Impeachment
Floor Speech
Donald Trump held taxpayer-funded military aid hostage from an ally at war while demanding a personal, political favor. He tried to cheat, got caught, and worked hard to cover it up. His actions constitute a shocking, corrupt abuse of power and betrayal of his oath of office. Just as a sheriff cannot delay responding to calls for help until the callers endorse his re-election, the President is not entitled to withhold vital military assistance from a foreign ally until they announce an investigation to smear his political rival. The proof shows precisely the type of corruption that the Framers sought to prevent through the Impeachment Clause, including foreign interference in our election.
Two further points are significant. First, the President is guilty of the crime of bribery, which is specifically listed in the Constitution as a grounds for impeachment.\1\ Second, the President's unprecedented campaign to obstruct the impeachment inquiry compels us to conclude that the evidence he is hiding would provide further proof of his guilt. I. The President committed the federal crime of bribery
There is no question--based on the original meaning of the Constitution, the elaboration of the impeachment clause in the Federalist Papers, historical precedent, and common sense--that the President need not violate a provision of any criminal code in order to warrant removal from office.\2\ The President's argument that he must violate ``established law'' to be impeached would be laughable if its implications were not so dangerous.
But there is no reasonable doubt that the President has violated established law. The Constitution specifically states that a President who commits bribery should be impeached.\3\ The evidence before us establishes that President Trump has committed the crime of bribery as it existed at the time of the framers and now. Therefore, even using the President's own standard, the Senate has no choice but to convict.
The evidence shows that the President solicited interference in the 2020 election for his own benefit by pressuring Ukraine to announce an investigation into his political opponents in return for releasing nearly $400 million in taxpayer-funded military aid Ukraine desperately needed, as well as a meeting with President Zelensky at the White House. He sought, indeed demanded, a personal benefit in exchange for an official act.
Section 201 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code criminalizes ``bribery of public officials and witnesses.'' A public official is guilty under this section when they seek ``anything of value'' in exchange for any ``official act'' and do so with corrupt intent. The code even specifies that punishment for this crime may include disqualification ``from holding any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States.'' \4\ A. The requested investigations constitute ``things of value''
The investigations that President Trump requested into his political enemies and to undermine claims that Russia illegally helped him get elected are clearly ``things of value.'' \5\ By all accounts, he was obsessed with them. According to multiple reports, Trump cared more about the investigations than he did about defending Ukraine from Russia. Ambassador Gordon Sondland even testified that the President ``doesn't give a s**t'' about Ukraine and only cares about ``big stuff'' like the announcement of the investigations he requested.\6\
Courts have consistently applied a broad and subjective understanding of the phrase ``anything of value.'' All that matters is that the bribe had value in the eyes of the official accepting or soliciting it. The Second Circuit has determined that ``anything of value'' includes stock that, although it had no commercial value at the time, had subjective value to the defendant.\7\ Similarly, the Sixth Circuit held that loans that a public official would have been otherwise unable to receive were ``thing[s] of value.'' \8\ The Eighth Circuit has similarly emphasized that ``anything of value'' should be interpreted ``broadly'' and ``subjectively.'' \9\
Further, the ``thing'' need not be tangible, and it need not be immediately available. For example, the Sixth Circuit held that a promise of ``future employment'' is a thing of value.\10\ A D.C. district court found that travel and entrance to various events that Tyson Foods gave to the Agriculture Secretary's girlfriend counted as things of value, despite the fact that they were not given directly to the Secretary and were not tangible items.\11\ Campaign contributions also count as ``things of value,'' even contributions made to Super PACs, despite Supreme Court precedent holding that independent expenditures do not have sufficient value to candidates to justify placing limits on them.\12\ In other contexts, the courts have interpreted the phrase ``thing of value'' to encompass a tip about the whereabouts of a witness,\13\ information about government informants,\14\ and the testimony of a government witness.\15\ The courts have roundly rejected the proposition that this phrase ``covers only things having commercial value;'' intangibles, including information itself, can certainly be a ``thing of value.'' \16\ The relevant inquiry is not the objective value of the thing offered, but ``whether the donee placed any value on the intangible gifts.'' \17\
Here, President Trump clearly placed value on the announcement of investigations. During the July 25 phone call, Trump stated that it was ``very important'' that Zelensky open these investigations.\18\ Over several months, Trump and Rudy Giuliani had made repeated public statements about how important they thought the investigations were. Since at least April, 2017, President Trump has been publicly promoting the debunked conspiracy theory that a California- based cybersecurity company, CrowdStrike, worked with the Democratic National Committee to fabricate evidence that Russia interfered in the 2016 election and hide the proof of their actions in Ukraine. Rudy Giuliani, the President's personal attorney, has been promoting a conspiracy theory about Joe and Hunter Biden since at least January, 2019.\19\ Days after Zelensky was elected, Trump stated on air that he would be directing Attorney General Barr to ``look into'' the CrowdStrike conspiracy theory.\20\ In May, 2019, Rudy Giuliani, with the knowledge and consent of President Trump and acting on the President's behalf,\21\ planned to travel to Ukraine to ask for these investigations, which he said would be ``very, very helpful to my client, and may turn out to be helpful to my government.'' \22\ On July 10, top Ukrainian officials met with Energy Secretary Perry, John Bolton, Kurt Volker, and Ambassador Sondland at the White House where Sondland made clear that an official White House visit with Zelensky was important to the President.\23\
Further, the electoral value to President Trump of investigations that would smear Joe Biden and the DNC while casting doubt on Russian interference in the 2016 election is obvious. President Trump was elected in a shocking and narrow victory after polls showed him trailing his opponent until officials announced that she was under investigation.\24\ The announcement of an investigation into his political opponents clearly had tremendous value to him personally.
The President's counsels claim that Trump demanded investigations of his political rival as part of a perfectly legitimate anti- corruption effort. In short, they want the Senate to leave our common sense at the door. At least four undisputed facts decisively disprove the claim that President Trump's actions were motivated by the public interest and not his own.
