Hire More Heroes Act of 2015--Continued

Floor Speech

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Ms. AYOTTE. Mr. President, I come to the floor to discuss what I believe is probably the most important foreign policy issue I have worked on in my time in the Senate. It is one of great consequence to our Nation and also to our allies.

I don't come to this decision lightly, but there are many reasons I would urge this body to disapprove the agreement that has been entered into between the Obama administration, the Iranian Government, and the P5+1 nations.

First of all, we need to understand the country we are dealing with. Just today the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said: I am saying to Israel that they won't live to see the end of these 25 years. With Allah's help, there will be no such thing as a Zionist regime in 25 years.

Of course, this is not the first time we have heard this from the Supreme Leader or the leaders of Iran. We are in this position even after having entered this agreement and having had the President go to the U.N. to seek approval of this agreement prior to coming to the Congress. We know that while this agreement was being negotiated, the Iranian Foreign Minister was smiling for the cameras and negotiating the agreement, while the President of Iran was actually at rallies in Iran where they were shouting ``Down with America'' and ``Death to Israel.''

Iran itself has a history that is important for us to understand. That history is a history of noncompliance. Iran has time and time again failed to comply with U.N. resolutions and failed to meet its obligations. Iran has violated U.N. Security Council resolutions. Iran has violated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the past. Iran has consistently been unresponsive to the International Atomic Energy Agency in the past--the IAEA--and Iran has failed to answer questions about its past nuclear weapons activities.

If there is no covert, undeclared nuclear facility in Iran today, Olli Heinonen, a former IAEA Deputy Director, has said it would be the first time in 20 years.

So one of the important issues, I believe, for any of us in reviewing this agreement is: What is the inspection regime that would be put in place to assure not only that we are doing a full inspection at the declared facilities of Iran but also the undeclared facilities? The reality is that under this agreement, the process for seeking inspection by the IAEA for undeclared facilities is a process that only a lawyer could love--and I happen to be one--because if we look at the language of the actual agreement, we will see in paragraph 75 that ``if the IAEA has concerns regarding undeclared nuclear materials or activities, or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA, at locations that have not been declared under the comprehensive safeguards agreement'' the IAEA first has to ``provide Iran [with] the basis for such concerns and request clarification.''

So that is the first step. Then, ``if Iran's explanations do not resolve the IAEA's concerns, the Agency may request access to such locations for the sole reason to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities'' and the IAEA also has to ``provide Iran the reasons for access in writing and will make available all relevant information.''

Then, Iran may come back and ``propose to the IAEA alternative means of resolving the IAEA's concerns that enable the IAEA to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities ....... ''

So if those alternatives aren't accepted from Iran, then, ``if the two sides are unable to reach satisfactory agreements to verify the absence of'' an undeclared nuclear facility, then at that point there is a process that goes into place, and that process--which has been described on this Senate floor--can take up to 24 days.

But we need to understand there is a whole litigation process that occurs even before those days, and this can be a much longer process.

Then, how does this get resolved? This gets resolved essentially by a committee process. So then we have a committee resolve all of this. That is why I say this is a lawyer's dream in terms of an inspection regime here.

Then, if we look at paragraph 78 of the agreement, ``The members of the Joint Commission, by consensus or by a vote of 5 or more of its 8 members, would advise on the necessary means to resolve the IAEA's concerns.''

This process, if we add up all the days, is a lengthy process. Again, it certainly is so far away from the anytime, anywhere inspection regime. We have to understand that Iran has a history of using every means possible to delay inspections, especially to areas that are undeclared or they are trying to hide their nuclear facilities. That is why I describe it as an inspection regime that only a lawyer could love because this will allow Iran to litigate access to their undeclared sites, and we already know they have a history of doing that.

One of the issues I have taken a keen interest in since I have been in the Senate is Iran's missile program. We have heard all along from the administration that they were not going to address Iran's support of terrorism, that they were going to keep that issue separate--that they were going to keep separate issues of Iran's support for terrorism around the world--we have heard about that in this debate today--their support for groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, their support for the Houthis in Yemen, their support for the Taliban in Afghanistan, their support for terrorism around the world. Yet at the last minute in this agreement, the administration conceded two incredibly important points: No. 1, allowing Iran to have the resolutions lifted on having arms sales and transactions within 5 years, and then, No. 2, within 8 years, lifting the U.N. resolutions on missiles or ICBMs.

As our own Secretary of Defense has described, the significance of course in ICBMs is the ``I,'' which means intercontinental, meaning missiles that can hit the United States of America. Yet that was lifted at the last minute, and that was lifted over the objections, over the recommendations of our highest military officer, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman Martin Dempsey.

This has been a focus of mine in the Senate because I have been concerned that we have heard in the Armed Services Committee from many of our top defense and intelligence officials that the preferred method for Iran to deliver a nuclear weapon to the United States of America would be an ICBM and that this certainly represents a threat to America and to our allies.

In fact, I was so concerned about this that last summer I wrote the President of the United States, and 26 Senators joined me in the letter that I wrote to the President. In that letter, I expressed the belief that the Iranian deal should address Iran's ICBM missile program. The reason I wrote and led this effort is because we had been hearing for years before the Senate Armed Services Committee from people such as the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, who testified before the committee in February of 2014, that ``we judge that Iran would choose a ballistic missile as its preferred method of delivering nuclear weapons.''

