Letter to The Honorable Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security - Extremism/Terrorism

Letter

Dear Secretary Mayorkas:

I am writing to request information regarding the Department of Homeland Security's
(DHS's) actions, consistent with existing guidelines and authorities, to detect and prevent
domestic terrorism and domestic extremist threats online and through social media platforms.
In recent years, domestic extremist groups' use of social media platforms, including
Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, TikTok and others, for communication, organizing, and planning
has expanded. Over time, this has included dissemination of digital manifestos, manuscripts, or
magazines, participation in online forums, and posting or streaming videos of violent acts.

Online platforms continue to be used to fundraise, recruit, organize, train, and plan for acts of
domestic terrorism. For example, social media was used by domestic extremists in the 2016
Pizzagate Conspiracy, the 2017 Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, VA, the 2018 Tree of
Life Synagogue shooting, the 2020 attempted kidnapping of Michigan Governor Gretchen
Whitmer, and the 2021 bomb threat at the U.S. Capitol.

Domestic extremists also used social media platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter,
YouTube, and TikTok, to recruit, organize, and communicate actions in the lead up to the
January 6th attack on the U.S. Capitol. In DHS's October 2020 Homeland Threat Assessment,
DHS stated that "[v]iolent extremist media almost certainly will spread violent extremist
ideologies, especially via social media, that encourage violence and influence action within the
United States." According to recent reports, a former Facebook employee filed a whistleblower
complaint with the Securities and Exchange Commission and disclosed internal Facebook
documents that indicate that Facebook's algorithms contributed to misinformation and the
January 6th attack on the Capitol, stating, "Facebook knew its algorithms and platforms promoted
this type of harmful content, and it failed to deploy internally recommended or lasting
countermeasures."6 The former Facebook employee recently testified to Congress that choices
by Facebook relating to its algorithms and content policies resulted in repeated "conflicts
between [Facebook's] own profits and our safety" and that "Facebook consistently resolved
those conflicts in favor of its own profits" concluding that "[t]he result has been a system that
amplifies division, extremism, and polarization…"

Despite the prolific and public planning of the events leading to the January 6th attack on
the U.S. Capitol and DHS's general awareness of the threat of domestic extremism on social
media, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Committee on
Rules and Administration found that DHS did not "[deem] online posts calling for violence at the
Capitol as credible" and did not issue "formal intelligence bulletins about the potential for
violence at the Capitol."

As both Ranking Member, and now Chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, I have previously requested information from DHS
regarding its prioritization and allocation of resources to detect and prevent domestic terrorism,
including its ability to track and provide data on these efforts. DHS is responsible for
"protecting the American people from terrorist threats," including "understanding evolving and
emerging threats" and "improving terrorism prevention."10 Within the Department, three offices
have relevant responsibilities related to addressing domestic extremism. The Office of
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), currently led by Counterterrorism Coordinator John Cohen, is
tasked with "equip[ping] the Department with the intelligence and information it needs to keep
the Homeland safe, secure, and resilient."11 The Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) office
"is the principal investigative arm" of the Department with the mission "to investigate, disrupt
and dismantle terrorist, transnational and other criminal organizations."12 Lastly, the Center for
Prevention Programs and Partnerships (CP3) "supports communities across the United States to
prevent individuals from radicalizing to violence and intervene when individuals have already
radicalized to violence."

I appreciate that DHS has now designated domestic violent extremism as a National
Priority Area, and that DHS has taken steps to address the threat of domestic extremism's
proliferation on social media, including after January 6th "to gather and analyze intelligence
about security threats from public social media posts." Further, the current Administration has
prioritized this issue by creating the National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism,
including addressing online extremism. I also recognize that DHS's Office of Intelligence and
Analysis recently produced a document warning federal, state, and local counterterrorism and
law enforcement partners about the spread of domestic extremist content through TikTok,
including concern over domestic extremists' use of TikTok "to recruit adherents, promote
violence, and disseminate tactical guidance for use in various terrorist or criminal activities."

However, concerns still exist over DHS's actions to combat the proliferation of domestic
extremism on social media, and how the Department has prioritized its resources to counteract that threat. The fiscal year (FY) 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) required
DHS to report data on domestic extremism, which is necessary to enable Congress to fully assess
the efforts of DHS and other federal agencies to counter the threat of domestic extremism, and
consider what additional support may be needed. But in its first joint Strategic Intelligence
Assessment with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, DHS failed to provide detailed information
on its staffing allocation for domestic terrorism.18 This lack of information and clarity on the
data and allocation of resources raises questions as to whether DHS is adequately postured to
address the threat of domestic extremism. I expect a full accounting from DHS in regards to this
question as required by law.

While I support DHS's efforts, it is also critical that the federal government take
precautions to ensure Americans' civil rights and civil liberties are protected, consistent with the
First and Fourth Amendment and other constitutional protections. I am encouraged that DHS
has involved the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and the Privacy Office in missions to
ensure these protections are not eroded.

In light of recurring concern regarding proliferation of domestic extremist content on
social media and to better understand what DHS is doing to address the issue, for the period
dating from January 1, 2019 to present, I respectfully request that you provide the following
documents and information:

1. DHS policies, procedures, guidance, and strategies for countering domestic terrorism
and domestic extremist threats on social media and online platforms.
a. What is DHS's role in the Administration's National Strategy for Countering
Domestic Terrorism, and how is DHS helping to achieve Strategic Goal 2.2,
"Address online terrorist recruitment and mobilization to violence by domestic
terrorists"?
2. Applicable statutory and DHS specific limitations for use of social media and online
platforms to detect and prevent domestic terrorism and domestic extremist threats,
including without limitation, guidance on applicable First and Fourth Amendment
constitutional protections.
3. DHS's coordination with social media companies and online platforms regarding
cooperation with efforts to detect and prevent domestic terrorism and domestic
extremist threats on social media and online platforms.
4. Strategies and actions, planned or taken, by DHS, including in coordination with other
federal, state, local, and tribal governments and agencies to detect and prevent extremist
violence online, including without limitation, in relation to the January 6, 2021 attack
on the U.S. Capitol.
5. HSI and I&A investigations involving domestic terrorism and domestic extremist
threats online and on social media platforms, including the number of investigations
opened and closed, the outcomes of such investigations, coordination with federal,
state, and local law enforcement authorities, and all related I&A products.
6. All I&A products related to domestic extremist threats online, including without
limitation any related follow-up or additional actions related to the April 19, 2021 I&A
Reference Aid, Some Domestic Violent Extremists and Foreign Terrorist Organizations
Exploiting TikTok.
7. The Offices within DHS responsible for receiving notifications from social media
companies and online platforms and the processes and policies for use of information
received from the public or from social media companies and online platforms in
publications and in disseminating information to other law enforcement entities.

The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs is authorized by Rule
XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate and Section 12(e) of S. Res. 70 (117th Congress) to
investigate the "efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of all agencies and departments of the
Government" and "processes as tested against the requirements imposed by the rapidly mounting
complexity of national security problems… [and] legislative and other proposals to improve
these methods, processes, and relationships."

Please provide these documents and information as soon as possible, but no later than
October 27, 2021. Thank you for your prompt attention and cooperation in this matter.

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