National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019
Floor Speech
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Mr. REED. Mr. President, I believe Senator Markey of Massachusetts is here to speak.
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Mr. REED. Mr. President, let me first thank Senator Markey and Senator Warren for their comments and just state that this amendment is very straightforward and simple. It ensures that Congress has an oversight role in authorizing the development of new or modified nuclear weapons, including low-yield nuclear weapons. It reiterates what Congress does every year in the National Defense Authorization Act. I consider the oversight role of this institution essential for the Defense Department and, in particular, for nuclear weapons.
There are many devastating weapons of war in the world, but nuclear weapons are different. Thankfully, it has been over 70 years since the only time nuclear weapons have been used in war, but because it has been so long, I think many are not fully aware of the awful power of nuclear weapons. On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped a nuclear bomb on Hiroshima. In the immediate aftermath, approximately 70,000 people--mostly civilians--were killed. Tens of thousands more would die of radiation poisoning within weeks. Approximately 80 percent of the city of 350,000 people was destroyed. The second nuclear weapon, dropped on Nagasaki 3 days later, killed 40,000 immediately and approximately 40,000 more people from radiation poisoning in the following weeks. A weapon that can kill more people in an instant than the United States lost in the entire Vietnam conflict deserves close congressional scrutiny.
To provide perspective on the size of these weapons, the bomb dropped on Hiroshima was 13 to 15 kilotons. The bomb dropped on Nagasaki was 18 to 20 kilotons. A low-yield nuclear weapon is defined as a nuclear weapon whose yield is less than 5 kilotons of explosive yield. For comparison, the Massive Ordinance Air Blast bomb, or MOAB, used on an Afghanistan tunnel network in 2017--and featured all across the media as a devastating explosion--is 11 tons, or 0.01 kilotons, about 500 times less powerful than a 5-kiloton, low-yield nuclear weapon. So we are talking about an extremely powerful weapon that will result in thousands of casualties if used.
Two weeks ago, I visited General Hyten, who is the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska. We participated in a classified exercise, involving the use of nuclear weapons. Again, the loss of life and destruction was truly sobering. I recommend that all of my colleagues participate in such a war game because it truly brings home the complexity and the essential role the Congress has in overseeing the development of nuclear weapons.
I would like to convey one point that General Hyten made to me at the conclusion of the war game--that his No. 1 job is to ensure that nuclear weapons never be used in the first place and that they act as a deterrence to their use.
With that, let me make a few observations on the amendment before us and why we are having this debate today.
The 2018 ``Nuclear Posture Review,'' released in February, recommends that the United States undertake deployment of a submarine-based, low- yield nuclear weapon. At present, the United States has several low- yield nuclear weapons, but they are deployed from the air.
The principle reasons advanced for this recommendation in the ``Nuclear Posture Review'' are, first, the development of the Russian doctrine to use low-yield nuclear weapons to ``escalate to de- escalate''; second, the inclusion of this doctrine not only in Russian plans but in repeated Russian war games; third, the significant expansion of the number of Russian nonstrategic, low-yield nuclear weapons that are not subject to arms control agreements, together with the Russian deployment of a land-based intermediate cruise missile that violates the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Agreement, or INF Agreement; and, fourth, finally, the development of extensive air defense systems over key Russian areas that could deny access to our current aircraft that would deploy a low-yield nuclear weapon.
The ``escalates to de-escalate'' strategy presumes that Russia has initiated hostilities in Europe and, after initial Russian success, either NATO forces regain the momentum and the conventional fight is turning decisively against Russia or Russia has secured its desired limited objective and anticipates a decisive counterattack by NATO. In either case, this Russian doctrine calls for a first strike with the use of a low-yield nuclear device to freeze NATO forces. The Russian logic is that we will not respond with high-yield weapons for fear of initiating an all-out nuclear exchange, and we lack the ability to strike key targets with our airborne low-yield weapons because of their area denial air defenses. Their doctrine assumes that we will accept the existing status of Russian forces, even if they occupy NATO territory, while nonmilitary measures are pursued. This conclusion is contrary to our longstanding commitment to NATO expressed at the NATO Summit in 2016. In the words of that summit, ``no one should doubt NATO's resolve if the security of any of its members is threatened. NATO will maintain the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations, wherever it should arise.''
Now, given this threat posed by the Russian doctrine, the Nuclear Posture Review proposes that the development of a submarine-based, low- yield nuclear weapon will strengthen deterrence, raise the nuclear threshold, and make Russia refrain from a first use of nuclear weapons since we will be capable of responding in kind to hold all of their critical targets at risk. In short, it will stabilize rather than destabilize nuclear deterrence.
