Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS -- (Senate - December 19, 2005)
BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise today, along with my good friend and colleague, Senator Joe Lieberman, to introduce the Chemical Facility Anti ter ror ism Act of 2005.
This legislation addresses one of the Nation's greatest vulnerabilities, the threat of a terrorist attack against a chemical facility.
My legislation would provide broad new authority to the Department of Homeland Security to ensure that the Nation's chemical facilities are better protected from terrorism.
This legislation would direct the Department of Homeland Security to establish criteria for evaluating the vulnerability of our Nation's chemical facilities to terrorist attack and to establish risk-based tiers for those facilities deemed in need of protection.
These regulations will require designated facilities to conduct vulnerability assessments and to create appropriate site security and emergency response plans. In addition, the Department would establish an office within the Infrastructure Protection Directorate responsible for implementing and enforcing the statute.
The bill also contains robust measures to ensure both compliance by chemical plants and effective implementation by the Department.
This legislation is strong medicine, and I do not prescribe it lightly. But the potential devastation that an attack on a chemical facility could cause, the sheer number of these facilities and the current widespread lack of security, as well as the clearly stated intent of terrorists to cause maximum harm to the American people and to our economy make these measures necessary.
The Homeland Security Committee has invested substantial effort in examining this threat and in deciding how best to respond to it. Our investigation included four hearings on this topic earlier this year.
From the horrifying chemical attacks of the First World War, and the tragic accident at Bhopal, India, in 1984, to the numerous and more recent accidental releases of hazardous chemicals in this country, we were reminded by expert after expert of the potential for useful productive chemicals to kill, if released accidentally or intentionally.
We also know that al-Qaida has a keen interest in the American chemical industry. Indeed, at our first hearing, Steven Flynn of the Council on Foreign Relations testified that the chemical industry is ``at the top of the list'' of al-Qaida and other terrorist groups. The chemical industry, said Commander Flynn, absolutely screams at you as essentially a weapon of mass destruction.
We should not wait until there is an attack on a chemical facility and then act after the fact. So often our security measures and our emergency legislation is passed after something horrible has already occurred and after lives have already been lost. Let us get ahead of this curve. Let us act now to address what witness after witness identified as being one of the greatest threats to our homeland.
The stakes are high and the vulnerability is widespread. The Environmental Protection Agency has cataloged some 15,000 facilities in the United States that manufacture, use, or store large quantities of hazardous chemicals for productive, legitimate purposes, but in amounts that could cause extensive harm if turned against us as weapons. And we have seen al-Qaida do this before. We have seen al-Qaida use commercial aircraft as weapons of mass destruction.
The Department of Homeland Security has identified 3,400 facilities that could affect more than 1,000 people if attacked.
According to the Government Accountability Office, tens of millions of Americans live close enough to chemical facilities to be at risk in the event of a terrorist attack. Yet despite this profound threat, only a fraction of our Nation's chemical facilities are regulated for security by the Federal Government under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, or subscribe to volunteer security standards.
While I applaud those companies that have taken voluntary measures, an unacceptable number have not. Moreover, given the severity of the threat, I believe it is a mistake in this case to rely on voluntary measures alone. The overwhelming majority of experts at our hearing testified that additional statutory authority is needed to effectively address the threat of terrorism against a chemical facility.
Leading security experts, chemical safety professionals, industry representatives, labor representatives, environmental groups, and the administration, all have testified that Federal legislation in this area is necessary, although obviously they differ considerably on the details.
The legislation I am introducing today provides that critical authority. While establishing the need for Federal legislation, our hearings stressed the importance of getting this right, of striking the right balance.
Chemical shipments in the United States approach $.5 trillion annually. The chemical industry represents our largest export sector, totaling $91.4 billion in 2003.
More than 900,000 people work directly in the American chemical industry with millions more in supplier and indirect jobs.
Chemicals are critical to our food and our water supply, our pharmaceuticals, our electronics, our clothes; in fact, just about everything.
A consistent theme that sounded throughout our hearing was that we cannot afford to drive the chemical sector out of this country in the name of security. And that is why we spent so much time in carefully crafting a bill that strikes the right balance.
Our hearings established a considerable consensus around two important concepts: First, that the legislation should be risk based. Our chemical industry is extremely diverse and any legislation must take into account that diversity. A small plant using chemicals in rural Maine faces very different risks than a major chemical manufacturing plant in the New York City area, and its security response should be structured appropriately. Security measures should be tailored to each particular facility, taking into account its vulnerabilities, its location, impact on the population, and other risk factors. High-risk facilities should undertake the strongest security precautions while obviously fewer precautions are necessary at very low-risk facilities.
Second, the legislation should be performance based. What do I mean by that? By that I mean our focus should be on having the Department establish the standards, the results, rather than prescribing exactly how a corporation should act to meet those standards, those results. Facilities should defend against particular threats. For example, the Secretary might specify that facilities should be able to protect against a hazardous release resulting from a truck bomb. Or the Secretary may mandate that every plant have a secure perimeter. Now, facilities could choose to meet those standards by building fences, erecting barriers, moving the most hazardous chemicals to a more secure area, or even switching to a less hazardous chemical altogether. By specifying the regulations should be performance based, facilities will have the incentives to identify the most effective and cost-efficient means of increasing protection.
