Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006

INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006 -- (House of Representatives - June 21, 2005)

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Ms. PELOSI. Madam Speaker, the preamble to the Constitution tells us that one of the first responsibilities of the Federal government is to ``provide for the common defense.''

My 10 years on the House Intelligence Committee have given me an appreciation for the vital role the men and women in our intelligence agencies play in doing just that.

Many of them take extraordinary risks on a daily basis in an effort to gather the information policy makers and military commanders need to make sound decisions. They are deeply dedicated to preserving our country's security, and each of us is grateful for their hard work and sacrifice.

They need an intelligence system that is as strong, smart, and competent as they are, and this bill takes several strong steps towards making sure we have that system.

I want to commend Chairman Hoekstra and Ranking Member Harman for their leadership and hard work in making sure that this legislation addresses not only the immediate needs of the intelligence community, but helps plan for the future as well.

However, it would be a mistake for us to pass this bill and declare that our work is done and that we have fulfilled our responsibility to the intelligence community and the American people.

It has now been more than 1,700 days since the September 11th terrorist attacks changed our Nation, and laid bare the holes in our intelligence gathering system.

It has been 11 months since the independent 9/11 Commission issued its findings and made its recommendations about how to close those gaps.

It has been nearly a year since the Senate Intelligence Committee concluded that our intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities was fundamentally flawed--a conclusion that was recently confirmed by the Presidential Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction.

In part, this bill provides the resources the intelligence community needs to prepare for the future by learning from mistakes made in the past. However, these recent reports--notably those of the 9/11 Commission and the Robb-Silberman Commission--point to the need to do far more than simply fund the intelligence community.

These two commissions made many recommendations for significant change in the way the intelligence agencies operate and are overseen by Congress, the way the intelligence community is managed, and in other matters associated with better protecting the

American people from the threats posed by terrorists, particularly terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction.

It was an intelligence authorization bill that established the 9/11 Commission, and it is therefore appropriate that in the context of the debate on this authorization measure, and with the first anniversary of the release of the Commission's report and recommendations fast approaching, we reflect on the recommendations that have been implemented, and on those that have not.

The Commission concluded that more centralized management of the intelligence community was needed, and that the manager had to have considerable power over people and money. The first Director of National Intelligence, Ambassador Negroponte is now in office. He faces a daunting task. We all hope he is successful in it.

That is why it was so surprising and regrettable that the Intelligence Committee, over the objections of Congresswoman HARMAN and the other Democratic Members, chose to welcome him with an effort to restrict his power. What a terribly negative message that provision sent about the commitment of the majority to intelligence reform. This bill is much improved with that provision removed, as the rule has done.

The impetus for this ill-advised action reportedly came from officials in the Department of Defense. We created the position of DNI to help address the interagency squabbling that leads to intelligence failures. This is simply no place for power grabs or bureaucratic self-protection and preservation on the part of the Pentagon.

Just as it was an intelligence authorization bill that created the 9/11 commission, I had hoped that this intelligence authorization would include Mr. WAXMAN's proposal to create a commission to investigate the prisoner abuses in Afghanistan, at Abu Ghraib, and at Guantanamo.

That will not occur as a result of actions taken by the Republican majority on the Rules Committee. For our international standing, our sense of fairness and decency, and to establish more effective means of intelligence gathering, these abuses must be examined.

As former Ambassador Thomas Pickering, attorney Floyd Abrams, and our former colleague Bob Barr wrote in The Washington Post on June 7: ``This is a time when we should be making extra efforts to reach out to Muslims and to ask them to work with us in the war against terrorism. Instead, our failure to undertake a thorough and credible investigation has caused severe resentment of the United States.''

Some of those who opposed most strongly an independent investigation of the 9/11 attacks also oppose an independent investigation of the prisoner abuse scandal. That is unacceptable.

But just as the American people would not accept the initial refusal to establish a 9/11 Commission, so too will demands continue for an independent commission to investigate the prisoner abuses in Iraq, Guantanamo Bay, and elsewhere.

Our country's standing in the eyes of the world depends on getting to the bottom of the prisoner abuse matter--a fact that will ultimately force the majority of this House to stop placing obstacles in the path of a full and independent inquiry.

Unfortunately this is not the only initiative this Congress has failed to act on. Despite the unanimity with which they were adopted and the near universal acclaim they have produced, some critical recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission have gone unfulfilled. For example, Chairman Kean pointed earlier this month to the failure to allocate more of the broadcast spectrum to first responder communications as ``almost a scandal.'' Congresswoman HARMAN has been a leader in trying to resolve this problem and I congratulate her for her efforts.

Chairman Kean also emphasized what has long been known to Members of the Intelligence Committee: the greatest danger facing the United States is a terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction, and the best way to address that is to safeguard or destroy WMD components, especially nuclear material, at its source.

Intelligence plays a huge role in efforts to combat proliferation of nuclear material and technology, but money is needed to better protect or acquire these materials in the countries where they were developed. We are simply not providing enough resources to this effort.

Finally, the 9/11 Commissioners have been clear in their assessment that, unless Congress overhauls the procedures by which it oversees the work of the intelligence agencies, intelligence reform will not be successful.

The House has not undertaken the kind of comprehensive review of the oversight process that the Commission believes to be necessary. I have let the Speaker know, repeatedly, that Democrats are prepared to work cooperatively on this review. It is imperative that we begin this task soon--we have already waited far too long.

This bill enjoys broad bipartisan support from members of the Committee, and I intend to support it. In doing so, however, I urge that the House dedicate itself to finishing the job begun last fall with the adoption of the 9/11 intelligence reform bill and address completely all of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.

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