Executive Session

Floor Speech

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Mrs. FISCHER. Mr. President, recently I came to the Senate floor to speak about the airborne leg of the nuclear triad. Today I rise to discuss the value of another leg of the triad--our intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs.

Following the brief deployment of the Atlas and Titan ICBM weapon systems in the early 1960s, the United States deployed the first Minuteman ICBMs in support of the strategic deterrence mission. Over half a century later, today the United States deploys 400 Minuteman III ICBMs, each carrying a single warhead. While the Minuteman III system was deployed in the 1970s, much of its technology dates to the previous decade. The system was originally designed for a 10-year service life but has sustained an exceptionally high availability rate and is expected to remain in service through the 2030s, thanks to a series of life-extension programs. But we cannot extend the current system beyond 2030, and that is why we are now developing its replacement--the ground based strategic deterrent. Doing so will require resources in a budget- constrained environment and, perhaps for that reason, we are hearing renewed calls to abandon the triad and cut our ICBM force. However, this step would be foolish and dangerous to the United States and to our allied security for several reasons.

First, ICBMs are highly reliable and always ready. That is why they are regarded as the most responsive leg of the triad. Unlike bombers and submarines, which may require time to arm or maneuver, the ICBM force provides the President the ability to promptly respond if deterrence fails. This virtue is often mischaracterized as a source of risk.

The system's rapid response is described as a ``hair trigger'' by critics who often paint chilling pictures of 400 ICBMs automatically flying to their targets and causing Armageddon, either by accident or as a result of cyber interference.

I want to be clear that there is no ``hair trigger'' about our ICBMs. We have many safeguards put in place to ensure the system operates only as intended. For example, our ICBMs are actually targeted on the open- ocean spaces as a means of ensuring that, even if all of our safeguards failed and a missile somehow managed to launch by accident, it would land in the ocean and not accidentally start a nuclear war. The critics conveniently fail to mention this.

Former STRATCOM commander General Robert Kehler recently testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, and he said: ``It isn't the same thing at all as thinking about a Wild West hair trigger . . . . It's not the way it works.''

The high readiness of the ICBM force also provides an important hedge against uncertainty. Since we no longer maintain bombers on nuclear alert, the ICBMs and the submarines reinforce each other so that a technical failure in one leg of the triad does not render our day-to- day deterrent inoperative.

Those who advocate for doing away with the ICBM force must account for the fact that, under their proposals, in such moments there would not have been an additional leg of the triad to ensure our Nation isn't left without a nuclear deterrent. As our nuclear forces continue to age, reliability challenges will only grow.

Critics often describe the ICBM force as being vulnerable, even going so far as to call our missiles sitting ducks. It is true that silos are not hidden, they aren't mobile, and they can be targeted. But, again, this is a misunderstanding of what actually is the strength of the ICBM force.

In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Hyten stated that the ICBM force ``creates the most significant targeting problem for an adversary, because there are 400 separate targets across the United States. All would have to be independently targeted by an adversary. That targeting problem is hugely problematic and creates a significant advantage for us.''

Simply put, destroying 400 hardened and geographically dispersed silos is an extremely difficult proposition. Only Russia possesses the capability to destroy our ICBM force. No other nation on Earth can do so, and it would greatly diminish Russia's arsenal in the process. That is not a vulnerability. As General Hyten clearly states, it is a significant advantage for our Nation.

For these reasons and many others, Republican and Democratic administrations alike have maintained ICBMs as part of our nuclear forces for decades. The role of ICBMs has been reconsidered and reviewed many times, and their value has been repeatedly reaffirmed in a bipartisan manner. For example, last November the report by the bipartisan National Defense Strategy Commission stated that the triad presents insurmountable targeting challenges for adversaries, imposes disproportionate costs on adversary defenses, and hedges against unforeseen geopolitical or technological changes.

Mr. President, I will close by saying that our ICBM forces make key contributions to our overall nuclear forces and, as Members on both sides of the aisle agree, they are an essential ingredient to the bedrock of our national security--our nuclear deterrent.

Thank you, Mr. President.

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