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Mr. RUBIO. Mr. President, I come to speak about the pending amendment we are going to vote on in about 25 minutes. It is an amendment that says it is a mistake to proceed with the withdrawal from Syria in the pace and scale that is currently proposed or that the White House has announced they are going to undertake.
What I will say here today is what I said about it initially; that is, that I think it is a bad idea. I said it then, and I said it to the President in a subsequent meeting, and I think it is important to restate it here as we begin to vote, since I believe this issue is going to be covered in the press more as a political issue than as a foreign policy one.
It is unfortunate that a lot of these issues are wrapped up as political decisions. These are not votes on political decisions. These are votes on the conduct of American foreign policy, which oftentimes have no partisan lines but rather are ideological, in some cases, or just simply a different way to view an issue.
I share the White House's and the President's desire that as quickly as possible--the key words being ``as possible''--we end conflicts abroad. It is in the best interest of our Nation, our families, and the families of the service men and women who are stationed abroad and involved in conflict zones that this be the case. The problem is, if you do so in the wrong way, you end up dramatically increasing the likelihood of a future conflict that will involve even bigger wars, with an even higher investment of lives and resources to win.
Our foreign policy in the Middle East today--particularly in this region we are talking about with Syria and Iraq--is focused on two primary objectives, as clearly stated by the policymakers. The first is the regional threat of Iran, its growing influence and its spreading reach, and the other is counterterrorism. These are the two linchpins of why we are there in the first place.
The Iran threat is self-explanatory. They pose a threat to our allies in the region, particularly Israel but ultimately to the United States. The terror threat is one that reminds us how quickly we as a nation have a tendency to forget things.
Now, no one has forgotten September 11, 2001, but what we sometimes fail to remember is what made it possible in the first place. What made September 11, 2001, possible in the first place was that a terrorist organization--al-Qaida--led by Osama bin Laden, had established within Afghanistan a safe haven. Al-Qaida was not the Government of Afghanistan--that was the Taliban--but the Taliban allowed them to have a safe haven in Afghanistan, and from that safe haven, they were able to plot terrorist attacks against America and ultimately strike us here in the homeland. It was possible because they had a place that allowed them to do this.
It is, in fact, the key to any terrorist organization that would like to conduct external attacks and that would like to attack America. They have to have a place to operate from, and it cannot be a place where they are being followed, where they are being attacked, and where they are being wiped out by Americans or coalition forces. It has to be a safe haven.
My No. 1 concern about this decision that has been made is that it could lead to the reestablishment of safe havens inside of Syria from which ISIS and al-Qaida could reconstitute themselves, conduct external plotting, and ultimately attack the United States.
We already face this risk. In Northwest Syria today, there is very little sustained pressure on ISIS elements. In Idlib, there is virtually no pressure on al-Qaida. Now, imagine with even less coalition pressure being put upon them, how capable they can become and how quickly they can establish a place from which they can plot against us.
To understand why ISIS needs to plot against us and conduct spectacular attacks against Europe and the United States--this is a group that needs to prove it is still alive, and it is still strong. If they can't prove it, they can't recruit people, and they can't raise money.
They are also in competition with other terrorist groups. In fact, ISIS is a spinoff of al-Qaida. These groups actually compete with one another for members and for resources. Both of them have a vested interest in attacking us abroad, not just in fulfillment of some ideological aims but as a means of survival because if these groups are able to conduct or inspire these kinds of attacks, it gives them credibility, they attract members and fighters, and it allows them to raise money for more attacks.
Some people will tell you: Well, let the others who are in the region take care of them--Turkey or Iran or the regime or the Russians. The problem is, none of these groups have shown any interest in fighting ISIS, not even a limited interest.
The Turks are largely interested in a buffer zone in the northern part of Syria--a buffer zone which the Kurds do not dominate because of their own internal politics. I am not claiming the Turks are fans of ISIS. I am saying ISIS is not their No. 1 priority.
Their No. 1 priority is defeating Kurdish forces and gaining control of a buffer zone in the northern part of Syria. That is what they are going to prioritize above anything and everywhere else. They are not a reliable partner, nor do they have the capability to be a reliable partner in sustaining pressure on ISIS.
