S.J. RES. 54--MOTION TO DISCHARGE--Continued

Floor Speech

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Mr. YOUNG. Mr. President, in light of the vote later today on the Sanders-Lee-Murphy legislation, or S.J. Res. 54, I rise today to discuss the situation in Yemen and the path forward. As many know, over the last year I have focused persistently on the humanitarian crisis in Yemen.

My activities have been manyfold. I have issued letters to the administration and the Saudi Government, an administration nomination, hearings, a Senate resolution, and countless meetings, briefings, and phone calls with senior administration officials, Saudi officials, and leaders of the NGO community.

My goal? My goal has been to address impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance--food, fuel, and medicine--into the country of Yemen.

Now, we have seen some progress, and I have been encouraged by this. The USAID-funded World Food Programme cranes have been delivered, and the Red Sea ports have been opened. According to the United Nations, since the ports were open, we have seen more than 884,000 metric tons of food and more than 410,000 metric tons of fuel delivered to the ports of Hodeidah and Saleef alone.

Of course, we understand the importance of the food. But why is the fuel so important? Well, without the fuel, you can't run the water treatment facilities and, therefore, the cholera epidemic that has broken out in Yemen will only get worse. So 884,000 metric tons of food and more than 410,000 metric tons of fuel have resulted in the saving of countless of lives in Yemen.

Look, there is a continued humanitarian crisis in Yemen. A lot of problems persist, and we need to address those. We have seen progress with respect to the delivery of some of the humanitarian assistance I mentioned, but commercial and humanitarian vessels have been offloading their lifesaving cargo less quickly than we would like. So there is a lot left for us to do.

The National Security Council presidential statement issued on March 15 related to Yemen indicated that there are still over 22 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. This is the world's largest humanitarian disaster. The risk of famine persists for millions of Yemenis.

The Saudi-led coalition continues, unfortunately, to impose unacceptable delays on ships carrying food and fuel into Yemeni ports. According to the U.N., the Saudi-led coalition caused 5.9 days of additional delay in the month of February on ships going to the major ports of Hodeidah and Saleef. Those delays continue this month.

Now, why does this matter? Well, this matters, of course, because we don't want people to suffer. It is inconsistent with our basic human values. It is inconsistent with what we Americans believe. When people suffer, it also exacerbates a national security crisis. It facilitates radicalization.

In fact, last week I chaired a Foreign Relations Committee subcommittee on this very topic--the connection between food insecurity, specifically, and the instability or radicalization of those who are food insecure. The hearing demonstrated that there is now a strong, evidentiary, and academic basis to conclude that it is in America's clear national security interest to address food insecurity, as well as a lack of fuel and medicine. A retired Marine Corps general testified at that hearing, Lieutenant General Castellaw. I thought he put it succinctly. He said: ``Food crises [can] grow terrorists.'' Well, we have seen a lot of terrorists grown in Yemen in recent years.

The longer the civil war persists in Yemen, the worse the humanitarian crisis will grow. This will radicalize yet more people and provide even further opportunities to Iran to undermine our national security interests and those of our partners.

What are our objectives in Yemen? That is a fair question. It is one that all of us as policymakers and, really, all Americans ought to be asking. Well, consistent with our humanitarian principles and our national security interests, I believe we have to continue to pursue two primary objectives. First, we want to address the largest humanitarian crisis in the world, and, second, we want to press all parties to end the civil war.

The real question here--because I don't think there is agreement on those two primary objectives--is how can we best achieve these two goals? That takes me to the Sanders-Lee-Murphy resolution before us today. We, of course, need to fulfill our article I constitutional responsibilities. Article I, section 8, of the Constitution indicates that it is Congress's responsibility to declare a war, and it is Congress's responsibility to authorize the use of military force. I share Senator Lee's conviction, Senator Sanders' conviction, and Senator Murphy's conviction that we need to take that responsibility very, very seriously. This is why I introduced an authorization for the use of military force last year. It is also why I have been working with Chairman Corker of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Kaine, and other members of the committee to break a logjam in negotiations--some principled disagreements that exist with respect to what the authorization for the use of military force should look like moving forward.

