Department of Homeland Security Insider Threat and Mitigation Act of 2015

Floor Speech

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Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise in support of H.R. 3361, the Department of Homeland Security Insider Threat and Mitigation Act of 2015.

Mr. Speaker, H.R. 3361, the Department of Homeland Security Insider Threat and Mitigation Act of 2015, authorizes the Department of Homeland Security to address the homeland and national security risk posed by trusted insiders.

Typically, trusted insiders are given unrestricted access to mission-critical assets such as personnel, facilities, and computer networks. While DHS, like other Federal agencies, conducts extensive vetting of prospective employees, there remains a risk that someone who gains ``insider status'' exploits their position to damage the United States through espionage, terrorism, or even the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive national security information.

As the ranking member of the Committee on Homeland Security, I am supportive of the Department of Homeland Security's current Insider Threat Program. It is targeted at preventing and detecting when a vetted DHS employee or contractor with authorized access to U.S. Government resources, including personnel, facilities, information, equipment, networks, and systems, exploits such access for nefarious, terroristic, or criminal purposes.

While I support the DHS program, I could not support this legislation when it was considered by the full committee because it did not include language to prevent the somewhat broad authority granted under this bill for being used by DHS to deploy ``continuous evaluation.'' Continuous evaluation is an automated system that constantly monitors public and private databases for information regarding the credit, criminal, and social media activities of certain individuals. The Defense Department has an extensive pilot underway, and I am concerned that Federal agencies, with the understandable urge to protect their IT systems and facilities, are racing to acquire this capability before knowing whether such costly systems are even effective.

At this time, I would like to engage in a colloquy with the gentleman from New York (Mr. King) about some concerns I have with the prospect that the Department will use the authority under this act to establish a continuous evaluation program.

Would the gentleman agree that it is important that, prior to establishing any such program under which certain DHS employees would be subjected to ongoing automated credit, criminal, or social media monitoring, the Department engages Congress about not only the potential costs and benefits of such a program but what protections would be in place for workers subject to such program?

I yield to the gentleman from New York (Mr. King).

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Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Speaker, we live at a time when the threats to our Nation are complex. None of us want to see someone exploit their access to DHS networks to carry out cybercrimes or other criminal activity.

Even as DHS works to detect and prevent such threats, it is important that such activities be carried out in a transparent way so as not to compound the chronic morale challenges that exist within the workforce.

Each time DHS considers making an adjustment to its Insider Threat Program, thoughtful consideration must be paid to whether the operational drawbacks and costs of such an adjustment outweigh the benefit of such change.

That said, I commend General Taylor, the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis at DHS, for the attention he has given to the insider threat challenge and look forward to continuing to work with him to bolster security within the Department.

I appreciate the gentleman from New York's cooperation and colloquy. I look forward to the successful passage and approval of this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

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