National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018

Floor Speech

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Mr. President, I again thank the chairman for his leadership. It has been critical, as has been demonstrated throughout the process during our subcommittee hearings and our committee hearings, but even before that, the chairman insisted upon hearings that were comprehensive so, as we prepared for this NDAA, we had a sense of the threats we faced, the resources we needed, and, as a result, as the chairman pointed out, we were able to send to the floor, with a unanimous vote, a very strong defense bill.

Since that time, working together, we have been able to incorporate over 100 amendments which improve the bill. As the chairman pointed out, we are still working on issues we hope we can bring forward for either adoption or, through debate, a vote, and I hope we can do that.

Again, as the chairman pointed out, this is a rare instance of regular order--of the committee report coming to the floor, moving to it by a strong vote, taking up and working to get amendments that are not controversial into the package, and then going ahead and, we hope, setting up debate, discussion, and votes on more difficult and challenging issues. I was encouraged by Senator Schumer's comment that we can anticipate a date for final passage of this bill.

We are confident we will have a national defense bill leaving the Senate and going to conference now. The final outline of that bill is still to be determined, and I hope we can add more to it. That is a very principled process of talking back-and-forth.

Again, I don't think any of this would have been done without the leadership of the chairman and his insistence that we adhere not only to regular order but that we don't forget this is ultimately about the men and women who serve us overseas.

With that, I yield the floor.

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Mr. President, I would like to turn to discuss my amendment to counter malign Russian influence. Amendment No. 939, sponsored by Senators McCain, Portman, Cardin, Brown, Warner, Whitehouse, Durbin, and myself, would advance U.S. national security interests by requiring the President to submit to Congress a strategy for countering the threat of Russia's influence activities intended to undermine democracy in the United States, Europe, and across the world and to disrupt the global international order.

The amendment would require the President to provide Congress a strategy that is comprehensive, using every tool at our disposal to counter Russia's malign activities. The strategy would direct actions across the whole of government, including the following areas: security measures, the strategy would include actions to counter Russian hybrid warfare operations, building the capabilities of allies and partners to identify, attribute, and respond to Russian malign activities, short of conflict, and supporting the NATO alliance and other security partnerships against Russian aggression; on information operations--the strategy would seek to counter Russia's use of disinformation and propaganda in social media as well as traditional media and to strengthen interagency mechanisms for coordinating and effectively implementing a whole-of-government response to Russian active measures; in the area of cyber, the strategy would require steps to defend against, deter, and when necessary respond to malicious cyber activities by the Kremlin, including the use of offensive cyber capabilities consistent with policies specified elsewhere in the act; in the political and diplomatic arenas, the strategy would be required to set out actions to enhance the resilience of U.S. democratic institutions and infrastructure and to work with countries vulnerable to malign Russian influence to promote good governance and strengthen democracy abroad; in the area of financial measures, the strategy would address the corrupt and illicit Russian financial networks in the United States and abroad that have facilitated and Russia's malign influence; and finally, on energy security, the strategy would include steps to promote the energy security of our European allies and partners, reducing Russia's ability to use energy dependence as a weapon of coercion or influence.

The amendment would also require that the administration's strategy be consistent with prior legislation relating to Russia's malign activities, including the Russian Sanctions Act that recently passed with overwhelming support in Congress; the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014, and the Magnitsky Act of 2012. This amendment would fill an important gap in our current approach to relations with Russia. To date, the Trump administration has been unwilling, for whatever reason, to articulate and implement an appropriate response to the threat to our democratic institutions and security posed by Russia's malign influence activities. This amendment would address this critical national security requirement.

It is both appropriate and critically important that this requirement for a strategy to counter Russian malign influence be amended to the National Defense Authorization Act because ultimately this is fundamentally an issue of national security. The administration's failure to acknowledge the insidious interference by Vladimir Putin and his cronies for what it really is--an attack by a foreign adversary on Western democracies and the institutions underpinning the global order--has real implications to our national security. The administration's lack of action to counter this malign influence only encourages the Kremlin to continue its aggression against the United States and its allies and partners.

