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Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I rise to speak in favor of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, and I urge my colleagues to support this much needed legislation. Nearly 3 months ago, the Senate was unable to find a path forward to adopt this important bill. Let's look at what has happened since the time that the Senate refused to proceed.
The fact is that our country has continued to endure a wave of damaging and expensive cyber attacks. These incidents include the first major hack of Apple's popular App Store, the compromise of 15 million T-Mobile users due to a breach at Experian, and the exposure of data of up to 8,000 Army families due to improper procedures followed by the General Services Administration. For the Army families who were affected, this sensitive information included medical histories, Social Security numbers, and child day care details.
Today, I renew my support for this bill in light of the continuing state of cyber insecurity that affects information held in the public and private sectors.
Passing the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act would make it easier for public and private sector entities to share cyber threat information and vulnerabilities in order to lessen the theft of trade secrets, intellectual property, and national security information, as well as the compromise of sensitive personal information. It would eliminate some of the legal and economic barriers impeding voluntary two-way information sharing between private industry and government. It is a modest but essential first step to protect networks and their information.
This bill would not in any way compromise our personal information. Its purpose is to help safeguard our personal information that breach after breach, cyber attack after cyber attack has proven to be vulnerable.
While this bill promotes appropriate information sharing between the government and the private sector--a good first step, as I have indicated--it unfortunately does little in its original form to harden the protection of Federal networks or to guard the critical infrastructure we rely upon every day. Thus, I have filed two amendments to further strengthen our Nation's cyber security.
The first amendment is directed at improving the security of sensitive personal data that is stored on networks of Federal civilian agencies. The insecurity of Federal databases and networks has been evident for years. Inspectors general reports have warned of it. Yet, by and large, those calls for action have not been heeded by Federal agencies, and certainly the weaknesses in our Federal agencies' security systems are underscored by recent breaches and intrusions.
In June, more than 20 million--20 million--current, former, and retired Federal employees learned that their personal data was stolen from the poorly secured databases of the Office of Personnel Management. Since that time, we have learned that the personal emails of the Director of the CIA have been hacked. We have learned from the State Department's inspector general that the State Department is ``among the worst agencies in the Federal Government at protecting its computer networks.'' This substandard performance at the Department of State continued even as an adversary nation breached the Department's email system last year. According to the IG, compliance with Federal information security standards remains ``substandard'' at the State Department.
I know from my many years of service on the committee on homeland security, where we worked on cyber security issues for literally a decade, producing legislation in 2010 and 2011 that unfortunately was not approved by this body, that this problem is long standing and it is only growing worse. We ignore it at our peril.
This appalling performance in so many agencies and departments led to my introducing bipartisan legislation with my colleague from Virginia, Senator Warner, as well as Senator Mikulski, Senator Coats, Senator Ayotte, and Senator McCaskill, to strengthen the security of the networks of Federal civilian agencies.
Our bill has five elements, but the most important provision would grant the Department of Homeland Security the authority to issue binding operational directives to Federal agencies to respond in the face of substantial breaches or to take action in the face of an imminent threat to a Federal network. Although the Secretary of Homeland Security is tasked with a very similar responsibility to protect Federal civilian networks, he has far less authority to accomplish this responsibility than does the Director of the National Security Agency for the dot-mil networks. We can no longer ignore the damaging consequences of failing to address these issues.
Our amendment would fortify Federal computer networks from cyber threats in many ways. The key elements, I am pleased to say, in our bill were incorporated into an amendment that has been filed by Senator Carper, along with the chairman of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Senator Johnson, and Senator Warner, my chief cosponsor of the bill we introduced, and, of course, myself.
Our amendment has been included in the managers' substitute amendment, and I wish to thank Chairman Burr and Vice Chairman Feinstein for their willingness to include these much needed provisions to boost the security of the networks at Federal civilian agencies.
Just think of the kind of data that civilian agencies have in the Federal Government. Whether we are talking about the Social Security Administration, the Medicare agency, the IRS, the VA or the Department of Defense, it is evident that millions of Americans--indeed, most Americans--have personal data, sensitive data, such as Social Security numbers, that are stored in these networks of Federal civilian agencies, and we have an obligation to protect as best we can that data.