The inherent difficulty in evaluating this recommendation is the realization that deterrence is based upon the perceptions of both parties and the implicit and explicit communication between both parties--in other words, what we are signaling with our words and actions, and whether the adversary is accurately interpreting those signals.
This is an extraordinarily difficult question. I and many of my colleagues have struggled with it throughout our service in the Senate and, in many cases, service in our previous careers. Indeed, experts in the field of nuclear deterrence honestly disagree with respect to the recommendation of this submarine launched, low-yield weapon. Some feel it is needed; others do not.
I am increasingly skeptical that a response to a low-yield Russian attack by an American low-yield counterattack will result in both sides refraining from future use of nuclear weapons. In other words, I am skeptical that we will avoid moving upward on the escalatory ladder leading to a larger nuclear exchange.
One important issue is the selection of targets and how that affects our interpretation of Russian objectives and, alternatively, how it will affect Russian interpretations. If the initial Russian target is integral to our military operations, will we see it as ``escalate to de-escalate'' or ``escalate to prevail.'' And if we respond in a way that is interpreted by the Russians as something more than a quid pro quo, will the Russians respond again, assuming we are beginning a nuclear campaign?
Moreover, will we cease conventional operations while allied territory is being held by Russia? This is the logic behind the Russian doctrine, but it contradicts our obligations under NATO. If we press these conventional attacks, especially if we are gaining advantages, the temptation to use additional nuclear weapons by the Russians may be irresistible.
Proponents may suggest that the simple possession of this seaborne low-yield weapon will be sufficient to deter the Russians, but that assertion seems to ignore existing airborne weapons that may be directed at critical targets that are accessible to our air attack and, as such, would accomplish the limited counterresponse that seems to be behind the current proposal. In addition, much of the investments we are making in modernizing our triad--particularly with long-range standoff weapons to replace our aging air-launched cruise missiles, the B-21 and the F-35 with the life extended B61-12 gravity bomb--should by 2030 offset the increasingly complex anti-access/anti-denial environment Russia is capable of.
There are no easy answers to these questions, and answers will change over time as political, military, and economic factors change. That is why I believe it is essential that Congress maintain a central role in the development and deployment of nuclear weapons and why I strongly urge this amendment. This is about Congress's role, not about a particular nuclear weapon.
In this bill, the fiscal year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, the request for the development of the submarine-launched, low- yield nuclear weapon is authorized. An amendment, offered in the Armed Services Committee, to require certain reports by the Defense Department before its deployment failed. It was offered by one of our colleagues on the Democratic side. Moreover, the funds are already appropriated for this weapon in the recent Energy and Water appropriations bill. An amendment to eliminate the funding at the full Appropriations Committee failed. So we are on track this year to go ahead with the development of this system, but the question is this: In the future, will Congress retain the right to make critical decisions about the development and the deployment of nuclear weapons?
So the debate today is not about whether the low-yield, submarine- launched ballistic missile will proceed. The debate today is about congressional oversight of the steps ahead on this new nuclear weapon and any other new or modified nuclear weapon.
Back in 1993, during consideration of the fiscal year 1994 National Defense Authorization Act, Congressmen Spratt and Furse included a provision that prohibited research and development that could lead to a low-yield nuclear weapon. Then, in 2002, President George W. Bush conducted a nuclear posture review, which concluded that the Spratt- Furse provision should be repealed because it purportedly had a chilling effect on the science in the DOE weapons laboratories and might be needed to destroy bunkers containing chemical or biological weapons. As a result, the fiscal year 2004 National Defense Authorization Act, reported out of committee by Chairman John Warner with Ranking Member Carl Levin, included section 3116, which repealed the Spratt-Furse provision.
When the fiscal year 2004 NDAA came to the floor for consideration in May of 2003, there was an exhaustive debate on the issue of this repeal, and several amendments were offered. The first amendment was an amendment by Senator Feinstein and Senator Ted Kennedy that proposed to strike the repeal, and it lost. I, then, offered the next amendment, which allowed research and development to occur but prohibited the final development and production of a low-yield nuclear weapon.
Senator John Warner then offered a second-degree to my amendment, which allowed research and development to occur but required specific authorization for final development and production, and that is the law today. Senator Warner was very clear about the necessary role of Congress. On the floor, John Warner stated:
In the second degree amendment, it is clear that the Congress is fully in charge, working with the Executive Branch. The Congress, and only the Congress, can authorize and appropriate the funds necessary to go one step beyond what the earlier [Reed] amendment has provided.
Well, now, while my amendment failed, the second-degree amendment offered by Senator John Warner passed 96 to nothing. Indeed, there are Members here today--our colleagues in the Chamber--who were there at the time and who voted for the modified amendment, the Warner-Reed amendment.