Interestingly enough, if you look at what Turkey will need--even if they wanted to be a sustained partner against ISIS--it is logistical support from the United States of America. In essence, they can't even do what they are promising to do unless we are there with them to do it, but they don't want us to be there. That tells you they really just want us to leave so they can create this zone in the northern part of Syria.
The regime only cares about ISIS if they are in population areas or if ISIS is threatening critical infrastructure. If ISIS is taking ahold of an oil facility somewhere, they will care. If ISIS is in the middle of a big city, they will care. All of these other vast spaces, they don't have the resources, and frankly they don't care, as long as they don't pose a threat to the regime, they don't pose a threat to population centers they want to control, and they don't pose a threat to critical infrastructure like oil. If they are not there, they are not going to spend their limited resources.
All things being equal, they probably want to defeat them, but they don't have the wherewithal to sustain pressure on them. They have limited resources, and they are going to invest those resources in controlling population centers and in controlling critical infrastructure.
So here is the answer: If the United States and the anti-ISIS coalition are not in Syria and operating until ISIS is completely wiped out, there will be no sustained pressure on ISIS or on al-Qaida, and they will both grow back stronger, and they will have the capability to plot against the homeland and American interests around the world. That is something we cannot allow to happen. We cannot have that happen.
Some may say: Well, we can target them. We just don't have to have 1,500 or 1,800 special operators on the ground. We don't need to do that. We can do it through the air and so forth. ISIS is becoming an insurgency. An insurgency is much different than a group with a flag that controls buildings and territory. You can find those people, and you can strike them. An insurgency is people who blend into the population.
By day, they are a baker or an accountant or a merchant, but in the evenings and at night, they are an ISIS fighter planting bombs and killing people. Insurgencies are very difficult to fight and almost impossible, if not impossible, to fight with simply airpower, which is why the situation in Syria has been so positive. Two thousand American servicemen and special operators, alongside thousands of Syrian Democratic Forces and Kurds--who are primarily doing the ground fighting with our logistical support and air support--have eroded ISIS's control of territory in the country, but they have not eliminated it, and there is enough of it left that it could reconstitute itself. In fact, it is in the process of doing so already. They are clearly capable of killing American servicemen, as they did a few days ago, and since that time, there have been a series of other IED attacks inside of Syria, some of which could have killed Americans.
This is a group who has openly talked about their desire to possess chemical weapons, which they could use at any moment, potentially, against Syrian Democratic Forces and Kurds in that area--and, by the way, putting directly in danger our remaining service men and women alongside them. This remains a dangerous group capable of conducting attacks not just in Syria but potentially--especially if they have a safe haven abroad--here in the United States.
That is not to even mention a group who doesn't get talked about enough anymore--al-Qaida. Al-Qaida still exists, and there is a part of Syria in which they are completely uncontested. No one is going after them. They completely dominate the area, and they do whatever they want from there. And I promise you they are not there starting a car wash; they are there working to expand their brand and reach, to resurrect the al-Qaida brand around the world. What is the fastest way to do that? By conducting an attack against the United States and our interests. We should be worried about that alone.
The first reason why I am against this policy and why I support this amendment is that this policy directly undermines one of the two pillars of our strategy and our policy in this region, and that is counterterrorism. The second is the spread of Iranian influence. Let there be no doubt that this withdrawal as currently structured is a win--perceptually at a minimum but I believe in reality--for Iran.
Let's begin in Southern Syria, the areas that border Israel and Jordan. Our withdrawal means Iran and their pro-Iranian forces that include Hezbollah militias will now have even more operating space from which to target Israel and will now be able to set up a more reliable ground route by which they can send weaponry into Lebanon to support Hezbollah so that one day they can attack Israel from the air with rockets, precision-guided munitions, and the like.
We see it already, for example, in Natanz, where the United States still maintains a presence very near a huge refugee camp. We can already see the pro-Iran, pro-regime forces beginning to encroach closer and closer upon the American position, to the point where we may have to leave simply because we no longer have a defensive posture we can sustain. But what the withdrawal has done is it has allowed Iran and the pro-regime forces to go to our allies, to go to the groups on the ground whom we have been working with to fight ISIS and say to them ``The Americans are unreliable. The Americans are leaving. You might as well partner up with us now. We are the only ones who can protect you'' or ``You can lay down your weapons and just go back to your families because Americans are leaving.'' I fear it is working. I fear that they may dictate the pace of our withdrawal, because that announcement alone has undermined our credibility in the eyes of the partners we have worked with in Southern Syria.