First, as one of my colleagues has put it,\25\ it ``strains credulity'' to suggest that President Trump was pursuing the public interest and not his political benefit when the only corruption investigations he could think to demand involved his political opponents.\26\ President Trump's counsel have claimed throughout this trial that the President believed corruption in Ukraine to be widespread. Yet he did not suggest a single investigation or programmatic action other than the two investigations of his political rivals.
Second, President Trump did not actually want Ukraine to conduct the investigations he only wanted Zelensky to announce them.\27\ If he really did want to get to the bottom of a legitimate concern, a public announcement of the investigation would not further that interest. Any good investigator knows that, if you actually want to get to the truth, you do not prematurely tip off the subject of the investigation. Indeed, federal prosecutors are instructed to not even ``respond to questions about the existence of an ongoing investigation or comment on its nature or progress before charges are publicly filed.'' \28\ While announcing the investigations could only harm any legitimate law enforcement objective, it would obviously benefit President Trump's political goals.
Third, President Trump never sought the investigations through ordinary, official channels, or if he did seek them the Justice Department declined to pursue them. If President Trump wanted bona fide investigations, as opposed to politically-motivated announcements, he would have charged the Department of Justice with conducting an official investigation, and the Department would have sought cooperation from the Ukrainian government through the U.S.- Ukraine Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT). Legitimate requests made pursuant to an MLAT allow DOJ to take testimony, obtain records, locate persons, serve documents, transfer persons into U.S. custody, execute searches and seizures, freeze assets, and engage in any other lawful actions that the state can take.\29\ Trump claims that he just wanted to root out criminality and corruption. But he did not ask domestic U.S. law enforcement to look into the matter; to date, there is no criminal investigation of Hunter Biden. Instead, Trump tried to coerce a foreign government to investigate a U.S. citizen without any formal coordination with the U.S. Justice Department. In other words, there was not a sufficient basis for a bona fide, domestic criminal investigation, so Trump had to go elsewhere. The fact that Trump asked a foreign government to investigate Hunter Biden is not evidence that he cared about corruption; it is evidence that he was engaged in corruption.
In fact, Ukraine ultimately resisted President Trump's requests for investigations precisely because the President had failed to rely on the usual channels used to prevent political interference with law enforcement.\30\ If Trump actually wanted a legitimate investigation, and wanted to ensure that DOJ would be privy to relevant information, he would have sought formal assistance through the U.S.-Ukraine MLAT. DOJ has confirmed that he did no such thing.\31\ Instead, President Trump acted through his personal attorney, Rudy Giuliani, a man who made clear that he was duty bound to pursue his boss's personal interests and not those of the public.\32\ The only reasonable explanation for the President's decision to completely bypass the Justice Department is that he knew that his conspiracy theories could not withstand scrutiny and he set out to circumvent law enforcement officials. They were solely intended to serve Trump's personal, political interests.
Finally, as the American Intelligence Community has unanimously concluded,\33\ the CrowdStrike conspiracy is not supported by any evidence. It is difficult to fathom how propagating Russian-generated propaganda that implicates American public figures and companies is in the national interest of the United States. Even if his motives were mixed, and he cared peripherally about corruption generally, his predominant goal was to smear a political opponent. B. The release of the hold on military aid and the promised White House visit constitute ``official acts''
The two acts the President agreed to perform--releasing the hold on military aid and setting up an official White House meeting with Zelensky--constitute ``official acts.'' The bribery statute defines ``official act'' broadly to include ``any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official's official capacity, or in such official's place of trust or profit.'' \34\ Military assistance and an official White House visit were within his control only because of his tenure in elective office. In fact, both receiving foreign dignitaries and providing foreign assistance are in the President's official, constitutional job description.\35\
Actions authorized by statute, such as the ones President Trump took here, are particularly clear examples of official acts.\36\ Congress has specifically authorized, and circumscribed, the President's ability to award military assistance to foreign countries. This process has been codified since the early 1960s, and there is an enormous federal apparatus devoted to evaluating the needs of foreign nations, how those needs intersect with legitimate U.S. foreign policy interests, and how to award foreign aid in line with those interests.\37\ Further, when the President placed a hold on the aid, he was acting on behalf of the United States, not in his personal capacity. It defies reason to argue that the President's decision to award, or fail to execute, a foreign aid determination is not an ``official act'' under the bribery statute.
Similarly, an official White House meeting is an ``official act'' because the President is specifically ``assigned by law'' \38\--in both the Constitution and numerous statutes-- with receiving representatives from foreign governments.\39\ Indeed, the authority to receive ambassadors and recognize foreign governments is considered so core to the office of the President that the Supreme Court has struck down statutes that interfere with it.\40\ C. The President corruptly sought a quid pro quo
President Trump made an agreement with the specific intent to be influenced in his decision whether to lift the hold on the military aid and to host a White House meeting. In United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, the Supreme Court held that a bribe made or solicited ``in return for'' an official act entails an exchange, a quid pro quo.\41\ In a seminal case, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that the term ``corruptly'' means that the official act would not be undertaken (or undertaken in a particular way) without the thing of value.\42\
Department of Justice guidance on the issue, citing the standard jury instructions that numerous courts have upheld, indicates that ``corruptly'' denotes ``nothing more than . . . acting `with bad purpose' to achieve some unlawful end.'' \43\ The guidance further explains that, ordinarily, this ``bad purpose'' is ``a hope or expectation of either financial gain or other benefit to one's self, or some aid or profit or benefit to another.''\44\ In other words, the intent merely to be influenced in the way prohibited by the bribery statute itself is sufficient to find that the defendant acted ``corruptly.''
