National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 - Resumed
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006--Resumed -- (Senate - July 21, 2005)
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Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, with some reluctance, I rise to oppose the amendment of the distinguished occupant of the chair, the senior Senator from Indiana. But I feel a certain obligation, as the chairman of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, out of which this particular portion of the bill emanated, to explain the reasons why the bill contains these conditions that I believe are important and which I will explain and which have existed in the bill as it has been passed by the Congress since its inception.
The question that I would pose is, what has changed? What has changed that now would lead this body to eliminate these important criteria that have existed in the bill for lo these many years? I think it is important, as a general matter, that there be some sort of reciprocal obligation on the part of Russia for receiving more than $400 million in American taxpayer money, potentially. I know there has been discretion added to make sure that WMD located in other countries can now be addressed by this Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. That is a good thing. But certainly, while I appreciate the argument that regardless of whether or not Russia complies with the conditions that are required to be monitored under this Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, I still do not believe that it is the best stewardship of the American taxpayers' moneys for us to say: We don't care whether Russia complies with their reciprocal obligations or not, and we are going to give the money away anyway, albeit for a good purpose.
On balance, I am not persuaded that the burden to change the system, as it has been since 1991, has been met, and I believe that we should retain some way to monitor the progress of Russia, the recipient of these funds, on these important criteria that have been set out in the bill.
Of course, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program has long been providing assistance to states of the former Soviet Union to help eliminate and safeguard weapons of mass destruction and related infrastructure materials. These programs helped to eliminate large Cold War stockpiles of dangerous weapons that are no longer needed. Today, of course, this is an important element of our strategy to keep weapons of mass destruction and know-how from falling into the hands of terrorists. That is the reason why I applaud the senior Senator from Indiana for his leadership in this important effort.
When Congress first authorized the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, an important element of the authorizing legislation was the inclusion of the conditions which now this amendment seeks to eliminate. These conditions must be met before a country can receive Cooperative Threat Reduction assistance from the United States. These conditions were retained n the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993 which reauthorized the original Nunn-Lugar program. That act included the requirement that for each recipient nation of Cooperative Threat Reduction funds, the President certify that the recipient nation is committed to the following goals:
One, to making substantial investment of its resources for dismantling or destroying its weapons of mass destruction; two, forgoing any military modernization program that exceeds legitimate defense requirements and forgoing the replacement of destroyed weapons of mass destruction; three, forgoing any use in new nuclear weapons of fissionable or other components of destroyed nuclear weapons; facilitating U.S. verification of any weapons destruction carried out under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program; complying with all relevant arms control agreements; and observing internationally recognized human rights, including the protection of minorities.
I would certainly agree with the distinguished senior Senator from Indiana that some of these are vague standards. For example, as he pointed out, complying with all relevant arms control agreements or observing internationally recognized human rights, including the protection of minorities. But the fact that they are somewhat general--some might say somewhat vague--does not mean that they are unimportant. One of the important roles played by these criteria is that there be some effort on the part of the Government to ascertain whether, in fact, the old Soviet Union is, in fact, exercising good faith as part of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. If, in fact, ultimately the President decides, as authorized by this bill, to ultimately waive the noncompliance of those criteria in the interest of our national security, at least Congress and the Nation know that some assessment has been made of the old Soviet Union's compliance with these criteria.
I think we would all agree that the information that is collected and scrutinized is important in the interest of our national security and in the interest of knowing that we have met our responsibility to see that American tax dollars are spent as wisely and efficiently as possible.
These conditions remain as relevant and as important today as they were in 1993. They provide Congress and the public relevant information about the countries that have received taxpayer-funded assistance for this program. The conditions also help provide us confidence that U.S. tax dollars will be well spent in countries that are committed to right-sizing their militaries, complying with arms control agreements, providing transparency with regard to Cooperative Threat Reduction assistance, and respecting human rights. I do not understand how one could argue that these conditions are unimportant or irrelevant to our national security or that we ought to simply blind ourselves to the recipient nation's compliance with these criteria in the interest of pursuing our ultimate goal.