The legislation I am introducing today meets those fundamental criteria. It is risk based and it is performance based. This legislation is modeled, in part, on the Maritime Transportation Security Act, consequently referred to as MTSA.
During the course of our four hearings, we heard substantial testimony from security industry experts, the administration and others, that the results-based cooperative approach of MTSA is a major success story. In fact, we heard so many positive things about the law that we brought in the Coast Guard's director of port security, Admiral Bone, to testify about their experience with the current law.
The first step in improving the security of our Nation's chemical facilities is to determine which facilities should be covered by Federal regulations and to what degree. This legislation requires the Department of Homeland Security to issue within 1 year of enactment regulations establishing criteria for evaluating the types of facilities that should be covered, as well as regulations establishing risk-based tiers for the designated facilities.
Following the issuance of these regulations, the Department would designate covered facilities and place them into tiers. The designations would be based on risk factors including potential likelihood of death or illness, proximity to population centers, and the potential impact on national security, the economy, and critical infrastructure. The tier would have increasingly strict security requirements as the risk and consequences of a terrorist attack at a covered facility increase.
The Department would then set security performance standards for each tier. Every facility would be required to conduct a vulnerability assessment, establish and implement a site security plan, and create an emergency response plan or update an existing plan to include provisions for an intentional attack. Vulnerability assessments would address the threats and consequences of a terrorist attack, including vulnerabilities from the use of hazardous chemicals.
The site security plan would address the identified vulnerabilities and meet the performance standards set by the Department. The site security plan would also identify how the facility is coordinating with Federal, State, and local officials for response to a terrorist attack. The facilities would be required to drill their security plans and emergency response plans. Covered facilities would have 6 months following promulgation of regulations to certify compliance and submit their assessments and plans to the Department for approval.
If a facility fails to comply, the legislation I am introducing provides the strongest remedy to the Department. The bill gives the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority to shut down chemical facilities that are at high risk and which the Secretary believes have not adequately addressed the risk of a terrorist attack. For the highest risk facilities, the Secretary could order an immediate closure. For the other lower risk facilities, the Department could order closure but only after a process of written notification, consultation, and further time for compliance.
Now, I recognize this shutdown authority concentrates considerable power into the Secretary's hands, but the dire
consequences of a terrorist attack justify giving the Secretary the authority to shut down a chemical facility that has failed to comply with the law. With hundreds of thousands of lives at stake, the Secretary must have the authority to ensure our chemical facilities have adopted security measures sufficient to reduce the risk of a terrorist attack. If a facility cannot, will not, or has not done so, it simply cannot be allowed to keep operating.
It was only after very careful consideration that I decided to include this power in my bill. I note that the Maritime Transportation Security Act provides similar authority to the Coast Guard. Admiral Bone testified since 2004 the Coast Guard has used this authority to shut down 32 facilities--three of which were chemical facilities. He testified it was imperative the Department of Homeland Security be given that closure authority.
Before closing, I will comment on a couple of very important and controversial issues. One is the issue of inherently safer technology which is often referred to as IST. My bill allows chemical facilities to choose whatever security measures best meet the performance standards required by the Department. IST is one of the recognized means of meeting a performance standard. In addition, my legislation requires the vulnerability assessment include an analysis of security measures, including vulnerabilities arising from the use, storage, and handling of dangerous chemicals. However, I make clear our legislation does not mandate IST. Not only would doing so be at odds with the performance-based approach we have endorsed in this bill, I also do not believe it is appropriate for a bill on security to dictate specific industrial processes. Such uses are outside the scope of the legislation, beyond the jurisdiction of this committee, and are not the only way to address security issues.
I fully expect some facilities will adopt inherently safer technologies. I certainly encourage them to do so if that is the best means for them. However, that should be their decision.
This legislation does not tell facilities how high to build their fences or what chemicals to use or how they may use them. It is the result that matters. I believe this bill will result in significantly enhanced security for the chemical sector. This is a Homeland Security bill. It is not an environmental regulation.
In summary, this legislation requires chemical facilities to conduct vulnerability assessments, create and implement security plans, establish emergency response plans, and to submit these plans to the Department of Homeland Security for approval or disapproval.
It gives the Department broad authority to ensure that chemical facilities are addressing the risks of terrorist attacks and giving the Department the authority it needs. The legislation is risk based and performance based, and I am confident it will provide long overdue standards that will ensure stronger and more consistent security at our chemical facilities.
Before closing, I once again thank my lead cosponsor and the ranking member of the Homeland Security Committee, Senator Lieberman. We have worked very hard with the members of our committee, including the Presiding Officer, all year long to explore this through a number of hearings, and we have engaged in many months of negotiations.
I also thank our cosponsors, Senator Coleman, Senator Carper, and Senator Levin, for their hard work on this bill.
I look forward to adding additional cosponsors and working with the committee to move this vital legislation forward.
Thank you, Mr. President.
http://thomas.loc.gov/