Further, the Supreme Court unanimously held in 2016 that the quid pro quo demand ``need not be explicit,'' the official ``need not specify the means that he will use to perform his end of the bargain,'' nor must the official actually intend to follow through for a prosecutor to succeed in making her case that the defendant is guilty of bribery.\45\ In a Seventh Circuit case, the court made clear that the context of a communication can be determinative: evidence of a quid pro quo can emerge from ``the often clandestine atmosphere of corruption with a simple wink and a nod if the surrounding circumstances make it clear that something of value will pass to a public official if he takes improper, or withholds proper, action.'' \46\ While the defendant in that case never made an explicit offer and never relayed a specific amount of money, the court nonetheless upheld his conviction for bribery.\47\
Trump's actions clearly qualify as a quid pro quo. Less than a month prior to this phone call, President Trump had put a hold on hundreds of millions of dollars in military aid to Ukraine and had previously set in motion, but not committed to, an official White House visit with Ukraine's new president, Volodomyr Zelensky. When Trump and Zelensky spoke on July 25, Trump set the terms of the conversation by making clear that he felt Ukraine owed him for America's generosity. And as soon as Zelensky mentioned that Ukraine was interested in receiving American anti-tank missiles, the President immediately stated that he would like Zelensky to ``do us a favor though,'' and explicitly asked Zelensky to investigate the Biden conspiracy theory and alleged Ukrainian interference in the 2016 election. As soon as Zelensky appeared to agree to open the requested investigations, Trump almost immediately assured the Ukrainian President that ``whenever you would like to come to the White House, feel free to call.'' \48\ Text messages sent by Special Envoy Volker indicate that it had also been made clear to the Ukrainians prior to the call that the official White House visit was also conditioned upon Zelensky complying with Trump's request for these investigations.\49\ Gordon Sondland, the American ambassador to the EU, testified that the President's proposal to lift the hold in exchange for the investigations was as clear as ``two plus two equals four.'' \50\ Trump's acting Chief of Staff, Mick Mulvaney, confessed during a press conference that there was a quid pro quo exchange and suggested that the public should just ``get over it.'' \51\
The implication of Trump's message to Zelensky on the July 25 phone call is that Trump would not lift the hold or have the White House meeting unless Zelensky opened the requested investigations. The obvious political value to the President of opening these investigations constitutes sufficient grounds for a jury to determine that he had a ``bad motive'' in making this request. Trump is guilty of quid pro quo bribery. D. Trump's defenses are not persuasive
Trump attempts to absolve his behavior by arguing that his subjective intent is irrelevant to whether he committed an impeachable offense, that there is no quid pro quo because Ukraine never announced the infamous investigations, and that, even if he did commit a quid pro quo, he cannot be impeached because the articles do not accuse him of bribery. Even setting aside that these defenses ignore the fact that Trump still has not held a White House meeting with Zelensky, these arguments are wholly unpersuasive in their own right. 1. Trump's subjective intent is eminently relevant
Trump claims that his subjective intent is irrelevant; that he cannot be impeached based on the reasons for which he sought the investigations.\52\ This argument is specious for at least three reasons. First, the two offenses that the Constitution explicitly mentions as requiring removal from office--treason and bribery--hinge on the subjective reasons that the official acted. If the Commander-in-Chief orders the military to take certain actions with the purpose of benefiting an enemy of the United States, then the President has committed treason, even if the President generally has the authority to command the armed forces. If the President vetoes a law because someone has paid him a large bribe, then he has committed bribery, even if the President generally has the authority to veto laws. When we are prohibited from scrutinizing the President's reasons for acting, we lose the ability to protect our democracy from tyrants and traitors.
Second, the President maintains that he needs to have violated ``established law'' in order to be impeached.\53\ Using the President's own standard, then, in evaluating whether he violated the federal bribery statute, we must evaluate whether he acted with corrupt intent. If the President wants to be scrutinized using the standards of the federal criminal code, then he must concede that his subjective intent is at issue.
Third, even if Trump had other reasons for releasing the aid, it was still a crime for him to even ask for the investigations. Section 201(c) of Title 18 prohibits public officials from demanding anything of value ``for or because of any official act.'' \54\ The courts have been clear that even if the official act ``might have been done without'' the bribe, the defendant is still guilty under section 201(c).\55\ Even if Trump never actually intended to maintain a hold on the aid, even if he decided to release the aid for entirely legitimate reasons, the fact that he requested the investigations as a ``favor'' \56\--because of how generous the President was in agreeing to conduct a White House visit or lifting the hold on the military aid--means that the President committed a crime.
Even if a legislator would have voted for a piece of legislation because he thinks it is in the public interest, he still commits bribery if he takes a payoff to do it. As the courts have made clear, an illegal bribe under this section may take the form of ``a reward [. . .] for a past act that has already been taken.'' \57\ Thus, the fact that the President continued to ask for the investigations after the hold was finally released \58\ does not absolve him; it further incriminates him. 2. Trump completed his crime the moment he solicited the bribe
It is undisputed that the President, either directly or indirectly, demanded investigations into Joe Biden and a conspiracy theory involving the Democratic National Committee. The President's only response is that he cannot be liable because he did not receive what he requested. Under federal law, however, a corrupt official need not receive the benefit he demands or perform the official acts in question; ``it is enough that the official agreed to do so.'' \59\ It is the solicitation of a private benefit in and of itself that constitutes the crime.\60\ All a prosecutor would have to demonstrate is that the President made an agreement or offer to exchange official acts for a thing of value.
We know from the memorandum of the July 25 phone call, from Volker and Sondland's texts, and from Sondland's testimony that Trump had agreed to lift the hold and conduct the White House meeting in exchange for the investigations.\61\ We also know that there is additional evidence out there that speaks to the President's communications--both directly and through his agents--with Ukraine regarding his illegal scheme. We know, at the very least, of the existence of diplomatic cables from the Ukrainian embassy about the hold on the military assistance and communications with the State Department about the hold.\62\ The head of the agency that placed the hold on the military assistance has refused to respond to a lawful subpoena, under the instruction of the White House.\63\ As discussed below, when a party fails to produce or obstructs access to relevant evidence, that failure ``gives rise to an inference that the evidence is unfavorable to him.'' \64\ In this case, although the evidence already presented proves the crime of bribery, the Senate should infer that the evidence that the executive branch has hidden about these communications would provide further evidence that Trump agreed to this illicit exchange. 3. Senators must convict if they conclude that the President committed the crime of bribery, whether or not the term `bribery' appears in the articles
The first article of impeachment accuses the President of ``corruptly solicit[ing]'' the public announcement of investigations that were in his ``personal political benefit,'' in exchange for ``two official acts.'' \65\ In response to questions from Senators, Trump's counsel has argued that because the article did not explicitly refer to the crime of bribery, Trump was provided inadequate notice. This argument is absurd.
