Letter to Shou Zi Chew, Chief Executive Officer, Tik Tok - Extremism/Terrorism

Letter

Dear Mr. Shou Zi Chew:

I am writing to request information regarding TikTok's policies on monitoring and
removing extremist and conspiracy content that advocates violence, its actions to address the
increase in use of its platforms to promote acts of domestic terrorism and violent extremism, and
its use of targeted advertising to reach individuals and groups that engage in these activities.

In recent years, domestic extremist groups' use of social media platforms, including
TikTok, for communication, organizing, and planning has expanded. Over time, this has
included dissemination of digital manifestos, manuscripts, or magazines, participation in online
forums, and posting or streaming videos of violent acts.1
Online platforms continue to be used to
fundraise, recruit, organize, train, and plan for acts of domestic terrorism. In the lead up to the
January 6th attack on the U.S. Capitol, domestic extremists reportedly used TikTok to recruit,
organize, and communicate.2
Since January 6th, domestic extremist groups have used TikTok to
continue to spread their messages through content supporting white supremacists, extremists, and
terrorist organizations.3

Recent reports have identified that on April 19, 2021, the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS's) Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) produced a document warning
federal, state, and local counterterrorism and law enforcement partners about the spread of
domestic extremist content through TikTok.4
The document detailed federal officials' concern
over domestic extremists' use of TikTok "to recruit adherents, promote violence, and
disseminate tactical guidance for use in various terrorist or criminal activities." DHS' I&A
determined that TikTok's algorithms and processes "can unintentionally aid individuals' efforts
to promote violent extremist content."5

Social media platforms can rapidly spread extremist content through their algorithms.
TikTok's algorithm suggests content to users based on the time users spend engaging with
similar content and on what content has the greatest overall engagement, through likes and
follows, on the platform.6 A recent Wall Street Journal investigation, using multiple automated
accounts, identified that TikTok's algorithm directed accounts with "a general interest in
politics" to videos "about election conspiracies and QAnon."7 These algorithms increase user
engagement, which in turn increases the amount of time users spend on these platforms, and by
extension, the amount of advertisements that can be shown. There is a financial incentive for
social media platforms like TikTok to keep users engaged on their platforms and viewing
content, including extremist content.

TikTok's tools that allow advertisers to target advertisement based on user demographics,
interests, and behaviors present additional concerns. Prior to this year, TikTok had allowed
users to opt-out of receiving targeted ads, but as of April 15, 2021, TikTok reportedly removed
this option, making targeted advertisements mandatory.10 Paid advertising is reportedly
"responsible for the lion's share of TikTok's revenue," at around $1.3 billion annually, and
concerns have been raised over the use of targeted ads on social media and their potential for
abuse by domestic extremists.

Under current law, with some exceptions, online service platforms are generally
protected from legal liability resulting from user-generated content. As a private company,
TikTok generally has the right to decide, through policies and user guidelines, what is and what
is not allowed on its platform. Using that right, TikTok has established policies that prohibit
content that promotes violence and extremism. However, in the aftermath of recent domestic
extremism events, questions remain about the effectiveness of these policies and TikTok's
willingness and ability to enforce them.

I appreciate that TikTok has taken actions in response to the increased use of social
media platforms to promote domestic extremist violence, including inviting other platforms into
a "global coalition to protect against harmful content." I also appreciate TikTok's steps to ban extremist and conspiracy groups, remove content promoting violence and extremism after
January 6th, and remove over 61 million videos from January 1, 2021 to March 31, 2021 that
violated TikTok's policies. However, TikTok removed some extremist content only after
continued reports from outside parties, and TikTok extremist content has been allowed to return
and continue operating on its platform. I am also concerned that TikTok was reportedly
prevented from joining the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism due to concerns from
other platforms regarding TikTok's "data collection and censorship practices."

Moreover, TikTok's Chinese owned parent company, ByteDance Ltd., is subject to
China's own data disclosure laws. Former President Trump issued two Executive Orders,
including an August 6, 2020 Executive Order directing additional steps -- including prohibiting
transactions with ByteDance -- to address national security concerns based on the company's
ownership, finding that ByteDance's ownership of TikTok "continues to threaten the national
security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States." While these orders have since
been revoked, concerns remain regarding the Chinese government's influence over TikTok and
the potential national security threat, including use of platforms like TikTok to carry out
misinformation campaigns in the United States.

In light of recurring concerns about advertising and content policies related to domestic
extremist threats and to better understand what TikTok is doing to address the proliferation of
domestic extremism online, for the period dating from January 1, 2019 to present, I respectfully
request that you provide the following documents and information:

1. TikTok's guidelines and parameters for determining how content violates TikTok's
policies prohibiting content that promotes violence and extremism, including without limitation information on how TikTok's artificial intelligence (AI) moderation software
finds such content.
2. Information identifying TikTok's terms of service and what actions have been taken to
enforce and comply with these terms of service, including without limitation, policies
for removal of content that violates the policies prohibiting the promotion of violence
and extremism.
3. Information on the content covered by the guidelines and policies referenced in
question 1, including content related to the promotion, recruitment, and advocacy of
events leading to the January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol that was removed from
TikTok's platforms in the three months preceding the January 6, 2021 attack on the
U.S. Capitol.
4. Strategies and actions, planned or taken, by TikTok in coordination with federal, state,
local, and tribal governments and agencies to detect and prevent extremist violence
online, including without limitation, in relation to the January 6, 2021 attack on the
U.S. Capitol.
5. TikTok's guidelines and parameters for recommending content, including without
limitation a description of how their algorithms identify and decide how to recommend
content.
6. TikTok's guidelines and parameters for targeted advertising, including without
limitation a description of how their algorithms identify advertisements' intended
targets.
7. TikTok's guidelines and procedures in place to ensure that the advertising parameters
in question 6 align with its policies on hate speech, violence, and domestic adversarial
threat policies.
8. A description of TikTok's actions to ensure its terms of service and targeted advertising
policies are enforced.

The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs is authorized by Rule
XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate and Section 12(e) of S. Res. 70 (117th Congress) to
investigate the "efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of all agencies and departments of the
Government" and "processes as tested against the requirements imposed by the rapidly mounting
complexity of national security problems… [and] legislative and other proposals to improve
these methods, processes, and relationships."

Please provide these documents and information as soon as possible, but no later than
October 27, 2021. Thank you for your prompt attention and cooperation in this matter.

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