The Russians know they cannot win in a conventional war, so they have adapted their tactics asymmetrically to leverage their strengths. These tactics pose a real threat, and we need to appropriately posture ourselves, using all tools of statecraft, to counter Russian malign influence.

Before President Obama left office, he ordered an intelligence review of Russian interference in U.S. elections.
On January 6, the U.S. intelligence community released a report on its findings on Russian interference in our democracy. This report included the consensus view of all 17 intelligence agencies, including the CIA, the National Security Agency, the FBI, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Among the key findings were President Putin ``ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the U.S. presidential election''; ``Russia's goals were to undermine public faith in the U.S. democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential presidency''; ``Russia's influence campaign was multifaceted, combining old-fashion Russian propaganda techniques with cyber espionage against U.S. political organizations and mass disclosure of government and private data:; ``Russian intelligence obtained and maintained access to elements of multiple US state or local electoral boards''; and ``Russia's state-run propaganda machine contributed to the influence campaign by serving as a platform for Kremlin messaging to Russian and international audiences.'' These findings were made public on January 6--over 8 months ago--with the additional warning from our intelligence experts that ``Moscow will apply lessons learned from its Putin-ordered campaign aimed at the US presidential election to future influence efforts worldwide, including against US allies and their election processes.''

Furthermore, with each passing week more evidence comes to light about the depths to which the Kremlin went to interfere with our democracy.

Just last week, we learned that a Kremlin-linked troll factory bought $100,000 worth of Facebook ads which were further disseminated through bot networks as part of Russia's attempt to influence our 2016 Presidential election. The ads traced back to 470 fake accounts and pages on Facebook and mostly focused on pushing politically divisive issues such as gun rights, immigration, LBGT rights, and racial discrimination. Further reporting by the New York Times laid out in lurid detail how these fake accounts amplified other tactics of Russian malign influence and ginned up web traffic to DCLeaks--the site where Russian military intelligence first posted hacked emails.

The New York Times also reported that hundreds or thousands of fake Twitter accounts regularly posted anti-Clinton messages and used Twitter to draw attention to hacked materials during last year's campaign. Cybersecurity firm Fireye concluded that many of these Twitter accounts were associated with one another and linked back to Russian military intelligence.

This is just one tactic of influence that Russia is using as part of the wide ranging campaign it is waging against us.
Again and again, Russia has used the range of coercive tools at its disposal--including political pressure; economic manipulation; collaboration with corrupt local networks; propaganda, deception and denials; and, increasingly, military force--to try to intimidate democratic countries and undermine the further integration of NATO, the European Union, and other Western institutions.

It is clear that we need a strategy and we need it soon; yet what is surprising and disturbing is that the White House has failed to direct that a plan be developed to counter this Russian malign threat and to prepare our country for renewed Russian interference in the upcoming 2018 and 2020 elections. Time is running out.
We are now 8 months into the Trump administration.

During this time, numerous administration officials have publicly reinforced the findings of the intelligence community's January assessment of the threat posed by Russia's malign influence activities.

On May 11, Director of Central Intelligence Mike Pompeo said he hoped that we learn from Russian activity in the 2016 election and be able to more effectively defeat it.

On May 14, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said, ``I don't think there's any question that the Russians were playing around in our electoral processes.''

On May 23, Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats stated, ``There clearly is a consensus that Russia has meddled in our election process . . . Russia's always been doing these kind of things with influence campaigns but they're doing it much more sophisticated through the use of cyber and other techniques than they did before.'' On
June 13, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis stated, ``We're recognizing the strategic threat that Russia is provided by its misbehavior.''

On July 9, 2017, U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley stated, ``Everybody knows that [the Russians] are not just meddling in the United States' election. They're doing this across multiple continents, and they're doing this in a way that they're trying to cause chaos within the countries.''

On August 5, National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster described the threat from Russia ``as a very sophisticated campaign of subversion and disinformation and--and propaganda that is ongoing every day in an effort to break apart Europe and to pit political groups against each other to sow dissension . . . and conspiracy theories.'' Yet, despite the assessment from the intelligence community and these acknowledgements from the President's own national security team that Russian malign influence and interference in our 2016 election and the elections of our close allies in Europe pose a national security threat, the President has yet to direct that actions be taken to counter Russian malign influence. As far as we know, the Oval Office has not ordered the national security team even to formulate a strategy to address these pressing threats from Putin and his cronies. Time is running out. In fact, 8 months in, and despite the assessments of his Cabinet, the President can't even clearly admit that the threat is coming from Russia.

