Approval of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

Floor Speech

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Mr. TONKO. Mr. Speaker, this agreement is the best option available to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. The alternatives are simply too risky and too costly, which is why the deal's opponents have failed to articulate a realistic alternative.

During my time in Congress, I have voted for every bill that imposed crippling sanctions on Iran, which brought the regime to the negotiating table and united the world to stop Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapon.

Sanctions were meant to be a tool to ensure negotiations; that is exactly what they have done, but as we have learned from the past decade, sanctions alone are not enough to stop Iran from expanding its nuclear program.

Before negotiations began, Iran greatly increased its enrichment stockpile and centrifuge capacity, despite sanctions. That is why a verifiable agreement that will cut off Iran's ability to build a nuclear weapon is necessary.

The International Atomic Energy Agency will have nearly continuous access to Iran's declared nuclear facilities and can gain unprecedented access to other suspicious, undeclared sites in as little as 24 hours.

Under this agreement, Iran will dismantle two-thirds of its installed centrifuges, remove over 97 percent of its uranium stockpile, and make changes to its Arak plutonium reactor before it receives sanctions relief.

United States Department of Energy Secretary and nuclear physicist Ernest Moniz has confirmed that the agreement increases Iran's breakout time significantly for well over a decade, from 2 to 3 months today to at least 12 months moving forward. This additional time will give us ample opportunity to catch and stop Iran should it choose to pursue a nuclear weapon.

Some have suggested that we need to reject this deal in order to get a better one, but I have found no evidence to believe that a better deal is possible.

It is clear that some of our negotiating partners and other allies do not want more sanctions. If we reject this deal, the robust international sanctions regime would certainly erode, if not unravel entirely.

In the meantime, Iran could move forward with its enrichment program without inspections; limitations on manufacturing, installation, research, and development of new centrifuges; and constraints on its enriched uranium stockpile. Simply put, no deal would mean no inspections and no constraints on Iran's nuclear ambitions.

Some have suggested that we cannot make an agreement with a country that we do not trust, but we must remember that this deal is not based on trust, but rather the most intrusive inspections regime upon which we have ever agreed.

We did not trust the Soviet Union, especially when we negotiated an arms reduction treaty with them as we fought in devastating proxy wars around the world.

Today we are not debating whether to trust Iran. We are debating whether and how we should enhance monitoring of its nuclear program.

I remain committed to working with the administration and my colleagues here in Congress to contain Iran's conventional capabilities that threaten stability in the region and throughout the world, but know that this deal is the best option to take the nuclear issue out of the equation.

I urge my colleagues to approve this agreement.

Again, I thank the gentlewoman from California for yielding.

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