Letter to The Honorable Christopher A. Wray, Director for the Federal Bureau of Investigation - Extremism/Terrorism

Letter

Dear Director Wray:

I am writing to request information regarding the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
(FBI's) actions, consistent with existing guidelines and authorities, to investigate and prevent
domestic terrorism and domestic extremist threats online and through social media platforms.

In recent years, domestic extremist groups' use of social media platforms, including
Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, TikTok and others, for communication, organizing, and planning
has expanded. Over time, this has included dissemination of digital manifestos, manuscripts, or
magazines, participation in online forums, and posting or streaming videos of violent acts. Online platforms continue to be used to fundraise, recruit, organize, train, and plan for acts of
domestic terrorism. For example, social media was used by domestic extremists in the 2016
Pizzagate Conspiracy, the 2017 Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, VA, the 2018 Tree of
Life Synagogue shooting, the 2020 attempted kidnapping of Michigan Governor Gretchen
Whitmer, and the 2021 bomb threat at the U.S. Capitol.

Domestic extremists also used social media platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter,
YouTube, and TikTok, to recruit, organize, and communicate actions in the lead up to the
January 6th attack on the U.S. Capitol. According to recent reports, a former Facebook
employee filed a whistleblower complaint with the Securities and Exchange Commission and
disclosed internal Facebook documents that indicate that Facebook's algorithms contributed to
misinformation and the January 6th attack on the Capitol, stating, "Facebook knew its algorithms
and platforms promoted this type of harmful content, and it failed to deploy internally
recommended or lasting countermeasures."5 The former Facebook employee recently testified to
Congress that choices by Facebook relating to its algorithms and content policies resulted in
repeated "conflicts between [Facebook's] own profits and our safety" and that "Facebook
consistently resolved those conflicts in favor of its own profits" concluding that "[t]he result has
been a system that amplifies division, extremism, and polarization…"

Despite the prolific and public planning of the events leading to the January 6th attack on
the U.S. Capitol and FBI's general awareness of the threat of domestic extremism on social
media, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Committee on
Rules and Administration found that while "the FBI Norfolk Field Office circulated a Situational
Informational Report" warning of a threat to the Capitol, FBI did not "[deem] online posts
calling for violence at the Capitol as credible" and did not issue "formal intelligence bulletins
about the potential for violence at the Capitol."

As both Ranking Member, and now Chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, I have previously requested information from the FBI
regarding its prioritization and allocation of resources to detect and prevent domestic terrorism,
including its ability to track and provide data on these efforts.8 The FBI's number one priority is
"protecting the United States from terrorist attacks." In its recent Strategic Intelligence
Assessment, the FBI has stated that with respect to its counterterrorism mission, "FBI maintains
about 200 [Joint Terrorism Task Forces] nationwide across all 56 FBI Field Offices," which provide FBI the opportunity to share information and leverage "local expertise and experience."

You have previously testified that the threat of "domestic terrorism has been
metastasizing across the country for a long time now and it's not going away anytime soon."11
You recently testified before this Committee that "today terrorism moves at the speed of social
media" and that FBI is "trying to improve our own communications with the social media
companies."12 I appreciate the steps that FBI has taken thus far to address this evolving threat of
domestic extremism and terrorism, such as increasing its domestic terrorism investigations
personnel by 260 percent in the last year, and increasing coordination and training with
important partners.13 Further, the current Administration has prioritized this issue by creating
the National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism, including addressing online
extremism.

While I support the FBI's efforts, it is also critical that the federal government take
precautions to ensure Americans' civil rights and civil liberties are protected, consistent with the
First and Fourth Amendment and other constitutional protections. FBI policy requires domestic
terrorism investigations to be "subject to heightened internal legal review and supervisory
approvals to ensure Constitutional rights, privacy, and civil liberties are protected at each
juncture."15 The Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations also limit what
First Amendment-protected activity FBI can monitor or investigate, including publicly available
information, such as information on social media. However, questions remain regarding both how these guidelines are applied and whether the FBI is adequately positioned to investigate
domestic extremism as it rapidly evolves on social media.

In addition, I remain concerned about Congress's ability to receive statutorily required
information regarding the allocation of resources and priorities at FBI as it combats the threat of
domestic extremism. The fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
required the FBI to report data on domestic extremism, which is necessary to enable Congress to
fully assess the efforts of FBI and other federal agencies to counter the threat of domestic
extremism, and consider what additional support may be needed. But in its first joint Strategic
Intelligence Assessment with the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI failed to provide
detailed information on its staffing allocation for domestic terrorism, as well as most of the data
required by statute. The FBI attempted to justify its lack of data due to paper-based
management systems and the fact that the FBI does not currently track certain requested data.
This lack of information and clarity on the data and allocation of resources raises questions as to
whether the FBI has sufficiently resourced and is adequately postured to address the threat of
domestic extremism. I expect a full accounting from FBI in regards to this question as required
by law.

In light of recurring concerns regarding proliferation of domestic extremist content on
social media and to better understand what the FBI is doing to address this threat, for the period
dating from January 1, 2019 to present, I respectfully request that you provide the following
documents and information:

1. FBI policies, procedures, guidance, and strategies for countering domestic terrorism
and domestic extremist threats on social media and online platforms.
a. What is FBI's role in the Administration's National Strategy for Countering
Domestic Terrorism, and how is FBI helping to achieve Strategic Goal 2.2,
"Address online terrorist recruitment and mobilization to violence by domestic
terrorists"?
2. Applicable statutory and FBI specific limitations for use of social media and online
platforms to detect and prevent domestic terrorism and domestic extremist threats,
including without limitation, guidance on applicable First and Fourth Amendment
constitutional protections.
3. The FBI's coordination with social media companies and online platforms regarding
cooperation with efforts to detect and prevent domestic terrorism and domestic
extremist threats on social media and online platforms.
4. Strategies and actions, planned or taken, by the FBI, including in coordination with
other federal, state, local, and tribal governments and agencies to detect and prevent
extremist violence online, including without limitation, in relation to the January 6,
2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol.
5. FBI investigations involving domestic terrorism and domestic extremist threats online
and on social media platforms, including the number of investigations opened and
closed, the outcomes of such investigations, and coordination with federal, state, and
local law enforcement authorities.
6. The Offices within the FBI responsible for receiving notifications from social media
companies and online platforms and the processes and policies for use of information
received from the public or from social media companies and online platforms in
investigations.

The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs is authorized by Rule
XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate and Section 12(e) of S. Res. 70 (117th Congress) to
investigate the "efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of all agencies and departments of the
Government" and "processes as tested against the requirements imposed by the rapidly mounting
complexity of national security problems… [and] legislative and other proposals to improve
these methods, processes, and relationships."

Please provide these documents and information as soon as possible, but no later than
October 27, 2021. Thank you for your prompt attention and cooperation in this matter.

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