On January 11, President Trump stated, ``As far as hacking, I think it was Russia. But I think we also get hacked by other countries and other people.''

On April 30, President Trump said, ``It's very hard to say who did the hacking . . . I'll go along with Russia. Could've been China, could've been a lot of different groups.''

On May 11, President Trump said, ``If Russia or anybody else is trying to interfere with our elections, I think it's a horrible thing and I want to get to the bottom of it.''

On July 6, just prior to his meeting with President Putin, President Trump said, ``It could have very well been Russia but it could well have been other countries and I won't be specific but I think a lot of people interfered. Nobody really knows. Nobody really knows for sure.'' Let's stop and think about that for a minute. ``No one really knows for sure''? That this is even a question runs completely counter to the informed assessments of the entire intelligence community and the President's own national security team. It is time President Trump admits what the rest of us know to be true.

We also know, from multiple administration officials' testimony to Congress, that the President has not directed his Cabinet or senior staff to work on a strategy.

On May 11, when our colleague and vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee Senator Warner asked DNI Coats where we stand in terms of preparation against a future Russian attack, he couldn't think of a single thing. He replied, ``Relative to a grand [Russia] strategy, I am not aware right now of any--I think we're still assessing the impact.'' On June 8, when our colleague Senator Heinrich asked whether the President had inquired about what the FBI Director, our government, or the intelligence community should be doing to protect America against Russian interference in our election system, former FBI director James Comey stated, ``I don't recall a conversation like that.'' When I asked Defense Secretary Mattis on June 13 whether the President had directed him to begin intensive planning to protect our electoral system against the next Russian cyber attack, he was not able to point to any guidance indicating that the President recognizes the urgency of the Russian threat or the necessity of preparing to counter it next year during the midterm elections.

On June 21, officials from the Department of Homeland Security testified that 21 States were potentially targeted by Russian Government linked hackers in advance of the 2016 Presidential election.
When I asked these officials whether the President had directed them to come up with a plan to protect our critical elections infrastructure, they also responded no.

On June 28, Representative Sherman asked U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley whether she had even talked to the President about Russian interference in the 2016 Presidential election. She replied that she had not talked to the President about the subject.

On July 7, in a press conference at the G-8 summit after the President's meeting with President Putin, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated, ``I think the relationship [with Russia]--and the President made this clear as well--is too important, and it's too important not to find a way to move forward.''

It is long past the point where anyone can deny that Russia interfered in our election and the elections of our allies and partners in Europe. This should have been a priority on day 1.

We need to formulate a strategy and take action across the whole of government to counter the threat from Russia.
We cannot just ignore this problem or sweep Kremlin attacks on our elections and those of our close European allies under the rug and move forward. We need a strategy to counter Russian malign influence that leverages all our tools of power across the government.

Though President Trump may be unwilling to confront or condemn Russian interference in our democracy, we in Congress have been willing and able to take a stand to put pressure on Russia and push back against Russian malign influence.

As you are all aware, we took an overwhelming bipartisan vote of 98-2 this summer and passed long-overdue Russian sanctions. That was an important first step, but more must be done. We must act because the Trump administration has refused.

I am pleased to be joined in this effort by Members from both sides of the aisle in sponsoring this amendment. As former FBI director James Comey said when he testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee, ``It's not a Republican thing or Democratic thing. It really is an American thing. They're going to come for whatever party they choose to try and work on behalf of . . . They're just about their own advantage.
And they will be back.''

This amendment will ensure the administration does take appropriate action. It will direct the President to formulate a comprehensive strategy to ensure that, when Putin and his minions come back in 2018 and 2020, we will have appropriate measures in place to detect, deter, and counter this serious threat to our democracy.

I urge my colleagues to support the adoption of this important and necessary amendment.

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