Hearings of House Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality - The Energy Policy Act of 2005: Ensuring Jobs for Our Future with Secure and Reliable Energy

HEARINGS OF HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND AIR QUALITY - THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005: ENSURING JOBS FOR OUR FUTURE WITH SECURE AND RELIABLE ENERGY

February 16, 2005

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Mr. Markey. Mr. Chairman? Is it possible, Mr. Chairman, in the magnificence of your generous heart that I could as----

Mr. Hall. Just as soon as Mr. Boucher leaves, I'll ask you--no, it is not possible because he has to be here to have----

Mr. Markey. Just 5 minutes----

Mr. Hall. Do you all--do you men mind him asking a few questions? Let me ask somebody over here. What about--is that okay with you all? Does anybody here object to it? Okay? All right. Markey, you are running the Congress now, just get after it.

Mr. Markey. You can leave now if you want. Mr. Kane, my----

Mr. Kane. Yes, sir.

Mr. Markey. In your testimony, you state that the provision of H.R. 6 that would require the NRC to conduct a rulemaking to devise--to revise the design bases threat security regulations and require the establishment of a force-on-force exercise program should be eliminated because the activities have already occurred. Is it not true the Commission undertook some security orders to revise the design bases threat, but has yet to conduct a public rulemaking?

Mr. Kane. What happened was they made an order, an interim compensatory measures order, and it required the industry to be in compliance last year with the new design bases threat, which is--which was on October 29, and all of the units were found to be in compliance with that.

Mr. Markey. Well, right after the attacks of September 11, the nuclear industry began to assert that there was no clarity in what it responsibilities were in the area of nuclear reactor security. Specifically, the industry claimed to be unclear as to what its role was in protecting the reactors against attack versus what the government's role was. The provision that you suggest be eliminated from the energy bill also requires the President to determine what those respective roles are. Do you believe that this determination has already been made? If so, please elaborate.

Mr. Kane. Yes. We have been working closely with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and with the Department of Homeland Security and are going about, now, determining through a system of councils. There is a Nuclear Coordinating Council, as there is with other segments of the critical infrastructure, that we are working with now to determine exactly what those interrelationships and an integrated response would be. But we are--we feel we have met, and the NRC agrees, that we have met the design bases threat piece that was in section 661 of the bill.

Mr. Markey. All right. Well, the Commission recently decided to allow the Nuclear Energy Institute to hire Wachenhut Corporation to serve as the adversary force at nuclear reactor even though Wachenhut forces currently guard about one-half of the Nation's operating reactors and even though there have been numerous reports of Wachenhut cheating or failing at force-on-force exercises at nuclear facilities. Just today, the Department of Energy Inspector General reported that Wachenhut personnel brought personal firearms onto the Nevada test site, against regulation. As you can guess, I don't think that the industry should be allowed to test itself, and none of the reported safeguards that are in place to mitigate the obvious self--obvious conflicts of interest are sufficient, but that hasn't addressed the obvious question of why the NEI hired a company with such an abysmal record of incompetence, cheating, and rule violations. Can you please describe the process by which the NEI made its decision to hire Wachenhut instead of another company, given the fact that Wachenhut is the guard for one-half the plants? How can a company test itself with regard to the security of the facilities that it already has a contract to protect?

Mr. Kane. All right. Part of the process in selecting the force-on-force adversary part was we want to see the best possible and the most professional adversary force put together that we possibly can. I would use an analogy from Navy flying, a top gun for example. Navy pilots fly the adversary aircraft and mimic who the would-be opponents would be, and they do a heck of a good job. And what we are trying to do here is to be sure that we have the very best adversary force.

Mr. Markey. I understand that, but the difference here is that Wachenhut makes money from guarding nuclear power plants today. So to have Wachenhut, then, do a test to whether or not--given the fact that is a corporation and it has to report to its shareholders, is it the same as having one group of Navy public servants test another group of Navy public servants, each in terms of their competency. It is just a completely different--in other words, Wachenhut's primary obligation is to their shareholders. In there--in the actual formation of their corporation, it says their principal duty is to their shareholders.

Mr. Kane. Right, but----

Mr. Markey. So if that is the case, and they short-change on safety, how can another part of Wachenhut bring them to account for something that is at the core of what their responsibilities are?

Mr. Kane. Right. I would say that these force-on-force security exercises are designed by the NRC, overseen and graded by the NRC, and the Wachenhut force-on-force--the adversary group provides what we think is probably the best adversary force that we can put together.

Mr. Markey. All right. I think it is an inherent conflict of interest. I think that is a huge mistake to have Wachenhut do the job, given their own track record. They need people overseeing them, and they need an independent group to be doing. I think it is a huge public safety risk that has been run in allowing that to happen, and I just hope that the public safety, in the long run, doesn't pay the price, given the deficiencies that exist in Wachenhut, generally. And I would say, Mr. Chairman, given your generosity and time, that--in conclusion, that the NRC has never done a public rulemaking on security. It has met secretly with the NEI and its members, but it has never done a rulemaking. I've read the secret orders. I find them wholly inadequate, and I think the NRC's failure to do a public rulemaking led to a product that is entirely deficient and which fails to protect against a terrorist attack on nuclear plants. I think that the hiring of Wachenhut to do the tests on the force-on-force security at nuclear power plants is just an example of the inadequacy of NRC oversight over this issue. It, once again, demonstrates just too-cozy a relationship with the nuclear industry that pays too much attention to the bottom line of the nuclear industry companies and not enough to the public safety and security issues. And I just wanted to put that on the record, Mr. Chairman, because we do know that Al Qaeda continues to place nuclear issues at the very top of their terrorist target list, and I think it is wrong for the NRC not to have yet gone through a public, formal rulemaking.

Mr. Hall. The record will reflect will opinions, and the record will reflect that we do not all agree with you. Will you yield back your time, Mr. Markey?

Mr. Markey. I will say that that Chairman--I will just--but just to point out, thought, that the Chairman has already voted for me 3 times in this committee to force a formal rulemaking by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on these issues, and I appreciate your support.

Mr. Hall. 3 times in 24 years is not bad, is it?

Mr. Markey. Even a blind squirrel uncovers an acorn once in awhile.

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