Finding that the President has not complied with Section 2 of the Iranian Nuclear Agreement Review Act

Floor Speech

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Mr. WELCH. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentlewoman, and I want
to thank my colleagues. Mr. Frelinghuysen, I agree with many of the
points that you made. This is a vote of conscience for all of us.

The question is not whether we trust Iran. We don't. The question is
not whether we want Iran to have any pathway to a nuclear weapon.
Proponents of this agreement--I am one--and opponents of this
agreement--there are many, my friend, Mr. Stewart--don't want Iran to
have a nuclear weapon. This question about trust, we have got to step
back a minute.

One of the fundamental challenges that a strong and confident country
faces is to secure its national security. That requires the Commander
in Chief, whose fundamental responsibility is to exercise his judgment
about what will work to increase our security, to enter into
negotiations with adversaries; and there may be no greater adversary to
the United States, to our allies, particularly Israel, than Iran.

Keep in mind, President Kennedy negotiated with the Soviet Union
after one of their leaders said they will bury this country, and he did
that, and it turned out that he was right to limit nuclear
proliferation. President Nixon went to China when it was Red China, an
absolute adversary of this country and our way of life, and it has
worked to the benefit of the national security of this country, and
President Reagan did the same.

The fundamental question here is not at all about whether we trust
Iran. We don't trust Iran. It is not about whether you negotiate with
people you trust. You have to negotiate with people that are your
adversaries.

The question is whether the terms and conditions of this agreement
that the President is recommending, along with our very close allies--
Germany, France, Great Britain, and Russia and China--will improve our
national security and that of our allies, particularly Israel. My
judgment is it will.

Number one, there is no pathway for Iran to have a nuclear weapon
under this agreement.

Number two, this is not based on trust. It is based on distrust and
strong verification provisions that will give us a heads-up if there is
any effort of Iran not to comply.

Third, we have the opportunity to snap back the sanctions all of us
supported that brought Iran to the table. We don't have to get a
majority vote; we can do that unilaterally.

Then, finally, we do have to ask the question of not whether this is
the perfect agreement--undoubtedly, there could be a better agreement
that might give more satisfaction and security and peace of mind to all
of us--it is a question of this agreement or no agreement. That is the
question that we face.

The weight of the opinion and judgment is that, if we repudiate this
agreement, the sanction regime that we constructed on the leadership of
President George Bush and President Barack Obama would dissolve. What
happens then? Iran gets the money and they have no restraint on their
ability to get the bomb.

I urge us to support this agreement in the national security interest
of the United States of America, Israel, and our allies.

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