Strengthening America's Security in the Middle East Act of

Floor Speech

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Mrs. FISCHER. Mr. President, I rise to speak about the Trump administration's decision to suspend compliance with the Intermediate- Range Nuclear Forces--or, the INF--Treaty and begin the process of withdrawing from this accord.

Signed in 1987, the INF Treaty banned all ground-launched cruise and ballistic missile systems with intermediate ranges between 300 and 3,400 miles. This landmark agreement led to the destruction of approximately 800 U.S. and 1,800 Soviet ground-launched missiles, along with their supporting equipment.

This is an issue I have been following closely since I joined the U.S. Senate in 2013. While concerns about Russia's compliance with the INF Treaty began long before then, 2013 was the first year U.S. officials formally raised the issue with their Russian counterparts. The following year, the Obama administration declared Russia to be in violation of the treaty and accused Russia of possessing an intermediate-range, ground-launched cruise missile.

After affirming Russia's violation of its INF obligations, the Obama administration continued to raise Russia's noncompliance at numerous bilateral and multilateral diplomatic engagements. In 2016, the Obama administration also resurrected the Special Verification Commission, a mechanism set up under the treaty to resolve compliance issues, which had not held a meeting since the year 2000. The Trump administration continued to exert diplomatic pressure on Russia, raising this issue at all levels of the Russian Government. Additionally, this administration began treaty-compliant research and development work on conventional, ground-launched missile systems to demonstrate to Russia that the United States would pursue additional military capabilities if Russia persisted in producing these illegal systems.

To further impose costs on Russia for its behavior, the administration sanctioned Russian companies involved in the development of the illegal missile system in December of 2017. Diplomatic engagement continued in 2018, and, despite multiple ultimatums, Russia continues to deny its violation of the treaty.

The United States has led a sustained, deliberate effort to methodically increase pressure on Russia, which has had every opportunity to return to compliance, but instead it continues to produce and deploy illegal systems in greater and greater numbers. Just last week, reports surfaced, alleging Russia has deployed another battalion equipped with the banned missile system. Instead of moving to correct its violation, Russia is going in the opposite direction. The evidence is clear, Russia has no intention of returning to compliance, and the United States cannot remain party to an agreement that amounts to a unilateral limitation on our Nation. It would certainly have been easier to ignore this issue and let another year pass with U.S. diplomats renewing their appeals while Russia builds more illegal weapons. However, this administration understood that maintaining U.S. compliance in order to prop up the illusion of an effective arms control agreement does not make our Nation safer. I applaud the Trump administration for making the tough but correct decision to withdraw.

The administration also deserves credit for its coordination with our NATO allies on this topic. A statement released by NATO last Friday expressed solidarity with the U.S. position, and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated:

All allies agree with the United States, because Russia has violated the treaty for several years. They are deploying more and more of the new nuclear capable missiles in Europe.

Let me repeat this point. As NATO has expressed solidarity with the U.S. position to withdraw from the INF treaty, our allies support us. Our NATO allies understand the Russian threat increase due to their treaty violation because they are at the most risk.

Some want to use this issue as an opportunity to debate the temperament of this administration and paint its decision to withdraw as a symptom of its contempt for arms control treaties. Others say the decision is motivated by China, as though Russia's violation and the deployment of a new nuclear-capable weapons system designed to hold our allies and our forces in Europe at risk is not relevant or is a secondary consideration, at best. Others have even gone so far as to argue that the decision to withdraw benefits Russia by liberating them from the limitations of the treaty. This is a deeply misguided view that overlooks the fact that Russia is already ignoring the treaty's limitations.

Let's be absolutely clear about what Russia wants. Russia wants the United States to stay in the treaty and maintain the status quo because it benefits them. They are building banned weapons systems while we are not. Their diplomats have sustained a campaign of denial and deception in order to put pressure on the United States to remain in this treaty. The notion that leaving the treaty is a windfall for Russia is a mistaken one.

Those who oppose the administration's decision must answer one basic question: How does remaining part of an agreement that Russia has already walked away from enhance U.S. security?

The answer is simple. It doesn't. The administration is right to leave the agreement, and responsibility for the failure of the INF Treaty lies squarely with Russia. The United States must now take additional steps to ensure that Russia derives no military advantage from its blatant violation of this accord.

Last year, the administration proposed developing a sea-launched cruise missile to ensure that our Nation has credible options to deter Russia's expanding arsenal of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. This effort must go forward, but it is years away from delivering such capability. Existing research and development efforts into ground-launched systems should be accelerated as part of a near-term response to Russia's actions.

Some will surely criticize these steps as an arms race and ridicule them as a symptom of outmoded ``Cold War'' thinking. Indeed, there are people who would prefer that we do nothing. I think that is dangerous. We must impose costs on Russia for its violation and create incentives for Russia to halt its destabilizing behavior. Again, they are building banned weapons systems. We are not. For years, we have used diplomatic appeals and sanctions to encourage Russia to stop production of these systems and to return to compliance. Yet they continue to blatantly violate the accord. Clearly, a firmer approach is needed.

Developing additional military capabilities in response to Russia's actions demonstrates to Russia that its pursuit of illegal systems will only result in a more lethal and a more capable U.S. military. In this way, we clearly indicate to Russia that violating treaties and building illegal weapons will ultimately harm its own national security interests. If we fail to respond sufficiently, Russia is likely to conclude that it can break treaties and favorably affect the balance of military power in the European theater at a modest cost. This will only encourage additional misbehavior, which could put the broader nonproliferation regime at risk.

The Trump administration's decision to withdraw is not the end of this process. The more important question is what comes next. Congress and the administration must ensure that the consequences of Russia's cheating outweigh any benefits it has obtained by violating this treaty.

Thank you, Madam President.

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