Trump has received plenty of notice that he stands accused of bribery. Trump's actions, as described in the article, clearly align with the elements of the federal crime of bribery: he solicited a thing of value in exchange for official acts and did so with corrupt intent.\66\ Further, the House Judiciary Committee report adeptly explained why the President is guilty of bribery under the criminal code.\67\ Lawmakers have been discussing the President's misdeeds in terms of bribery for months now.\68\ His lack of a defense is due not to lack of notice but to lack of facts.
The historical record confirms the common sense notion that the articles need not name specific crimes. In 1974, the House Judiciary Committee approved three articles of impeachment against President Nixon, none of which referenced any provisions of any criminal code.\69\ Many of my colleagues were presented with similarly drafted articles of impeachment against Judge Porteous in 2010. In that instance, the House adopted four articles of impeachment, none of which explicitly referenced the criminal code.\70\ The first article described conduct that amounts to bribery--claiming that Judge Porteous ``solicited and accepted things of value'' in exchange for ruling in favor of a particular party--but never used the term ``bribe'' or mentioned the federal bribery statute.\71\ The Senate unanimously convicted Judge Porteous on this article and voted to forever disqualify him from holding office.\72\ No one seriously entertained the notice argument then, and there is no good reason to do so now. This bad faith defense is a red herring, and we must not let it distract us from the issue before us: the President's crimes.
Trump's claim that he cannot be removed for a crime unless the crime is specifically mentioned in the articles of impeachment--coupled with his claim that there must be proof of a crime--is simply untenable. By Trump's flawed logic, if he had been impeached for ``shooting someone on Fifth Avenue,'' he could not be removed for ``murder'' unless that word was specifically included in the articles. We have not been called to sit in judgment of the House of Representatives' diction; we sit in judgment of the President's actions--carefully and precisely described in the articles of impeachment as a clear-cut case of bribery. II. The President's unprecedented campaign to obstruct access to relevant evidence compels us to conclude that the evidence is against him.
The House of Representatives has made a very strong case that the President's refusal to engage in any way with their investigation is unlawful and constitutionally offensive. But make no mistake--this conflict is more than a dispute between the branches of government. The House of Representatives and a number of Senators have raised the alarm bells not for our own sake, but because when the President hides from Congress, he hides from the American people. The separation of powers does not exist to benefit members of Congress; it exists to curb the excesses of enormously powerful government officials.
Throughout this entire ordeal--from the moment the call transcript was improperly placed on a classified server \73\ to the time when Trump threatened to unlawfully assert executive privilege over any testimony requested by the Senate \74\--the President has sought to keep his illegal scheme secret from the very people the scheme was designed to manipulate: the American electorate.
Indeed, the withholding of aid itself was concealed, unlike with other similar pauses or suspensions of military assistance.
The law and historical precedent are clear--when the President stifles Congress' investigative authority, whether during an impeachment inquiry or when Congress is exercising its broader mandate to investigate the executive branch, he has exceeded the bounds of the law. Because Trump has flouted congressional inquiry in such a brazen and unhinged manner, this violation alone requires us to vote to remove him from office.
Separately, this egregious campaign of obfuscation strengthens the case against the President for abuse of power. As a matter of law, when a party to a case improperly withholds relevant evidence, courts can instruct juries to make an adverse inference--to assume that the evidence would be unfavorable to the withholding party. In this case, Trump has withheld every single piece of evidence that the House requested. The facts before us confirm the underlying logic of the adverse inference rule--that when a party hides something, it is because they have something to hide. Applying that rule here, the already overwhelming evidence against Trump becomes an avalanche. A. Trump's obstruction requires us to infer that all the evidence is against him, which only strengthens the case for removal for abuse of power
It is a long-established rule of law that when a party ``has relevant evidence within his control which he fails to produce, that failure gives rise to an inference that the evidence is unfavorable to him.'' \75\ Importantly, this rule applies even in the absence of a subpoena and, in fact, ``the willingness of a party to defy a subpoena in order to suppress the evidence strengthens the force of the preexisting inference,'' because in that scenario ``it can hardly be doubted he has some good reason for his insistence on suppression.'' \76\ Indeed, the courts have recognized that the adverse inference rule is essential to prevent intransigent parties from abusing ``costly and time consuming'' court proceedings to subvert their legal duty to produce relevant evidence.\77\ The Supreme Court has specifically applied this rule against a party who selectively provided weak evidence and failed to allow those persons with the most relevant knowledge to testify, noting that ``the production of weak evidence when strong is available can lead only to the conclusion that the strong would have been adverse.'' \78\ As the Court put it, in circumstances like this, ``silence then becomes evidence of the most convincing character.'' \79\
We know that the Trump administration has relevant evidence that it refuses to produce. As an initial matter, the President has failed to comply with a single request from the House of Representatives, and, following the President's orders, the White House, the office of the Vice President, the Office of Management and Budget, the State Department, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Energy refused to produce a single document in response to 71 specific requests issued by the House of Representatives.\80\
But we also know of specific pieces of evidence that go to the heart of the House's case and that Trump is concealing. Mark Sandy testified that in August, OMB produced a memorandum recommending that the President's hold on the Ukraine military assistance be released.\81\ William Taylor testified that on August 29, he sent a first person cable to Secretary Pompeo, relaying his concerns about the ``folly I saw in withholding military aid to Ukraine at a time when hostilities were still active in the east and when Russia was watching closely to gauge the level of American support for the Ukrainian Government.'' \82\ Mr. Taylor also testified that he had exchanged WhatsApp messages with Ambassadors Volker and Sondland as well as with Ukrainian officials. The White House has refused to release any of these documents. We therefore must infer that they demonstrate that there was no interagency process to review the best use of the funds--that this rationale was pre-textual.
