Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act of 2021
Floor Speech
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1621, the Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act of 2021.
The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution ensures that criminal defendants have the right to a trial by jury. This right is so important that our Founding Fathers preserved it in the Bill of Rights. It is a hallmark of our great country and one of the many things that separates us from other countries.
Our commitment to trial by jury means we accept the jury's decision whether we agree with it or not.
This bill would prohibit Federal judges from increasing a defendant's sentence based on conduct for which the defendant had been acquitted by a jury.
In 1987, the United States Sentencing Commission established Federal sentencing guidelines. These guidelines allow judges to consider conduct that was not formally charged or proven beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial, so long as the judge finds the conduct relevant by a preponderance of the evidence.
There are numerous examples of this happening. Judges have intervened to overrule the determinations of juries and have handed down harsher sentences after considering conduct for which the defendants have been charged and acquitted.
Allowing judges to consider acquitted conduct punishes people for a crime for which they have not been convicted. It is wrong and violates the spirit of our Bill of Rights.
Both Justice Kavanaugh and the late Justice Antonin Scalia recognized the fundamental unfairness of using acquitted conduct at sentencing. Both said it must stop.
In 2015, as a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, then-Judge Kavanaugh wrote: ``Allowing judges to rely on acquitted or uncharged conduct to impose higher sentences than they otherwise would impose seems a dubious infringement on the rights to due process and to a jury trial.''
I agree with Justice Scalia and Justice Kavanaugh.
Ms. JACKSON LEE.
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Mr. BENTZ. I yield to the gentleman from Tennessee.
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Mr. BENTZ. Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. JACKSON LEE.
I thank the gentleman from Oregon for supporting this legislation. He cited a number of judges and courts who added their support to this important legislation.
Mr. Cohen's eloquence was in the efforts he has made to help those who have suffered injustice.
We thank Congressman Armstrong for his work as well. The fact that they are speaking in tandem speaks loudly on this floor.
As I close, I include in the Record the dissenting opinion of Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg, with simple comments from their opinion:
``On petitioners' appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that even if their sentences would have been substantively unreasonable but for judge- found facts, their Sixth Amendment rights were not violated.''
That was found by the D.C. Circuit.
``We should grant certiorari to put an end to the unbroken string of cases disregarding the Sixth Amendment.''
So, you are more than affirmed that the Sixth Amendment in these cases is patently disregarded.
I include in the Record the Supreme Court dissent on the Jones v. United States case. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Joseph Jones, Desmond Thurston, and Antwuan, Ball v. United States ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT No. 13-10026.--Decided October 14, 2014
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting from denial of certiorari.
A jury convicted petitioners Joseph Jones, Desmond Thurston, and Antwuan Ball of distributing very small amounts of crack cocaine, and acquitted them of conspiring to distribute drugs. The sentencing judge, however, found that they had engaged in the charged conspiracy and, relying largely on that finding, imposed sentences that petitioners say were many times longer than those the Guidelines would otherwise have recommended.
Petitioners present a strong case that, but for the judge's finding of fact, their sentences would have been ``substantively unreasonable'' and therefore illegal. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 372 (2007) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). If so, their constitutional rights were violated. The Sixth Amendment, together with the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, ``requires that each element of a crime'' be either admitted by the defendant, or ``proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.'' Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. __, __ (2013) (slip op., at 3). Any fact that increases the penalty to which a defendant is exposed constitutes an element of a crime, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483, n. 10, 490 (2000), and ``must be found by a jury, not a judge,'' Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 281 (2007).* We have held that a substantively unreasonable penalty is illegal and must be set aside. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). It unavoidably follows that any fact necessary to prevent a sentence from being substantively unreasonable--thereby exposing the defendant to the longer sentence--is an element that must be either admitted by the defendant or found by the jury. It may not be found by a judge.
For years, however, we have refrained from saying so. In Rita v. United States, we dismissed the possibility of Sixth Amendment violations resulting from substantive reasonableness review as hypothetical and not presented by the facts of the case. We thus left for another day the question whether the Sixth Amendment is violated when courts impose sentences that, but for a judge-found fact, would be reversed for substantive unreasonableness. 551 U.S., at 353; see also id., at 366 (Stevens, J., joined in part by Ginsburg, J., concurring) (``Such a hypothetical case should be decided if and when it arises''). Nonetheless, the Courts of Appeals have uniformly taken our continuing silence to suggest that the Constitution does permit otherwise unreasonable sentences supported by judicial factfinding, so long as they are within the statutory range. See, e.g., United States v. Benkahla, 530 F. 3d 300, 312 (CA4 2008); United States v. Hernandez, 633 F. 3d 370, 374 (CA5 2011); United States v. Ashqar, 582 F. 3d 819, 824-825 (CA7 2009); United States v. Treadwell, 593 F. 3d 990, 1017-1018 (CA9 2010); United States v. Redcorn, 528 F. 3d 727, 745-746 (CA10 2008).
This has gone on long enough. The present petition presents the case the Court claimed to have been waiting for. And it is a particularly appealing case, because not only did no jury convict these defendants of the offense the sentencing judge thought them guilty of, but a jury acquitted them of that offense. Petitioners were convicted of distributing drugs, but acquitted of conspiring to distribute drugs. The sentencing judge found that petitioners had engaged in the conspiracy of which the jury acquitted them. The Guidelines, petitioners claim, recommend sentences of between 27 and 71 months for their distribution convictions. But in light of the conspiracy finding, the court calculated much higher Guidelines ranges, and sentenced Jones, Thurston, and Ball to 180, 194, and 225 months' imprisonment.
On petitioners' appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that even if their sentences would have been substantively unreasonable but for judge-found facts, their Sixth Amendment rights were not violated. 744 F. 3d 1362, 1369 (2014). We should grant certiorari to put an end to the unbroken string of cases disregarding the Sixth Amendment--or to eliminate the Sixth Amendment difficulty by acknowledging that all sentences below the statutory maximum are substantively reasonable.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I will say that the failure to address this issue for so many years has contributed to the epidemics of overincarceration and mass incarceration, weakened the finality that a jury trial is meant to provide, and undermined overall public confidence in our justice system.
I really think this legislation has exposed some incredulous behavior because most people believe that you are sentenced on the reasonable doubt convictions as opposed to additional sidebar conversations that may come to the judge's attention in terms of other offenses.
Today, we consider a simple, narrowly tailored bill that builds on our bipartisan effort to create a fair justice system. This bill will make sure that defendants are punished only for the conduct that prosecutors are able to prove at trial, consistent with the constitutional guarantees of due process and the right to a trial by jury of their peers, and consistent with the principles on which country was founded.
Before I close, I join with my colleague from Tennessee's remarks and indicate the deepest sympathy to the family of the dean, Congressman Don Young. He is a voice--and I speak in the present. His presence was larger than life. He spoke to everyone. His booming voice is something that I am certainly going to find a great loss, as well as his love and passion for not only his family and his great State but also for this institution.
I don't know if we will ever find an institutionalist such as Don, but we can certainly follow in his footsteps and his desire for order when he cited the words ``regular order.''
We were blessed by having him here, and may he rest in peace.
Mr. Speaker, I ask that my colleagues join me in supporting this bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass H.R. 1621, the ``Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act of 2021, as amended.
1621.
Opening Statement
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