Federal News Service-The Nomination of Lieutenant General John Abizaid to be Appointed the Rank of General and to be Commander of U.S Central Command

Federal News Service

June 25, 2003 Wednesday

HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
 
SUBJECT: THE NOMINATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN ABIZAID TO BE APPOINTED TO THE RANK OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER OF U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
 
CHAIRED BY: SENATOR JOHN WARNER (R-VA)
 
LOCATION: 216 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

SEN. JACK REED (D-RI): Well thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And welcome, General Abizaid.

GEN. ABIZAID: Sir.

SEN. REED: I've had the privilege of knowing John Abizaid for 30 years. We were lieutenants together in the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment. Back then it was certain he'd be a general, and certain I'd be a civilian. And we both accomplished -- (laughter) --

SEN. WARNER: How certain that you'd become a senator, though?

SEN. REED: Well, that was uncertain.

GEN. ABIZAID: We were certain of that!

SEN. REED: And I will second the comments of all my colleagues. There is no one better prepared for this important assignment, this critical assignment, than John Abizaid. And it's a function of his intellect, his experience and his character. And all those virtues will be tested mightily in the days ahead.

And I will also second his recognition of his wife, Kathy, and his family. They have been an integral part of everything he's done. And I don't think it was humility, Mr. Chairman, it was just sheer honesty that he gave credit to Kathy for all the good things that happened in his life. He's an honest person.

So, John, I'm delighted—General, I'm delighted that you're here and that you're going to take on this responsibility.

One of the aspects I think that we're facing today in Iraq is an insurgency, which is already causing us casualties, which is directed against infrastructure, which is—it's unclear yet whether it's well organized or it's simply spontaneous, but it is an insurgency. Can you give us your estimate of whether the situation will get worse before it gets better? Or are we—frankly, are we, in the days ahead for some very difficult times before it's resolved?

GEN. ABIZAID: I think, Senator, that we are certainly in for some difficult days ahead periodically. It wouldn't be safe to say that the situation is going to continue to get worse. As a matter of fact, I believe the thing that a lot of people underestimate is the degree to which Iraqis want military activity to end as well. There is a lot of support for the coalition presence, and there will be more support for the coalition presence as we build governmental institutions that are good for the future of Iraq.

So I think over time, as you move forward on the economic, diplomatic and political fronts, that you will have less military activity directed against you. But we shouldn't kid ourselves about the fact that we can be the subject of terrorist attacks in Iraq, because we know people are coming our way. And we shouldn't kid ourselves about the ability of Ba'athist groups to come forward and strike Americans or British or other soldiers in a way that causes a lot of casualties.

That having been said, I just would like to say that the—there are a lot of people in the Middle East that believe that our weakness is our inability to stay the course, and they believe that two casualties today, two casualties tomorrow, four the next day, will eventually drive us out. And it is a belief that they hold firmly, and we need to be just as firm that we can't be driven out.

SEN. REED: Well, I concur with your assessment that there is a probably a thought that if we suffer casualties, we will be driven out. But one important way to maintain this public support that's necessary is to be absolutely candid and forthright about the costs that we will bear, both in terms of personnel, in terms of time, and in terms of resources. And that's something, I think, if we don't, then the American people will react unfavorably if they feel that they have not been given all those facts. I am confident you will do that.

Let me raise the issue of troop levels. I know we had a chance to chat about this in the office. I concur that in this situation, intelligence is absolutely critical. Adding more troops without good intelligence is probably not effective. But it seems that there areas in the country that are essentially—because we can't cover them—refuges for organization or for recovery of these groups.

In addition to that, it appears also that they're targeting pipelines and other facilities which might require active patrolling. In the context of the evolving situation, do we need more forces there?

GEN. ABIZAID: Sir, my estimate is that we do not at the present time. But I also want to assure the committee that should we think we need more, we will ask for more. The protection of the infrastructure is a problem that we have to look at very carefully. Right now, we have a lot of Iraqis helping us in the protection of that infrastructure. I think we'll find that over time, that there will be sufficient Iraqi interest in protecting their future and they will do that. If, on the other hand, attacks against the infrastructure continue to score a lot of damage, then we'll have to re-look the way that we use our forces.

To me, there are sufficient forces to do what we have to do. But we can't get locked into this notion of a certain number of soldiers per square kilometer. The way that you conduct military operations most effectively is to free up your forces for offensive action and move to where the problem is. And that's what we intend to do. But we won't hesitate to ask for more if we need them, sir.

SEN. REED: Let me raise an issue again about this intelligence situation. I was very surprised that it appears there were no weapons of mass destruction deployed with Iraqi forces. That is a fact now. That's not an argument of debate, is it? We can establish that as a fact, that you have found no deployed weapons. Is that correct?

GEN. ABIZAID: That's correct. We've found no deployed weapons. And I expected that we would have.

SEN. REED: And frankly, you weren't alone in that expectation. And I'm—my time has expired, but if I can have one minute --

SEN. WARNER: Finish your question. This is important.

SEN. REED: Your experience in these matters is much greater than anyone on this panel, but I would have assumed that there would be tell-tale signs of a chemical weapon or chemical artillery rounds; that in a situation where you had penetrated their signals so completely, even random comments about special weapons, all those things, the configuration—I recall seeing something yesterday that Secretary Powell at the U.N. was briefing about a facility which he declared was a—contained chemical weapons. Did you have that kind of intel? I mean, were you targeting sites that you thought, before you crossed the LD, had chemical weapons?

GEN. ABIZAID: Yes, sir. We had about 1,000 sites that we thought, in one way or the other, were related to chemical weapons, or biological weapons or the nuclear program. But we issued orders as we crossed the line that I described before—Kut, al-Amarah, Karbala—to increase our targeting against artillery, because we had indications from intelligence that they were getting ready to distribute chemical weapons to forward Republican Guard artillery units. That's what we thought, and so we really targeted those artillery units, in particular, very, very hard.

So, the answer to the question is I am, again, perplexed as to what happened. And I can't offer a reasonable explanation with regard to what has happened. But I believe that when the Iraqi Survey Group conducts their work, that through the documents we look at, through the interviews that we conduct and through the people that are going to come forward, that we'll piece the picture together, but I think it will take some time.

SEN. REED: If I can make one additional comment, which doesn't require a response by the general. There are many—and I was included in that category—that felt that there might be weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. But that was only one part of assessing the threat which would require a military option. The other was the intention of the regime to use them and deploy them. And I think certainly right now we have to reevaluate whether our intelligence was effectively gauging the intention, the capability or the will of that regime to use weapons of mass destruction, which is a critical question, I suspect, in the calculation to employ a military option.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.