The White House maintains that Ukraine was not even aware of the hold on the military assistance until after it was reported on publicly. But we have testimony to the contrary-- testimony that includes reference to specific documents that the President is withholding. Laura K. Cooper, the American deputy assistant secretary of defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia, testified that her staff received two emails on July 25th that directly undermine Trump's claim. The first, received at 2:31 PM, stated that the Ukrainian embassy was asking about the security assistance. The second, received at 4:25 PM, stated that the Ukrainian embassy knew that the foreign military financing assistance had been held up.\83\ At the behest of President Trump, the State Department has not released these emails. Unless and until the administration produces these documents and any others bearing on when Ukraine first learned about the hold, we should assume that they demonstrate that Ukraine knew about the hold when Trump spoke to Zelensky on July 25. B. The evidence that has emerged despite Trump's intransigence has only bolstered the case against him
Based on the above analysis alone, the Senate is more than entitled to infer that the mountain of evidence that Trump is withholding would demonstrate his guilt. But two further points compel us to make such an inference. First, Trump confessed on national television to having ``all the materials'' and bragged about how he had kept them from Congress.\84\ We cannot let this gleeful boast stand without inferring that the materials in question speak to Trump's guilt.
Second, as the House managers repeatedly cautioned us would happen, the evidence that Trump has been hiding has started to come out. And each newly revealed tape or record has been unfavorable to the President's case. The assumption that the law compels us to make about the contents of these materials--that they demonstrate the President's guilt--is confirmed each and every time they come out into the light. Most damning has been the leak of a draft of John Bolton's forthcoming book, which confirms that the President ``told his national security adviser in August that he wanted to continue freezing $391 million in security assistance to Ukraine until officials there helped with investigations into Democrats including the Bidens,'' as well as details about the involvement of various senior cabinet officials in Trump's illegal scheme.\85\ And this is only the most recent revelation in a rapidly growing series of records that have come to light. On January 14, 2020, Lev Parnas, a former associate of Rudy Giuliani, released documents which demonstrate both that the President was orchestrating a deal to get Zelensky to ``announce that the Biden case will be investigated,'' and that Marie Yovanovitch was the subject of an illegal intimidation campaign.\86\ On January 25, 2020, a tape from April, 2018 was publicly released of a private dinner with top donors where Trump is heard yelling: ``Get rid of her! Get her out tomorrow. I don't care. Get her out tomorrow. Take her out. Okay? Do it,'' in reference to Ambassador Yovanovitch.\87\ The President is also heard specifically asking how long Ukraine would last in a war against Russia absent U.S. support--in other words, inquiring how much Ukraine is at the mercy of the United States.\88\ Not only does this tape provide further evidence of a coordinated campaign against the Ambassador; it also undermines ``earlier defenses by the White House that Trump wasn't aware of what was taking place in the early phase of the Ukraine affair.'' \89\ This tape suggests that Trump not only knew about the Ukraine affair, but also that ``he may have been directing events'' as early as April 2018.\90\
The steady drip of damning evidence leaking from the President's associates, combined with Trump's own public confession to concealing relevant evidence, compels us to conclude what the law already instructs us to infer: that the mountain of evidence Trump is hiding proves his guilt. Conclusion
It is clear to me that Trump is guilty of bribery and that his campaign to obstruct any investigation into his wrongdoing only strengthens the case against him. Trump's actions require us to vote to remove him from office. When the Framers included the impeachment power in the Constitution, they knew that there would be a presidential election every four years--and they also knew that this was an insufficient check against a President who abuses the power of his office to cheat his way to re-election. Trump's misdeeds are a case study in the need for impeachment.
Throughout the impeachment trial, I have been moved by the grave moral purpose that the Senate is charged with pursuing--of sustaining America as an idea, of our Constitution as a living document that gives substance to our identity as the world's leading democracy. As we sit in judgment of a President who has demonstrated nothing but contempt for our laws and our values, history sits in judgment of the Senate. By failing to remove Trump from office, we will have failed our country. ENDNOTES
1. U.S. Const. art. II. Sec. 4 (``The President [. . .] shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors'').
2. See generally, Jared P. Cole & Todd Garvey, Cong. Res. Serv., R44260, Impeachment and Removal (2015); see also Paul Leblanc, Democrats Play 1999 Video of Lindsey Graham Talking About Impeachment to Bolster Case Against Trump, CNN, Jan. 23, 2020, available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/23/ politics/impeachment-managers-lindsey-graham-video/index.html (quoting then-Representative Graham's statement during the Clinton impeachment that an impeachable offense ``[d]oesn't even have to be a crime. It's just when you start using your office and you're acting in a way that hurts people, you have committed a high crime''); Steven J. Harper, Why Did Alan Dershowitz Say Yes to Trump?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 2020, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/22/opinion/alan- dershowitz-impeachment.html (quoting Alan Dershowitz's 1998 comments regarding the Clinton impeachment that ``[i]t certainly doesn't have to be a crime if you have somebody who completely corrupts the office of president and who abuses trust and who poses great danger to our liberty. You don't need a technical crime. We look at their acts of state. We look at how they conduct the foreign policy. We look at whether they try to subvert the Constitution'').
3. U.S. Const. art. II Sec. 4.
4. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 201(b).
5. The President does not contest that he is a ``public official,'' and the law confirms that it would be foolish to claim otherwise. The courts have found that a wide array of officials are subject to the bribery statute: from a cook at a federal prison, U.S. v. Baymon, 312 F. 3d 725, 728 (5th Cir. 2002), to a private in the United States army, U.S. v. Kidd, 734 F. 2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1984), to a housing eligibility technician employed by an independent public corporation, U.S. v. Hang, 75 F. 3d 1275, 1280 (8th Cir. 1996). It would defy reason to argue that a cook at a federal prison is a public official but the President of the United States is not.
