Approval of Joint Comprehensive plan of Action

Floor Speech

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Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the resolution of
approval of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Throughout this debate, there have been accusations questioning the
motives and loyalties of Members in making this decision. It is
precisely because I believe this agreement is in the interest of the
United States and because I have been a strong supporter of Israel my
entire life that I am supporting the Iran nuclear agreement.

This must not be a vote of politics but of conscience. I, for one,
could not live with myself if I voted in a way that I believe would put
the lives of Americans and Israelis at greater risk of an Iranian
nuclear bomb.

My priority and overriding objective in assessing this agreement has
been to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear bomb. The interests of
the United States and of Israel in this respect are identical. In
addition to constituting an existential threat to Israel, a nuclear-
armed Iran would make Iran's conventional threats more dangerous and
difficult to counter and pose a greater danger to the United States, to
the region, and to the world.

The question before us is not whether this is a good deal. The
question is which of the two options available to us--supporting or
rejecting the deal--is more likely to avert a nuclear-armed Iran. I
have concluded, after examining all the arguments, that supporting the
Iran nuclear agreement gives us the better chance of preventing Iran
from developing a nuclear weapon.

The agreement will shut Iran's pathways to developing the necessary
fissionable material for a nuclear bomb for at least 15 years. The
inspection and verification procedures against illicit plutonium
production or uranium enrichment are airtight.

The questions that have been raised about inspection procedures--the
so-called side deals, the alleged self-inspection--do not relate to the
central issue of production of fissionable material. And without
fissionable material, you cannot make a bomb.

Even after 15 years, when some of the restrictions will be eased, we
would still know instantly about any attempt to make bomb materials
because the inspectors and the electronic and photographic surveillance
will still be there. The options available to a future President for
stopping Iran then would be better than the options available now if
the deal is rejected because we would have more access, instant
intelligence, and more knowledge of the Iranian program.

The argument that if we reject the deal, we can force Iran back to
the negotiating table and obtain a better deal is a fantasy. It is not
a viable alternative. The other countries that have joined us in
multilateral sanctions against Iran have made it clear that they will
drop their sanctions if we reject the deal; and American sanctions, by
themselves, have been proven ineffective in coercing Iran.

We must be very clear that, if necessary, the United States will use
military force to prevent an Iranian nuclear bomb; but the odds of that
being necessary are significantly less with approval of this deal than
with rejection of the agreement.

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Mr. NADLER. Going forward, it remains vital that we continue to
pursue ways to further guarantee the security of the United States, of
Israel, and of our other allies in the Middle East. This will require
strict and diligent oversight of the implementation of the agreement,
maintaining Israel's qualitative military edge, and countering Iran's
support for terrorism and other destabilizing conduct.
We must be ready to take action against Iran's nefarious behavior,
and Iran must know that the United States will never allow it to pose a
nuclear threat to the region and the world.

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