Hire More Heroes Act of 2015

Floor Speech

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Mr. MERKLEY. Mr. President, the United Sates, our citizens, our President, and I believe every single Member of Congress stand united in our commitment to block Iran from securing a nuclear weapon. The question we
are debating is the pathway that is best for ensuring that outcome. Is the international agreement negotiated between Iran and the P5+1 nations the best strategy for blocking Iran's potential pursuit of a nuclear weapon or is there some other route that yields better probability, better outcome? That is the issue we are considering.

Over the last month, I have explored the strengths of every argument and counterargument. I have met with policy experts, intelligence analysts, advocates, and the Ambassadors of our partner nations. I have sought and received the counsel of Oregonians on both sides of this issue. Taking all of this into account, this deal is the best available strategy for blocking Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

The plan's strength is that for 15 years it creates an effective framework for blocking Iran's three pathways to securing a nuclear weapon: the uranium path, the plutonium path, and the covert path. It blocks the uranium path by requiring Iran to dismantle two-thirds of its centrifuges; more importantly, to reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium by 97 percent; and to limit enrichment of uranium to 3.67 percent--far below the 90 percent required for a nuclear weapon.

It blocks Iran's plutonium pathway by requiring Iran to pull the core of its Arak reactor and to fill it with concrete, to build any replacement reactor with a design that will not produce weapons-grade plutonium, and to forgo the reprocessing of spent fuel which is essential to the plutonium path. The agreement also blocks a covert path to a bomb by imposing extensive inspections and monitoring. This includes providing onsite inspections anywhere a violation is suspected. Unprecedented procedures have been put in place to guarantee that Iran cannot indefinitely stall these inspections, including setting a maximum number of days for access and number of days that is guaranteed to ensure that we can, with confidence, detect any work with radioactive materials. The result--attested to by 75 nonproliferation experts and diplomats in a recent letter--is that it is ``very likely that any future effort by Iran to pursue nuclear weapons, even a clandestine program, would be detected promptly.''

As many have pointed out on the floor today, the agreement is not without shortcomings. It has not sustained the current U.N. ban on Iran's importation of conventional arms. Iran could acquire conventional arms up to 5 years and missile technology after 8 years.

It does not dictate how Iran can spend the dollars it reclaims from cash assets that are frozen. It does not permanently maintain bright lines on Iran's nuclear research or nuclear energy program, lifting the 300-kilogram stockpile limit and 3.77 percent enrichment limit after 15 years. These exclusions are trouble.

It is possible, perhaps probable, that Iran will use some of that additional cash and access to conventional arms to increase its support for terrorist groups. It is possible that Iran will use a nuclear research program and a nuclear energy program as the foundation for a future nuclear weapons program. That is a substantial concern.

For this reason, many have come to this floor and argued the United States, instead of implementing this agreement, should withdraw from it and negotiate a better deal. The prospects for that possibility, however, are slim.

Our P5+1 partners--and I have met with all of their Ambassadors to explore this issue--have committed the good faith of their governments behind this agreement. They believe this is the best path, the best opportunity to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. They plan to honor the deal they have signed on to with or without the United States as long as Iran does as well. Iran has every reason to honor this agreement, even if the United States rejects it because agreement fulfills Iran's goal of lifting the international sanctions and it sets the stage for valuable trade and investment partnerships.

If Iran were to follow this course, it would gain many benefits while leaving the United States at odds with the balance of our partners, undermining, in a dramatic international fashion, American influence with strategic and security consequences throughout a large spectrum. On the other hand, if Iran exits this agreement and responds to its rejection by the United States, our country then is the one that stands in the pathway of a potential diplomatic solution to this incredibly important international security issue. It will be the United States blocking a plan with high confidence of stopping Iran from acquiring a nuclear bomb. Furthermore, the international support for economic sanctions would fray, giving Iran some of the economic relief it is seeking without the burden of intrusive inspections.

In short, this course would shatter diplomacy, impact and diminish American leadership, and shred our economic leverage, increasing reliance on one leftover tool--military options--while at the same time dramatically diminishing our confidence in the actual state of Iran's nuclear program. Less information, more reliance, and less confidence would be a dangerous combination.

The most effective strategy for blocking Iran's access to a nuclear bomb is to utilize this agreement and maximize American participation to hold Iran strictly accountable, not through the first 15 years but through the next decades that follow, where Iran is still completely constrained by its commitment to never develop a nuclear weapon.

After 15 years, Iran will be subject to the deal's requirement that it will never ``seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.'' And Iran will continue to be subject to ongoing intensive monitoring and verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA.

We, the United States, can greatly strengthen this framework. The United States should use a massive intelligence program to back up the plan in the first 15 years and strengthen the IAEA's monitoring after the first 15 years. The United States should lead the international community in defining the boundary that constitutes the difference between a nuclear research program and a nuclear energy program versus a nuclear weapons program. Those bright lines that are diminished are replaced with a commitment that has to be defined, and it is through participation and agreement that the United States can ensure that the international community sustains a clear line and enforces that clear line.

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Mr. MERKLEY. In conclusion, no foreign policy choice comes with guarantees. The future, whether we approve or reject this deal, is unknowable and carries risks. But this agreement, with its verification and full U.S. participation, offers the best prospect for stopping Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon at any point here forward, and for that reason I will support it.

I thank the Presiding Officer.

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