6. Tom Porter, Ambassador Sondland Said Trump Doesn't `Give a S--' about Ukraine Except When it Benefits Him Personally, Official Testifies, Business Insider, Nov. 19, 2019, available at https://www.businessinsider.com/sondland-said- trump-doesnt-give-a-s-about-ukraine-official-2019-11. This attitude to Ukraine is amplified by a statement made by Secretary of State Pompeo, who has refused to testify before the House of Representatives, when he recently asked a NPR political reporter whether she thought Americans gave a [expletive] about Ukraine. Mary Louise Kelly, Encore: NPR's Full Interview with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, NPR, Jan. 25, 2020, available at https://www.npr.org/2020/01/25/ 799470712/encore-nprs-full-interview-with-secretary-of-state- mike-pompeo.
7. United States v. Williams, 705. F2d. 603, 602-23 (2d Cir. 1983) (``Corruption of office occurs when the officeholder agrees to misuse his office in the expectation of gain, whether or not he has correctly assessed the worth of the bribe.'').
8. U.S. v. Gorman, 807 F.2d 1299, 1304-05 (6th Cir. 1986) (explaining that ``anything of value'' should be ``broadly construed'' with a ``focus . . . on the value which the defendant subjectively attaches to the items received'').
9. U.S. v. Renzi, 769 F.3d 731, 744 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Williams and Gorman in explaining importance of subjective test for ``anything of value'').
10. Gorman, 807 F. 2d 1299 at 1299.
11. Williams, 7 F. Supp. 2d 40 at 52-51.
12. U.S. v. Menendez, 132 F. Supp. 3d 635 (D.N.J. 2015); see Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010) (``The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent [. . .] undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate,'' and therefore the government was not justified in placing limits on independent expenditures.)(internal citations and quotations omitted).
13. U.S. v. Sheker, 618 F. 2d 607, 609 (9th Cir. 1980);
14. U.S. v. Girard, 601 F. 2d 69, 70 (2d Cir. 1979).
15. U.S. v. Zouras, 497 F. 2d 1115, 1121 (7th Cir. 1974).
16. Sheker, 618 F. 2d at 609.
17. U.S. v. Williams, D.D.C.1998, 7 F.Supp.2d 40, vacated in part 240 F.3d 35, 345 U.S.App.D.C. 111 (emphasis added).
18. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telephone Conversation with President Zelensky of Ukraine 3 (July 25, 2019).
19. Ryan Lucas, House Committees Subpoena Rudy Giuliani in Impeachment Inquiry, NPR, Oct. 1, 2019, available at https:// www.npr.org/2019/10/01/765986709/house-committees-subpoenae- rudy-giuliani-in-impeachment-inquiry.
20. Tamara Keith, Trump, Ukraine and the Path to the Impeachment Inquiry: A Timeline, NPR, Oct. 12, 2019, available at https://www.npr.org/2019/10/12/768935251/trump- ukraine-and-the-path-to-the-impeachment-inquiry-a-timeline.
21.Ichael Biesecker, Mary Clare Jalonick & Eric Tucker, Giuliani Associate Names Trump, Pence, More in Ukraine Plan, Associated Press, Jan. 17, 2020, available at https:// apnews.com/708b81d4c77 038eb0b751c 30f72ff315 (quoting letter from Giuliani requesting a meeting with Zelensky ``as personal counsel to President Trump and with his knowledge and consent'').
22. Kenneth P. Vogel, Rudy Giuliani Plans Ukraine Trip to Push for Inquiries that Could Help Trump, N.Y. Times, May 9, 2019, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/us/ politics/giuliani-ukraine-trump.html.
23. See Keith, Trump, supra n. 23.
24. Amy Chozick & Patrick Healy, `This Changes Everything': Donald Trump Exults as Hillary Clinton's Team Scrambles, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 2016, available at https://www.nytimes.com/ 2016/10/29/us/politics/donald-trump-hillary-clinton.html.
25. Benjamin Wood, Mitt Romney Says Everybody Knows It `Is Wrong' to Ask a Foreign Government to Probe a Political Rival, Salt Lake Tribune, Oct. 11, 2019, available at https:/ /www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2019/10/10/mitt-romney-says-he- hasnt/. Sen. Romney made this statement in regard to Trump's request, made live on national television, that China investigate the Bidens. But the logic of the Senator's claim applies with equal force to Trump's demand that Ukraine investigate the Bidens.
26.hile CrowdStrike is not actually a Trump political opponent, Trump was accusing them of conspiring with the Democratic National Committee and did not suggest any illegal conduct on their part unrelated to President Trump's political past and future.
27. Zach Beauchamp, Trump Didn't Want an Investigation into Biden. He Wanted a Political Show., Vox, Nov. 20, 2019, available at https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/11/ 20/20974201/gordon-sondland-impeachment-hearing-testimony- biden-show-trump.
28. See United States Attorneys' Manual 1-7.400--Disclosure of Information Concerning Ongoing Criminal, Civil, or Administrative Investigations, 1997 WL 1944080. Only in special circumstances are U.S. attorneys permitted to make public statements about ongoing investigations, such as when necessary to ensure public safety.
29. Treaty of Mutual Legal Assistance, Ukraine-U.S., art. 1 cl.2, July 22, 1998, T.I.A.S. No. 12978.
30. The Trump-Ukraine Impeachment Inquiry Report: Report for the H. Perm. Select Comm. On Intelligence Pursuant to H. Res. 660 in Consultation with the H. Comm. On Oversight and Reform and the H. Comm. On Foreign Affairs at 122, 116th Cong. (2019).
31. Department of Justice, Statement, Sept. 25, 2019 (``The President has not asked the Attorney General to contact Ukraine--on this or any other matter. The Attorney General has not communicated with Ukraine--on this or any other subject.'')
32. See Kenneth P. Vogel, Rudy Giuliani Plans Ukraine Trip to Push for Inquiries that Could Help Trump, N.Y. Times, May 9, 2019, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/us/ politics/giuliani-ukraine-trump.html (quoting Giuliani, in response to questions about his travel to Ukraine, noting that ``this isn't foreign policy--I'm asking them to do an investigation [. . .] because that information will be very, very helpful to my client [Donald Trump], and may turn out to be helpful to my government.'') (emphasis added).
