Military Aid to Indonesia

MILITARY AID TO INDONESIA

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, just 1 month ago, this Congress approved the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, of 2006. President Bush signed the bill into law on November 14. The act contains strong language concerning the political and military situation in Indonesia.

Congress requested from the administration evidence of genuine progress in military reform, the protection of human rights, and accountability for crimes against humanity. It asked for such evidence before the administration made available to Indonesia any funds appropriated under the Foreign Appropriations Act for the Foreign Military Financing Program and before it issued any licenses for the export of lethal defense articles for the Indonesian Armed Forces.

Congress also gave the administration the authority to waive these conditions when it is in the interests of national security to do so, as it usually does when placing these kinds of conditions on this or any administration.

To measure the desired improvements in military reform, we asked the State Department to certify that, No. 1, the Indonesian Government is prosecuting and punishing, in a manner proportional to the crime, members of the Armed Forces who have been credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights; No. 2, at the direction of the President of Indonesia, the Armed Forces are cooperating with civilian judicial authorities and with international efforts to resolve cases of gross violations of human rights in East Timor and elsewhere; and No. 3, at the direction of the President of Indonesia, the Government of Indonesia is implementing reforms to improve civilian control of the military.

Congress does not make these requests lightly, and we based our decision on four decades of Indonesian history and U.S.-Indonesian relations. The Indonesian Armed Forces have frequently acted to forestall progress and the growth of democracy in Indonesia. Over the last decade, taking note of this, Congress has placed certain restrictions on military assistance to Indonesia, and--over that same span of time--we have seen certain positive changes in TNI behavior.

This progress is occurring--of course--in a larger context. Indonesia is making commendable progress in building one of the world's largest democracies, with democratic elections most recently in 2004.

Congress did not include the conditions on aid for Indonesia's military contained in the Foreign Operations Act to hinder the development of Indonesian democracy or punish the Indonesian people, but to assist them as they build a better future for their country.

The Indonesian Armed Forces have rightly been criticized in the past, but I also want to emphasize the changes we have seen, the positive steps Indonesia's military authorities have taken. Those steps are important and praiseworthy.

The Armed Forces have revised their old ``Dual Function'' doctrine, an artifact of the Sukarno and Suharto years, under which the Armed Forces claimed both a military and a socio political role in the life of the Indonesian state.

Under Suharto, military officers also served as parliamentarians, provincial governors, mayors, civil servants, and teachers. The Armed Forces also controlled the police. They effectively controlled giant industrial and commercial concerns such as the state oil company.

That has stopped. The TNI has stepped back from politics, and given up its reserved seats in the Indonesian Parliament.

Indonesia's military officers have shown repeatedly in recent years that they accept their place in the new Indonesia, and during their country's last two national elections, they have behaved in an exemplary fashion.

When Indonesia suffered the terrible blows inflicted upon it by last December's tsunami, the Indonesian military acted with bravery and great humanity to bring assistance to the victims of that most terrible natural disaster.

We recognize what they have done and we admire their commitment to the new and more democratic system their country is building.

Sadly, while the Indonesian Armed Forces have done a great deal, they have not done enough. Too many reasons for serious concern remain.

Six years after the TNI's involvement in East Timor's referendum on independence left 1,400 people dead, the Indonesian authorities have not brought one Indonesian officer to justice for abuses committed in the Timorese capital of Dili and elsewhere in that island nation. Indeed, some officers suspected of serious abuses have received not punishment or censure, but promotions to higher grades of their services.

There are numerous cases of human rights activists being harassed and even murdered, and we still have not seen justice for these victims.

Last year, when Indonesia's Parliament was considering a South African-style truth and reconciliation commission to discuss past atrocities, military officials objected--strongly and publicly--to the inclusion of ``truth'' in the commission's title, warning any ensuing investigation into past human rights crimes would not help the aim of building national unity.

During that debate, a retired Indonesian major general serving in Parliament, a man named Djasri Marin, said a remarkable thing. According to Australia's The Age newspaper, he said, ``If we reveal everything, it will be far from the idea of reconciliation, because there will be trials.'' He added, ``If we want to disclose everything for the sake of mere truth, it will prevent us from real reconciliation ..... Let's bury the past and step towards the future.''