We have finalized an updated AUMF against Islamic terrorist groups like al-Qaida and ISIS that will merit consideration in coming weeks. In fact, we heard from Chairman Corker. He has now offered a public assurance that there will be hearings on the issue of authorizing military force and there will be marking-up and reporting of legislation so that this 17-year-old authorization for the use of military force can be re-upped. My own view is that whatever one thinks of the legal merits of this long war under the authorizations given in 2001 and 2002, the further away we get from that point in time, where a past Congress authorized force, the more attenuated that argument is and the less power it has. Moreover, we owe it to the men and women in uniform to consistently debate our involvement in overseas conflicts. So I commend the chairman for agreeing with other members of the committee that we need to have hearings and to pass legislation specifically on this matter through the committee of jurisdiction through what we call regular order.

Let me share with those who are watching my remarks here today what I believe the wrong approach is. I believe S.J. Res. 54 is the wrong approach. That resolution sidesteps the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It doesn't lead to the sort of fulsome debate. It doesn't allow us to hear from professional witnesses and members of the administration the way a formal committee hearing and markup would allow.

Moreover, the legislation is never going to become law. It will never become law. It is an exercise in messaging. Now, messaging is important. We need to make the argument, and I respect my colleagues for making their principled arguments. They are strong in conviction, and they make each of them quite articulately. But the administration has already indicated that the President wouldn't sign this into law. The administration has already indicated that they do not regard, under the law, that we are engaging in hostilities, which is required to trigger the law they have invoked. So this will never become law.

Moreover, we most certainly will not be overriding a Presidential veto should this pass out of the Senate and the House and go to the President, whereupon he would veto it. So this will never become law.

The last reason I think S.J. Res. 54 is the wrong approach is because it will not achieve our shared objectives. It would fail to achieve its stated objective because the administration rejects the premise of the Sanders-Lee legislation related to hostilities, as I have already stated.

So there is a better approach. Rather than just criticizing S.J. Res. 54--and let me be careful to distinguish between criticizing the legislation that we will be voting on later and my colleagues, because I have great respect for my colleagues and their motives. I wanted to play a more constructive role in this debate. So I wanted to introduce legislation that would provide leverage to pressure the Saudis to actually end the civil war in Yemen and to actually improve the humanitarian situation. At the same time, we have to acknowledge and respond to Iran's malign behavior in Yemen, as well as the presence in Yemen of ISIS and AQAP--al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. This is arguably the most aggressive and most dangerous al-Qaida franchise in the world. We also have to recognize Saudi Arabia's legitimate right to not have ballistic missiles launched into their cities. This is our partner.

So I wanted to develop a bipartisan compromise that could actually pass out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, be passed by both Chambers, and signed by the President of the United States. I think we are well on our way to doing that. I wanted to develop legislation that would actually further its stated purpose and our objectives in Yemen-- ending the civil war and addressing the humanitarian crisis.

So that is why I and Senator Shaheen introduced S.J. Res. 55 on March 8. Now, since then, we worked with the committee, we have worked with members of both parties, and we have worked with the administration and outside experts to further refine our legislation, making numerous substantive changes and principled compromises.

The current version of our legislation would require the Department of State to certify in an unclassified and written report that Saudi Arabia is undertaking the following: No. 1, an urgent and good-faith effort to conduct diplomatic negotiations to end the civil war in Yemen; No. 2, appropriate measures to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Yemen by increasing access for Yemenis to food, fuel, and medicine, including through Yemen's Red Sea ports, the airport in Sana'a, and external border crossings with Saudi Arabia; and, No. 3, demonstrable action to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure resulting from its military operations in Yemen, including by complying with applicable agreements and laws regulating the use of cluster munitions and other defense articles and services purchased or transferred from the United States.

Now, if the Department of State can't make that certification, then U.S. air refueling missions, which are essential to the Saudi coalition's operations, would end. They would be prohibited under our law. Given the humanitarian crisis in Yemen and our national security interests there, I appreciate Chairman Corker's commitment today to mark up Yemen legislation in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee when we return from recess in April.

So based on this reasoning, which I have laid out quite clearly here today, I plan to oppose the Sanders-Lee-Murphy legislation today. Instead, I will support legislation like ours that could actually become law and would provide the administration the leverage they need to result in real change in Yemen.

Thank you.

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