33. Miles Parks & Brian Naylor, Trump Did `Nothing Wrong,' His Legal Team Says in First Day of Impeachment Defense, NPR, Jan. 25, 2020, available at https://www.npr.org/2020/01/25/ 797321065/president-trumps-legal-team-to-begin-impeachment- defense?utm-source= twitter.com&utm-term=nprnews &utm- campaign= npr&utm-medium= social (``American intelligence agencies have been unanimous in their assessment that it was Russia that interfered in the last presidential race'').
34. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 201(a)(3).
35. See U.S. Const. art. II Sec. 2 (The President ``shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers,''); Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2086 (2015)(the Reception Clause ``assigns the President means to effect recognition on his own initiative'').
36. Cf. U.S. v. Birdsall, 233 U.S. 223, 231 (1914) ([I]t is sufficient that [the act] was governed by a lawful requirement of the executive department under whose authority the officer was acting; and such requirement need not have been prescribed by a written rule or regulation, but might also be found in an established usage which constituted the common law of the department.'').
37. See Marian L. Lawson & Emily M. Morgenstern, Cong. Res. Serv., R40213, Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy (2019).
38. McDonnell v. U.S., 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2373. The meetings that the Court considered in McDonnell are not comparable. Nowhere in Virginia's constitution or statutes is the governor tasked with arranging meetings, hosting parties, or engaging in unofficial conversations with other government officials. The Court took issue with a jury instruction which stated that an official act need not have been taken ``pursuant to responsibilities explicitly assigned by law,'' whereas the President's actions here clearly are assigned by law.
39. See U.S. Const. art. II Sec. 2 (The President ``shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers''); Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2086 (2015)(the Reception Clause ``assigns the President means to effect recognition on his own intiative''); 22 U.S.C. Sec. 2754; 22 U.S.C. Sec. 2311(a).
40. See Zivotofsky 135 S. Ct. at 2096.
41. 526 U.S. 398, 404 (1999).
42. U.S. v. Brewster, 506 F. 2d 62, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In contrast, with a bribe under 201(c), the thing of value need not be a reason that the official performed the act at all. See infra 14-15.
43. Department Of Justice, Criminal Resource Manual, 834. Intent Of The Parties, available at https://www.justice.gov/ jm/criminal-resource-manual-834-intent-parties.
44. Id.
45. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2371.
46. United States v. Synowiec, 333 F. 3d 786, 789 (7th Cir. 2003).
47. Id. at 789-90.
48. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra n. 21 at 5.
49. Charlie Savage & Josh Williams, Read the Text Messages Between U.S. and Ukrainian Officials, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2019, available at https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/ 10/04/us/politics/ukraine-text-messages-volker.html.
50. Lisa Mascare, Mary Clare Jalonick & Eric Tucker, Watch: Ambassador Gordon Sondland Testifies Trump Directed Ukraine Quid Pro Quo, Associated Press, Nov. 19, 2019, available at https://www.wgbh.org/news/national-news/2019/11/19/watch- live-eu-ambassador-gordon-sondland-2-others-testify-on-day-4- of-impeachment-hearings.
51. Jessica Taylor, `Get Over It': Politics is Part of Foreign Policy, Mulvaney Says, NPR, Oct. 17, 2019, available at https://www.npr.org/2019/10/17/770979659/watch-white- house-holds-now-rare-press-briefing-amid-impeachment-syria- conflicts.
52. See Trial Memorandum of President Donald J. Trump at 27-28 (Jan. 20, 2020) (rebutting ``radical claim that a President can be impeached and removed from office solely for doing something he is allowed to do, if he did it for the `wrong' subjective reasons [. . .] By eliminating any requirement for wrongful conduct, House Democrats have tried to make thinking the wrong thoughts an impeachable offense'') (emphasis in original).
53. As discussed supra pp. 1-2, it is eminently clear that the President need not have violated ``established law'' in order to have committed an impeachable offense.
54. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 201(c).
55. Brewster, 506 F. 2d at 72.
56. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra n. 21 at 3.
57. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. at 404.
58. See Kevin Breuninger, Trump Says China Should Investigate the Bidens, Doubles Down on Ukraine Probe, CNBC, Oct. 3, 2019, available at https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/03/ trump-calls-for-ukraine-china-to-investigate-the-bidens.html (quoting President Trump, in response to question about what he wanted Ukraine to do, stating that ``[i]f they were honest about it, they would start a major investigation into the Bidens'').
59. McDonnell v. U.S. 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2371 (2016).
60. Id. at 2370-71 (2016); see also United States v. Hawkins, 37 F. Supp. 3d 964 (N.D. Ill. 2014), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, remanded, 2015 WL 309520 (7th Cir. 2015)(``What is required to make the act corrupt is not an intent to take a specific action, but the holding out of the performance of the duties of one's office for sale.'').
61. See supra pp. 12-13.
62. Andrew E. Kramer, Ukraine Knew of Aid Freeze in July, Says Ex-Top Official in Kyiv, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 2019, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/03/world/europe/ ukraine-impeachment-military-aid.html; Transcript: Laura Cooper and David Hale's Nov. 20 Testimony to House Intelligence Committee, Washington Post, Nov. 20, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/11/20/ transcript-laura-cooper-david-hales-nov-testimony-house- intelligence-committee/. Any statement to the contrary by Zelensky is not reliable for the simple reason that Ukraine's future depends on remaining in Trump's good graces. As Catherine Croft, who testified that the Ukrainians knew about the hold much earlier than she expected to, stated, the Ukrainians did not want the hold publicized because it ``would be a really big deal in Ukraine, and an expression of declining U.S. support for Ukraine.'' Charlotte Butash, Summary of Catherine Croft's Deposition Testimony, Lawfare, Nov. 16, 2019, available at lawfareblog.com/summary-catherine-crofts-deposition- testimony.
63. Peter Baker, Mulvaney Will Defy House Impeachment Subpoena, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 2019, available at https:// www.nytimes.com/2019/11/12/us/politics/mulvaney-impeachment- subpoena.html.
64. Interstate Circuit v. U.S., 306 U.S. 208, 226 (1939); see infra Part II.
65. H. Res. 755, 116th Cong. Sec. 1 (2019).
66. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 201(b); see supra pp. 2-13.
