saying that the Congress will approve it. Why believe a scientist will say: I won't work on research unless I can produce and blow something up, an atomic weapon. If those are the scientists we have working, then perhaps we should look around for some other scientists. They, more than many other people, understand the power and the devastating effect of these weapons.

If we are really talking about research, let's make it research, not the back door to testing, development, and deployment. My amendment makes it much clearer that is what we are talking about. Indeed, my colleagues came to the floor yesterday and said this has nothing to do with deployment; it is all just science; we have to raise these issues; we have to ask these questions; intellectual curiosity and honesty must be respected in this realm as elsewhere.

Indeed, yesterday, Secretary Rumsfeld was asked: Are you pursuing nuclear weapons? His response: To pursue? I think it is a study. It is not to develop—his words—it is not to deploy, it is not to use, it is to study.

That is what the Reed amendment says. Essentially it says we will allow the scientists who operate in phase 1 through 2A of our well-defined process—research, development—but at the third phrase, that is where they stop. And similarly, if they are modifying a weapon rather than developing one from scratch, you would stop at phase 6.3. It is clearly defined.

The Warner amendment suggests we eliminate all of these prohibitions and we simply say: If you are going over here, come back to us and ask for permission. Functionally, in both amendments the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense would have to come to us. But there is a much more powerful, much more forceful, much more effective symbol if this moratorium is retained.

A few weeks ago, the Government of Pakistan offered to go nuclear free. They said: We would like to eliminate nuclear weapons on the subcontinent. The Indians would have to agree. That is a very interesting and very positive approach. The problem is, how do we reinforce that effort when we are not talking about going nuclear free? We are talking about new nuclear weapons, more sophisticated weapons that can be used. That will not encourage the Pakistanis to give up weapons, or the Indians. I think it will encourage their scientists to start looking at more and new technology.

We can make a difference if we maintain this ban by allowing what everyone says. That is all we want. We just want the opportunity to research. The Reed amendment gives that opportunity.

I yield the floor and I reserve the remainder of my time.