I have also filed another amendment to the cyber bill, amendment No. 2623, that is aimed at protecting our country's most vital critical infrastructure from cyber attack. This bipartisan amendment was cosponsored by Senator Coats, Senator Warner, and Senator Hirono.
The livelihood and well-being of almost every American depend upon critical infrastructure that includes the electricity that powers our communities, the national air transportation system that moves passengers and cargo safely from one location to another, and the elements of the financial sector that ensure the $14 trillion of payments made every day are securely routed through the banking system. Those are just some examples of critical infrastructure. There are obviously many more.
Our amendment would have created a second tier of mandatory reporting to the government for the fewer than 65 entities identified by the Department of Homeland Security where damage caused by a single cyber attack would likely result in catastrophic harm in the form of more than $50 billion in economic damage, 2,500 fatalities or a severe degradation of our national security. In other words, only cyber attacks that could cause catastrophic results would fall under this reporting requirement.
For 99 percent of businesses, the voluntary information sharing framework established in the bill before us would be enough, and the decision on whether or not to share cyber threat information should rightfully be left up to them. A second tier of reporting is necessary, however, to protect the critical infrastructure that is vital to the safety, health, and economic well-being of the American people.
Under our amendment, the owners and operators of the country's most critical infrastructure would report significant cyber attacks just as incidents of communicable disease outbreaks must be reported to public health authorities and to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Think about the situations we have here. Does it make sense that we require one case of measles to be reported to a Federal Government agency but not a cyber attack that could result in the death of more than 2,500 people? How does that make sense?
The threats to our critical infrastructure are not hypothetical. They are already occurring and increasing in frequency and severity. At a recent Armed Services Committee hearing on cyber security, Senator Donnelly asked the Director of National Intelligence, Jim Clapper, what the No. 1 cyber challenge was that he was most concerned about. Director Clapper testified that, obviously, it was a large-scale cyber attack against the United States infrastructure.
In light of this No. 1 threat, how protected is our country? Well, I have posed that very question to the Director of the NSA, Admiral Mike Rogers. His answer, on a scale of 1 to 10, was that we are at about a 5 or 6. That is a failing grade when it comes to protecting critical infrastructure, no matter what curve we are grading on.
Although I am very disappointed that the Senate will not consider the original amendment I filed, I do want to acknowledge that Chairman Burr and Vice Chairman Feinstein have worked closely with me on a compromise to begin to address the issue of cyber security risks that present such significant security threats to our critical infrastructure, and I am grateful for their acknowledging that this is a problem that deserves our attention.
This new amendment, which is section 407 of the managers' amendment, requires the DHS Secretary to conduct an assessment of the fewer than 65 critical infrastructure entities at greatest risk and develop a strategy to mitigate the risks of a catastrophic cyber attack. Let me stress two things. We are only talking about fewer than 65 entities that have already been designated by the Department of Homeland Security as critical infrastructure where a catastrophic cyber attack would cause terrible consequences.
Second, let me again describe what we mean by a catastrophic attack. It means a single cyber attack that would likely result in $50 billion in economic damage, 2,500 Americans dying or a severe degradation of our national security. We are talking about significant consequences that would be catastrophic for this country--consequences we cannot and should not ignore.
There are plenty of cyber threats that cannot be discussed in public because they are classified--I know that as a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee--but in light of the cyber threat to critical infrastructure described by Admiral Rogers and Director of National Intelligence Clapper in open testimony before the Congress, the bare minimum we ought to do is to ask to require DHS and the appropriate Federal agencies to describe to us what more could be done to prevent a catastrophic cyber attack on our critical infrastructure.
One or two years from now, I don't want us to be standing here after a cyber 9/11 chastising ourselves, saying: Why didn't we do more to confront an obvious and serious threat to our critical infrastructure?
By including these two provisions in the managers' substitute amendment, we are strengthening the protections for Federal civilian agencies and beginning--not going nearly as far as I would like but beginning the vital task of protecting our critical infrastructure. We will be strengthening the cyber defenses of our Nation.
I urge my colleagues to support the managers' amendment and the underlying bill. By passing this long-overdue legislation, we will begin the long-overdue work of securing our economic and national security and our personal information for generations to come.
Thank you, Madam President.
I yield the floor.
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