It will be difficult to move into a common future in a unified fashion if the Indonesian military cannot own up to its past and take responsibility for its actions. That is one reason why we need to continue promoting positive change within the Indonesian Army. We need to continue pressing for evidence of genuine military reform, human rights protections, and accountability for crimes against humanity, just as Congress has requested.

In plain and simple language, Congress made its intent clear, asking the administration for evidence of genuine improvement in these three areas. It seems unlikely that either the President or the Secretary of State could have misunderstood or misconstrued this congressional expression of intent. Still, only a week after President Bush signed the Foreign Operations bill into law, the State Department hastily waived these conditions on military assistance, squandering an opportunity to encourage the TNI and Indonesian authorities to engage in meaningful reforms.

The waiver authority, granted to the administration by Congress, comes with implicit expectations by Congress that the administration will use it wisely and well. During the few days that passed between the time the President affixed his signature to the Foreign Appropriations Act and the moment Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns affixed his signature to the waiver, the President has little time to act on congressional concerns.

We certainly saw no major advances in the three areas marked out by Congress. The TNI took no new steps to assure the appropriate prosecution and punishment of TNI members credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights. The TNI took no new steps to show it is cooperating with civilian judicial authorities and with international efforts to resolve cases of gross violations of human rights in East Timor and elsewhere. The Indonesian authorities took no new steps to improve civilian control of the military. How could they? A week is hardly any time.

The great irony of all this is that the amount of assistance affected would have been small; small, but of great symbolic importance. I regret to say that the administration's decision to waive these conditions on national security grounds is also of great symbolic importance. Congress was promoting accountability and the rule of law in a democratic system. The Department of State has said the administration remains committed to accountability, but its actions suggest otherwise.

To waive these conditions in such a preemptory fashion raises serious questions about the relationship this administration has decided to have with Congress. In truth, it makes a mockery of the waiver process. Can we trust the administration to implement conditions like this in good faith? They waived the conditions--on supposed national security grounds--a week after the President signed the bill into law. It probably takes a week just to move a paper like that through the State Department bureaucracy.

In truth, it demeans the process, making a national security waiver a waive-it-when-you-feel-like-it waiver, rather than a last resort when other priorities intrude.

And so, I ask the administration, how shall we do business with one another in the future? Does the administration want us to eliminate such waiver authorities, so that its officers are required to give our concerns a fair hearing?

The administration needs to do more to make sure that U.S. policy and U.S. assistance to Indonesia promote TNI accountability and discourage the impunity the TNI still enjoys. I respectfully disagree with MG Djasri Marin. Nobody can step towards the future by burying the past.

We are intensely interested in Indonesia's future and the success of its democracy. Indonesia is the world's fourth most populous country, with an Islamic population larger than that of any other country on the planet. It unwillingly hosts a number of radical terrorist groups that have killed hundreds of Indonesian citizens and hundreds of foreign visitors to Indonesia's shores. It sits astride vital trade routes linking the Middle East to the Pacific.

We want Indonesia to succeed, and we will continue to support the Indonesia Government and the Indonesian people. But uncritical assistance to the TNI will only hinder Indonesia's democratic transition and undermine our interests in that country.

We know Indonesia faces a serious terrorist threat and that the Indonesian authorities must act to protect their nation's citizens from that threat. We have urged closer U.S. cooperation with Indonesian police authorities to face down terrorism, and we support efforts to fund, train, and equip the Indonesian police's antiterrorism units. We applaud the Indonesian Government's determination to vet all members of such units to make sure they have not been involved in human rights violations.

We do not dispute that the TNI could play an important and appropriate role in Indonesia's own fight against terrorism, but we cannot ignore the institution's history of human rights abuses. We should not lend American support to an unreformed TNI, a TNI that no Indonesian democratic institution can hold accountable for human rights abuses. Congress clearly expressed its intent in this regard.

We will find ourselves on shaky ground--and place our counterterrorism strategy in the region at risk--if we do not press for reforms in an Army that considers itself above the law.

I strongly urge the State Department to reconsider its decision to waive in such a preemptory fashion the restrictions placed upon military assistance to Indonesia by this Congress. The administration needs to provide Congress with a better sense of the benchmarks it is using to encourage TNI reform and measure TNI progress. And it needs to use its waiver authority more judiciously if it expects Congress to continue granting such authority.

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