The truth is, we all agree in the ultimate goal of this important program.
But this provides us additional checks and balances and information that is relevant, significant, and which I think demonstrates that we are being good stewards of the American taxpayer dollar while we pursue a safer and more secure world.
These certification requirements do not impede the provision of cooperative threat reduction assistance. For years now, the Congress provided the President with waiver authority, so that even if one or more of the certifications cannot be made for a particular country, the President may provide these funds if it is in our national interest to do so, and that is appropriate.
One of the things this bill does is to make that temporary waiver authority that had been conferred upon the President permanent, to provide the kinds of flexibility that Secretary Rice said the President and the administration wanted when it came to this program in her letter of June 3, 2005, which has been previously referenced.
This provision for permanent waiver authority for cooperative threat reduction programs in the bill provides the flexibility needed. It also provides us the way to deal in a responsible fashion with the countries that compose the former Soviet Union. I remember, of course, the famous words of President Reagan when talking about negotiating with the Soviet Union, where he said, ``trust, but verify.'' What these criteria do in this cooperative threat reduction program is allow us to not just trust but also to verify that these countries that were once the old Soviet Union are worthy of our trust by allowing us to verify their good faith compliance with this program.
The amendment of the senior Senator from Indiana would also repeal conditions Congress placed on the provision of financial assistance to Russia for chemical demilitarization activity. These conditions were established in the fiscal year 2000 National Defense Authorization Act. They required the Secretary of Defense to certify that Russia has provided a full and accurate accounting of its chemical weapons stockpile; demonstrated a commitment of $25 million annually to chemical weapons elimination; developed a practical plan for destroying its stockpile of nerve agents; agree to destroy or convert two existing chemical weapons production facilities; finally, a commitment from the international community to fund and build infrastructure needed to support and operate the chemicals weapons destruction facility in Russia.
Here again, these provisions would be effectively repealed by this amendment which is proposed today by the distinguished Senator from Indiana. They do not represent an impediment to the accomplishment of the chemical demilitarization program because they may be likewise waived in the end if the President deems that waiver in our national interest. But no one, it seems to me, could in good faith argue that these criteria are unimportant or irrelevant.
Indeed, each of these criteria demonstrate the reciprocal good faith and responsibility of the recipient nations in accomplishing chemical demilitarization, a goal that is the subject of an international treaty that this country is a party to and one that is certainly in our national interest to see accomplished.
For several years, Congress decided not to support the provision of cooperative threat reduction assistance for chemical weapons destruction in Russia. It was precisely the inclusion of these conditions in the authorizing language that persuaded Congress to resume assistance under the chemical threat--the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program for this important effort of chemical demilitarization.
These conditions relevant to the chemical weapons destruction program in Russia also have a waiver provision, so that the assistance, as I mentioned a moment ago, can continue in the absence of certification if, in the end, the President deems it in the national interest. The eligibility requirements and conditions for assistance are entirely appropriate.
Mr. President, I believe the burden of proof on those who would repeal it has not been met. They remain an important element in assuring that the American taxpayer is being well served and that the money is being spent appropriately and wisely on the underlying aims of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program that we all agree are a good thing. This assurance to the American taxpayer and to the American people that their money is being well spent is essential to maintaining strong public support for this important program.
The waiver authority ensures that even in cases where a country doesn't meet all eligibility requirements, the President has the flexibility to provide this assistance if it is in the national security interest to do so. This is all, in the end, that the administration, through Secretary Rice's letter, has requested. So we have accomplished that goal already, even before this amendment has been proposed.
Mr. President, I urge my colleagues not to support this amendment that would repeal the conditions and the eligibility requirements under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. We all share the goal of supporting programs like this that can help keep dangerous weapons of mass destruction and technology and know-how from slipping out of the countries that used to be the old Soviet Union.
I continue to believe that certification requirements are useful in helping to maintain public confidence in this important program, and I urge my colleagues to vote against the amendment.
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