67. See Report of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Impeachment of Donald John Trump, President of the United States at 120-26, 116th Cong. (2019).
68. See Patricia Zengerle, Karen Freifeld & Richard Cowan, Pelso Says Trump Has Admitted to Bribery as Impeachment Probe Intensifies, Reuters, Nov. 14, 2019, available at https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-impeachment/pelosi-says- trump-has-admitted-to-bribery-as-impeachment-probe- intensifies-idUSKBN1XO1HD; Jessica Taylor, Rep. Adam Schiff: Trump's Potentially Impeachable Offenses Include Bribery, NPR, Nov. 12, 2019, available at https://www.npr.org/2019/11/ 12/778380499/rep-adam-schiff-trumps-potentially-impeachable- offenses-include-bribery (explaining that Rep. Schiff believes ``there's a clear argument to be made that Trump committed `bribery' and `high crimes and misdemeanors'--both explicitly outlined in the Constitution as impeachable offenses--when pressuring the Ukrainian government to investigate former Vice President Joe Biden's son in exchange for long-promised military aid''); Sean Collins, A Republican Memo Details the Party's Impeachment Inquiry Defenses. They Aren't Very Strong, Vox, Nov. 12, 2019, available at https:// www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/11/12/20961073/trump- impeachment-hearings-republican-testimony-strategy (quoting Rep. Speier: ``[t]he president broke the law. He went on a telephone call with the president of Ukraine and said `I have a favor, though,' and then proceeded to ask for an investigation of his rival. And this is a very strong case of bribery'').
69. H. Doc. No. 109-153, Jurisdictional History of the Judiciary Committee: The Committee and Impeachment, at 124- 27.
70. See H. Res. 1031, 111th Cong. (2010).
71. Id. at Sec. 1.
72. Jennifer Steinhauer, Senate, for Just the 8th Time, Votes to Oust a Federal Judge, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 2010, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/09/us/politics/ 09judge.html.
73. Carol D. Leonnig, Tom Hamburger, & Greg Miller, White House Lawyer Moved Transcript of Trump Call to Classified Server after Ukraine Adviser Raised Alarms, Washington Post, Oct. 30, 2019, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/ politics/white-house-lawyer-moved-transcript-of-trump-call- to-classified-server-after-ukraine-adviser-raised-alarms/ 2019/10/30/ba0fbdb6-fb4e-11e9-8190-6be4deb56e01_story.html.
74. Jennifer Haberkorn, Trump Will Try to Block Bolton Impeachment Testimony; Senate to Get Case Next Week, Pelosi Says, L.A. Times, Jan. 10, 2020, available at https:// www.latimes.com/politics/story/2020-01-10/pelosi-trump- impeachment-case.
75. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agr. Implement Workers of America (UAW) v. N.L.R.B., 459 F. 2d 1329, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (noting that ``this rule can be traced as far back as 1722); United States v. Roberson, 233 F. 2d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 1956) (``Unquestionably the failure of a defendant in a civil case to testify or offer other evidence within his ability to produce and which would explain or rebut a case made by the other side may, in a proper case, be considered as a circumstance against him and may raise a presumption that the evidence would not be favorable to his position.'').
76. International Union, 459 F. 2d at 1338 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 1339.
78. Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. at 226.
79. Id.
80. Sharon Lafontaine, House Managers Asks: Where are the Documents, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 2020, available at https:// www.nytimes.com/live/2020/impeachment-trial-live-01-24.
81. Jeff Stein & Josh Dawsey, In New Legal Memo, White House Budget Office Defends Withholding Aid to Ukraine, Washington Post, Dec. 12, 2019, available at https:// www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/in-new-legal-memo- white-house-budget-office-defends-withholding-aid-to-ukraine/ 2019/12/11/0caa030e-1b95-11ea-826b-14ef38a0f45f_story.html.
82. Jeremy Herb & Manu Raju, Top US Diplomat Said John Bolton Opposed Call Between Trump and Ukrainian President, CNN, Oct. 22, 2019, available at https://www.cnn.com/ politics/live-news/impeachment-inquiry-10-22-2019/ h_a1a8938b60cfd525c6768fd7dc207e6d.
83. Transcript: Laura Cooper and David Hale's Nov. 20 Testimony to House Intelligence Committee, Washington Post, Nov 20, 2019, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/ politics/2019/11/20/transcript-laura-cooper-david-hales-nov- testimony-house-intelligence-committee/.
84. Peter Wade, Trump Brags About Concealing Impeachment Evidence: We Have All the Material, They Don't, Rolling Stone, Jan. 22, 2020, available at https:// www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/trump- impeachment-evidence-we-have-all-the-material-they-dont- 941140/.
85. Maggie Haberman & Michael S. Schmidt, Trump Tied Ukraine Aid to Inquiries He Sought, Bolton Book Says, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 2020, available at https://www.nytimes.com/ 2020/01/26/us/politics/trump-bolton-book-ukraine.html.
86. Greg Sargent, Four Big Takeaways from the Explosive Lev Parnas Documents, Washington Post, Jan. 15, 2020, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/01/15/four- big-takeaways-explosive-lev-parnas-documents/.
87. Rosalind S. Helderman, Tom Hamburger & Josh Dawsey, Listen: Trump Tells Associates to `Get Rid Of' U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, Washington Post, Jan. 25, 2020, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ recording-of-trump-calling-for-yovanovitchs-ouster-appears- to-corroborate-parnass-account/2020/01/24/77326098-3ed3-11ea- baca-eb7ace0a3455_story.html.
88. Josh Lederman, Trump Appears on Audio to Demand Yovanovitch's Ouster Without Knowing Her Name, NBC News, Jan. 25, 2020, available at https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/ politics-news/trump-appears-audio-demand-yovanovitch-s- ouster-without-knowing-her-n1123171.
89. Philip Ewing, Trump Impeachment Recap: Dems Wrap With Exhortation to Act, NPR, Jan. 24, 2020, available at https:// www.npr.org/2020/01/24/799426878/trump-impeachment-recap- dems-wrap-with-exhortation-to-act.
90. Id.
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