The John Warner amendment has been uncontested until this year in the fiscal year 2019 Defense authorization bill. An amendment offered in committee--and this is the amendment offered by the Presiding Officer-- eliminates the John Warner language requiring congressional authorization for development and deployment of the low-yield nuclear weapon.
Instead, now the administration simply has to submit funding in the Department of Energy budget for new or modified nuclear weapons, not the Department of Defense budget. As such, this could be done through the Secretary of Energy, not necessarily through the Secretary of Defense. Indeed, in a strictly legal interpretation, the Secretary of Defense would have no role in this budget request. In addition, once the information appears in the budget sent to Congress, the executive branch can immediately begin using prior year's monies, subject to reprogramming guidelines approved informally by the four defense committees and not the full Senate, to begin work on a low-yield nuclear weapon.
I think it is important to note this: Under the present language in the bill before us, it is the Secretary of Energy who could, at the request of the White House, indeed, conceivably--not likely, but conceivably, even over the objection of the Secretary of Defense--propose in his budget that we begin to develop a new nuclear device. Simply submitting that budget would authorize him to begin reprogramming funds, which would be approved, at best, by a handful of Senators. That is not the kind of consideration we must apply to develop a new nuclear weapon. It is the role of the Senate--all of us--to stand up and to state where we believe this country should be headed.
The threat and power of nuclear weapons has not changed. In fact, in the complex and unstable times of present day, with so many more states seeking nuclear weapons, I think it is imperative that Congress be more involved, not less, in the development and deployment of our country's nuclear arsenal.
Therefore, my amendment simply puts Congress back in the loop, restoring the oversight put in place by the John Warner amendment in 2003.
It is our fundamental duty to review, authorize, and appropriate, if necessary, the programs the executive branch will execute. I would contend that this is especially true, given the nature of nuclear weapons and their capability for destruction. Some may agree with the need for a new, modified, or low-yield weapon and some may not, but everyone in Congress should have a say on the issue.
My amendment simply ensures that Congress is involved every step of the way in the development of any new or modified nuclear weapon. I believe it is critical, considering the awesome destructive powers of this weapon, and I urge my colleagues to support this amendment so we can continue to exercise appropriate guidance on an issue that is existential to the survival not only of the country but of the world.
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Mr. REED. Mr. President, first, let me thank the Senator from Oklahoma for his graciousness in allowing me to respond.
As I read the language of the bill, the language we had in place since 2004 was stricken. That language prohibited, essentially, the production and development of a low-yield nuclear device without congressional authorization. In addition to that, the language that was inserted in the bill that is before us now creates a process, whereby in order to begin work in production and development of a low-yield or perhaps even any type of nuclear weapon, the Secretary of Energy simply must submit the request in the budget, at which point they can begin reprogramming funds that already had been appropriated to start moving forward with the development of not only the low-yield nuclear weapons we are talking about now but in the future, additional ones. The essence of my amendment is clearly to get to the point where we are considering going forward with any new proposal by the administration. I will emphasize, too, the way this language is crafted in the bill, it is the Secretary of Energy--it is not the Secretary of Defense--that puts it in his budget. Once it is in his budget, then they can begin to move money around. It could be for this submarine launch system or it could be for a system we have had in the past. We had nuclear field artillery in 1950s and 1960s. It might not be, frankly, the Secretary of Defense or anyone else. It might be the President or the NSC that decides to do that. I am simply saying we have had for a decade or more the responsibility, the obligation, to authorize new nuclear weapons and specifically low-yield weapons. That is why we have to include in this bill a specific authorization for this proposed submarine low- yield nuclear weapon.
If the language existed as is in the bill now, next year I don't think we would have that requirement. The Secretary of Energy could simply put it in his budget and then say: It is ready to go. I am moving money around. I am going to get ahead and create a new low-yield device--maybe not a submarine device, maybe a short-range rocket for the U.S. Army or a field artillery piece, which the chairman from Oklahoma understands because we were both in the service when they had those. This simply says, we as the Congress have the obligation and responsibility to say the provide oversight and authorize any such system. That is why we are on the floor today with respect to this low- yield submarine weapon system, because if we did not stand up and authorize it, it could not be constructed.
As we go forward, I think we still would have to have that congressional responsibility, particularly in a world that is becoming increasingly complicated by nuclear weapons not just from the major powers but by rising powers by many countries.
I urge my colleagues to support the amendment. It simply maintains the status quo and says, if we are going to develop a new weapons system, come to us. We can debate it. We approve it or we don't approve it, but the American people can rest assured that this is not something that has been simply moved through the administrative channels of any Executive, this President or any other President.
With that, I will ask for support.
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Mr. REED. I thank the Senator.
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