What I just outlined is also true in the north, where the Kurds are facing the risk of military attack from the Turks, and they are saying: America is leaving, and the only people left whom we can partner up with to protect us are Iran and the regime and/or the Russians.
In fact, we have left them no choice but to join up with Iran and the Russians and pro-regime forces because if the choice is between annihilation by a Turkish military attack and joining up with a regime to stop a Turkish intrusion, they are joining up with a regime in Iran, further increasing Iran's power in this country.
It is not just contained within Syria; this announcement has actually accelerated the process of putting pressure on us to also get out of Iraq. All of the pro-Iran political parties inside the Iraqi Parliament are pushing very hard, very aggressively to pass a law that kicks America out of Iraq, and they are moving quickly on this. We see their tentacles in Afghanistan, where they are beginning to create internal political pressure through their parliamentary body to force America to pick a date: Tell us when you are leaving, a date certain.
People may say: What is wrong with this? Get out of Syria. Get out of Iraq. Get out of Afghanistan. Why are we fighting other people's wars?
We are not. These are not other people's wars; these are ours. These people who are going to operate in these safe havens and Iran--we are their target. They want to strike at us. And if we are not in Afghanistan and we are not in Iraq and we are not in Syria, then from where exactly are we going to conduct operations against terrorism? From where exactly are we going to be postured to defend ourselves if Iran decides to strike our other military facilities in the region? The answer is, we won't have anyplace to do that from. We won't. Not to mention what it says to the region.
Understand this: The Iranians and our enemies in the region have been telling everyone for a long time--and the Russians echo this--``The Americans are unreliable. They always abandon their friends. You can't count on them'' or ``America is a declining power.'' That is the other argument they use openly: ``America is a great power in decline, and every year that goes by, you will see that they can't back up their words, and that is why you can't count on them. America is weakened.'' I don't believe that is true. In fact, we know that is not true. But halfway around the world, they do, and when we take actions that prove it, it makes it true in the minds of a lot of people and a lot of countries, and it actually is dangerous because it could invite someone to take a reckless and irresponsible action on the basis of miscalculation. Someone may actually believe ``America is now weak; let's attack them,'' and then we will be in a war.
The best way to prevent a war is to make sure those who want to fight you know they have no chance of winning. If you give them any belief that they have a chance to win because you have withdrawn and, as a result, reinforced the narrative being used against you, I believe you will have increased the chance of war.
This is being used against us right now. Iran is openly parroting this. They are holding this up as an example of an Iranian win. They are saying: This proves our strategy has been working. The Americans are leaving Syria. They are going to have to leave Iraq. They are going to leave Afghanistan with their tail between their legs. We are winning, and they are losing.
It reinforces a narrative, by the way, that is also used against us by the Chinese and other parts of the world.
This is a very dangerous situation. That is why this is a bad idea. This is about a lot more than just pulling out and not wasting any more money in these other places. There is no one in the world who wishes that more than I do. I wish the money, I wish the lives, I wish all of this investment had not had to be spent. I openly wonder, how much more could we be doing if we didn't have this threat? But here is the problem: Whether or not we want it to exist, the Iranian threat and the threat of terrorism exist.
We cannot deal with the world the way we want it to be; we have to deal with the world the way it is. We didn't create the terror threat, but it is there. We can ignore ISIS, we can ignore al-Qaida, and we can ignore Iran, but they will not ignore us. We can decide not to go after them, but they will come after us.
I think it is a grave mistake because if we allow al-Qaida or ISIS or both to have a resurgence, they will attack the United States of America, they will attack our allies and our interests around the world, and they will try and they will plot to attack us here at home. The Iranian influence operation and their growth and influence in Iraq and Syria and now in Lebanon and increasingly in Yemen--and God forbid, in the future, in Bahrain--pose an existential threat to all of our allies in this region--none more so than the State of Israel. That is why I support this amendment. That is why I hope all of my colleagues will support this amendment.
It is important that the legislative branch and the Senate, which has a constitutional role to play in the setting of American foreign policy--they come to us to confirm people, and they come to us to fund these things--that we play our rightful role in the setting of American foreign policy. It is important that the Senate be on the right side of this issue so that we can hope to influence future actions and policies before they are taken and we can help change them once they have been taken in places headed in the wrong direction.
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