National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018--Motion to Proceed--Continued
Floor Speech
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Mr. President, I have listened intently to the discussions this afternoon with respect to the AUMF of 2001 and the AUMF of 2002, and all of the speakers have made a point that I think is obvious: We have to update our authorizations to account for the past 16 years, to account for the transformation of the threats in those 16 years and many other factors.
The Paul amendment does not give us that transformative language so that we can make a reasoned judgment. It simply gives us a 6-month period of time to work our way through all of the nuances, which are very complicated and difficult. I think it would unwittingly and unintentionally cause more difficulties than be an effective way to urge action and to seek complete action in this Senate and the House and a signature by the President.
Again, I do understand the concerns of all. I supported the 2001 authorization for the use of military force after the incredible and shattering attacks on New York City, Washington, and the crash of an aircraft in Shanksville, PA, and we responded.
Like so many of my colleagues who were here at the time, I did not expect that 16 years later we would still be engaged in the evolution of that fight that began on 9/11, but we cannot simply stop and threaten to pull back our legal framework with the expectation that in 6 months we will produce a new and more appropriate authorization for the use of military force.
I think we should be on the floor debating such an AUMF. I think it should have been debated seriously and thoroughly in the Foreign Relations committee, subject to amendment, and brought forward to this Senate so that we could debate it. Then we could present it to our colleagues in the House and ultimately to the President and also do so in the full view of the American public.
What we are simply doing, if the Paul amendment is adopted, is saying: If we can't get our job done in 6 months, then we have no legal authority or questionable legal authority to continue operations across the globe. It would be an arbitrary 6-month period. I think it would, unfortunately, send a very inappropriate signal to our troops and to our allies in the fight across the globe. Also, it would send an unfortunate signal to our adversaries because it would raise, quite literally, the possibility, since we have supported the option, of abandoning our legal basis for conducting many of these operations in 6 months. I think it would be read many places as a signal that the Senate has essentially declared that in 6 months we are going to de- authorize our military efforts. I think that signal would be very disturbing to our troops in the field, to our allies, and it would give a huge propaganda lever to our adversaries.
The 6-month period is not related to our operations on the ground, not related to the planning and the operational procedures that are in place already. It is unrealistic to believe that if we cannot come to some resolution in 6 months, we could suddenly withdraw our forces or find some other reason to prosecute these wars and these efforts.
Again, we have to think seriously about what the message would be if we adopted this resolution. I think the headline might say ``Senate moves to end involvement.'' I am more certain, after multiple trips to Iraq and Afghanistan and recently to Syria, that the headline in Baghdad and Kabul and Damascus would be ``U.S. moves to end engagement.''
That would cause great concern among our allies. It would cause great concern among our troops.
Operationally, our planning and staging is not something that is donein 6-month periods. It takes months and months for military forces to prepare to go in. Unless we could do something literally next week, we would be running into the reality of American military commanders wondering whether they should begin to plan for the extraction of our forces and the closing of our facilities on these bases. I don't think anyone here believes, with the workload we have, that we could tackle this issue in the next week or two.
As the days go by, that contingency becomes more pressing on our military forces. Those commanders would have to start making serious plans. Those serious plans would be easily communicated to our allies, to our adversaries, and to our troops on the ground. As a result, I think, again, this is not the responsible way to pursue what we all want, which is a more realistic AUMF, one more resonant in terms of being consistent with the reality today.
Some people have argued--in fact, this seems to be the most compelling argument--that this will force Congress to act. Well, I do think we have to act, but I think what the proponents are missing is that our action will not be immediate. As we look ahead, we have recesses that we will observe; we will have other requirements; we have to get appropriations done. We have a host of legislative items. If this effort takes a backseat and we approach the 6 months again, the difficulty of conducting military operations will be significantly complicated. What is intended to be a forward effort in Afghanistan will gradually begin planning for withdrawal, even if at the last moment we come forward with a new authorization.
We have to think about those things because it does affect the troops who are defending us today, it does affect how much our allies will be supportive of our efforts, and it will also, as I indicated, give our adversaries the argument that they have used repeatedly--that the United States is going. It was pointed out years ago on one of my first trips to Afghanistan--a saying has become commonplace where the Taliban would say: ``You all have the watches, we have the time.'' And what we are doing with this measure is once again giving them the time so they can predict or proselytize with more power that our presence will be diminished.
Secretary Mattis and Secretary Tillerson have written to the Senate leadership expressing their concerns with this approach, and I immensely respect both gentlemen. I particularly respect Secretary Mattis for his service. He has been on the ground. He knows what it takes to lead marines, soldiers, airmen, and sailors in action. They are quite concerned. They are concerned about issues, too, to which we have not devoted full attention.
As Secretary Mattis and Secretary Tillerson indicate, there is a strong argument that the legal basis for continuing to hold captured combatants at Guantanamo Bay would be taken away and that these individuals could, through our courts, apply for habeas corpus and could likely be released-- something that I don't think anyone would want to see. The presence of an AUMF provides a legal basis for holding these very dangerous combatants at Guantanamo Bay.
I think it could also affect our ongoing operations against terrorists throughout the globe, particularly our military operations, our special forces operations that are focused on terrorists connected to Al-Qaida, connected to ISIS, connected to those groups who have, over several administrations, been included within the scope of the AUMF.
To a point my colleagues have made, administrations going back to President George W. Bush, the Obama administration, and now the Trump administration--particularly in the case of the Obama and Bush administrations--have adjusted the AUMF to confront new circumstances, such as the rise of ISIS, et cetera. They have done so, though, in the context of a congressional statute, not because of the expansive power, under article II of the Constitution, of the President to defend the United States. One issue here is, again, do we want to put ourselves in the position where there is no governing law; rather it is simply that article II of the Constitution that provides the legal basis?
For many reasons, I hope we will think carefully about our role with respect to Senator Paul's amendment. He has been tireless in his advocacy--``relentless,'' I think, is probably a better word. He is doing so with the utmost integrity and the utmost commitment to doing what he thinks is in the best interest of the United States.
I come here today to point out what I think our consequences would be, which would be very serious and very detrimental to ourselves, particularly our troops. I ask all of my colleagues to think clearly about what we are doing. We should and we must replace the AUMFs--both of them; however, until we have a replacement, we shouldn't create a 6- month period of uncertainty, doubt, and confusion. That is what it will be because it will affect our soldiers, our allies, and in some respects, give more leverage to our adversaries.
With that, I yield the floor.
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