National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017
Floor Speech
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Mr. KAINE. Madam President, today I wish to speak about the fiscal year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, NDAA. I want to thank Senator McCain and Senator Reed for all their work on this Defense bill. This year's floor process has been challenging to say the least, but with their leadership and that of their staff directors, Chris Brose and Liz King, I am confident we can find a meaningful path forward.
I supported this bill out of committee in hopes of having a vigorous debate on some of the proposals I had expressed concern over regarding Defense reform. It was my belief that the public release of this bill would invite greater scrutiny by officials in the Department of Defense to inform floor debate. In anticipation of their concern, I again submitted an amendment that I had offered in committee to initiate a commission on Defense reform to assist Congress in considering future legislation. I have been surprised at the absence of comments about many of the reform proposals. This has contributed to a sense that the concepts were welcome and being embraced by the Department. It wasn't until the administration's response was released, in the midst of the bill being on the Senate floor, that concern was finally noted.
Despite my belief that some of our proposals lack sufficient analysis and have gone too far, I do share the chairman's concern over whether the Department has the ability to adapt and remain successful in today's security environment. I am also concerned that the Department may in fact be mired in duplicative process and complicated organizational designs. Many of the witnesses in front of the Armed Services Committee testified to these facts, but several went on to recommend caution.
On November 10, 2015 in front of a hearing by this committee, Jim Thomas from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis said, ``all of these ideas would require detailed analysis to fully understand their strengths and avoid outcomes that might inadvertently leave us worse off.'' At that same hearing, we heard from James Locher, a former staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee during the Goldwater-Nichols reform, who stated ``pinpointing problems was the committee's sole focus for eighteen months. As part of this thorough process, the committee staff produced a 645-page staff study with detailed analyses of each problem area. . . . a hasty reform without a deep appreciation for the origins of the behaviors that currently limit Pentagon effectiveness would be a mistake.'' Additional comments by witnesses like the Honorable David Walker, ``there needs to be a fundamental review and reassessment of the current organizational structure and personnel practices,'' or former Under Secretary of Defense Michele Flournoy, ``it is imperative that we think through the second and third order effects of any changes proposed. . . . great care should be taken to hear the full range of views and consider the unintended consequences,'' should have provided the necessary direction and caution to this committee to pursue a deliberative, well-researched, and open approach.
Many of the reform provisions were drafted by the committee's very skilled professional staff. While I have the full confidence that they crafted proposals to address various challenges in the Department, it is ultimately the responsibility of the members to fully understand them. Despite the numerous hearings and countless witnesses, the only theme that emerged was that reform was needed interspersed with a few conceptual suggestions. To date, no study has proposed the legislation contained within this bill. No officials offered their views for consideration until the bill was on the Senate floor.
In the absence of a debate on the merits of an independent study, investigative work, or official Department views, I suspect many of my colleagues do not have confidence that the proposals address the Department's challenges. Should we require the chairman of the Joint Chiefs to consult with and seek the advice of others? Should the headquarters be reduced in addition to previous reductions? Is an additional 15 percent of staff adequate in a time of war or crisis? Will the new Under Secretary for Research and Engineering make the Department's acquisition process run more efficiently? Last year we removed a pay increase for general officers; this year, we reduced their number by 25 percent. The combination of these two provisions makes me wonder whether we are doing all we can to cultivate the next Eisenhower, Halsey, Abrams, or Dunford.
We made significant reforms in previous years empowering acquisition professionals to have flexibility and offer service chiefs greater ownership of their acquisition programs. We have also charged the Department with necessary authorities to ``hire top talent'' in an attempt to drive innovation. Many of us in the Senate have demanded a more comprehensive military strategy in countering the myriad of threats around the globe. In addition, this bill encourages numerous outreach and coordination programs with our allies and partners. These requests are not hollow or zero-sum. People are required to assist our service chiefs with acquisition programs. People develop more comprehensive doctrines and offset strategies. Hiring and retaining top-talent means just that.
What impact will the reorganization of the Department and significant changes in personnel policies have on our operations in the midst of a two-front cold war and expanding conflict in the Middle East? Do we challenge the advice our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is providing? How do we get ``top talent'' if each spring we reorganize and cut our Department of Defense workforce? How will a reduction in general and flag officers impact current and future senior officers? What are the secondary effects to changes in combatant command responsibilities? How will our allies and adversaries interpret the reduction or disappearance of general officers in overseas billets? I submit that most of my colleagues do not know the answers to these questions, but I would encourage them to consider them prior to taking similar drastic action in the future.
I share the chairman's desire to improve the organization and capability of the Department of Defense. I know he has reached a comfort level with the reform proposals contained within, that in time I may better understand their impacts. However, I am mindful of the cautions relayed by many of our witnesses. We should take our independent oversight responsibility very seriously. I remain committed to working with my colleagues in a bipartisan fashion and seek a more measured and informed approach to any legislation that has the potential to negatively impact the very Department we seek to improve. It is in this spirit that I offered my amendment on establishing a commission to study Defense reform.
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