In 2013, we also heard from Director Clapper that the Iranians are developing two systems that could have intercontinental capability as early as 2015. Here we are in 2015. Some have estimated it may take a few more years. Regardless, according to public testimony from our intelligence community, Iran could have ICBM capability in the next few years, and here we have, in conjunction with this agreement, our blessing because we agreed that the U.N. resolution against their missile program that said, no, Iran, you

cannot have ICBM capability, now it is OK. It will be legitimate for them to have ICBM capability.

Why do they need ICBM capability if they don't have any interest in delivering the most destructive weapons to the world--to countries on the other side of the world, including our own?

So as I said, this issue was against the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's advice. When I heard public reports--there were reports bubbling up about the agreement before it was signed that Iran was pressuring, with support from other countries like Russia, to lift the arms embargo, to lift the missile embargo. I was so worried about it that a week before the agreement I asked Chairman Dempsey in the Armed Services Committee, on July 7, about the reports that these resolutions may be lifted on arms and missiles. He told me that under no circumstances should we relieve pressure on Iran relative to ballistic missile capability and arms trafficking. Yet that is exactly what happens in this agreement.

The Chairman came back to our committee after the agreement was signed to testify about the agreement, and I asked him again about including this in the agreement. He told me it was against his military advice to lift the arms resolution and to lift the missile resolution.

So as I look at the grave concerns we should have for our national security, this is one of the top concerns--an insufficient inspection regime legitimizing their ability to have ICBM capability, allowing them in 5 years to legitimately have more arms. We already know they are supplying arms and cash around the world to their terrorist proxies. This agreement of course gives them, within a 9-month period, billions of dollars more cash to support terrorism.

One of the things I have heard on the floor today from my colleagues on the other side of the aisle who are supporting this agreement is that somehow this leaves on the table all of the tools we need to deal with Iran's support for terrorism--which, of course, destabilizes the region. Except the problem is that nobody has told the Iranians this point because they have a very different viewpoint on this agreement. Iran has taken the position that if any of the sanctions are reimposed, they can walk away from the agreement.

If we look at paragraph 26 of this agreement, I would argue the language in the agreement actually allows them to make that argument, unfortunately.

Tehran has specifically stated that it will treat the imposition of any sanctions that are similar to those that were in place before this deal as a reason to walk away.

So why is this important? It is important because we know they support terrorism around the world. My colleagues have said we have to deal with their support for terrorism, and we still have the tools in our toolbox to issue tough sanctions to deal with their terrorism, even while being part of this agreement. The problem is that the language doesn't necessarily bear that out in the agreement.

In a July 20 letter, Iran told the U.N. Security Council that it would ``reconsider its commitments under the JCPOA if the effects of the termination of the Security Council, European Union, or United States nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures are impaired by continued application or the imposition of new sanctions with a nature and scope identical or similar to those that were in place prior to the implementation date, irrespective of whether such new sanctions are introduced on nuclear-related or other grounds, unless the issues are remedied within a reasonably short time.''

In other words, Iran is taking the viewpoint, under the language of this agreement, that if we reimpose any of the sanctions that are lifted as part of this agreement--which, by the way, these are the toughest sanctions, right? These are the tools in our toolbox--even if they commit acts of terrorism, they can walk away from this agreement.

So let's put this all together. Iran, within 9 months, gets more cash for this agreement. They get to keep their infrastructure for their nuclear program because they get to keep their centrifuges. They are now in a position where people are doing business with them--because we know that many countries around the world want to be able to do business with Iran, so an infusion of cash and relationships there. And then they are continuing to support terrorism. They commit through their proxies a major terrorist event that triggers something that we want to do here--we want to take tough sanctions against them because they have supported a terrorist attack against us or our allies. Yet they are going to take the position that we can't reimpose any of their sanctions no matter what they do because of the language of the agreement in paragraph 26. They are interpreting it that way.

So if you are Iran, right now, this is a pretty good deal for you. You can get the cash. You can get the legitimatization. People are doing business with you again. You can continue to support terrorism, and our hands apparently, in their view, are tied on sanctions.

So when I hear from those supporting the agreement that somehow we still have all the tools in our toolbox to deal with terrorism, it seems to me that if we look at the language of this agreement and how the Iranians are supporting it, we have tied our hands, and we will be in a weaker position to deal with their support for terrorism around the world no matter how egregious their behavior is.

This is a real issue when I think about our national security, when they have the largest state sponsor of terrorism in the world and they will now have legitimate access to developing their ICBM program with the lifting of sanctions in the U.N. and the legitimate purchasing of arms. We know there are countries like Russia that are lining up to sell these arms to them, and then we are going to weaken our ability to impose terrorism-related sanctions in the future.

I heard many of my colleagues talking earlier about the 60-vote threshold in the United States Senate. When we voted on the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, we voted on it, I believe, 98 to 1. We would think at that point we wouldn't be worried at all about actually getting to the debate on the actual bill. So I hope my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, when they voted for the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, were serious about having a substantive vote, given that this was a vote of 98 to 1 on this agreement. I believe the American people deserve nothing less than a substantive vote on the merits of this agreement as provided for by the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act.

I know that many of my colleagues are here to speak, but I want to raise one final issue that we have heard about on this floor; that is, actually being able to see the full text of this agreement. We all know that when you have an agreement, especially with a country that has a history of cheating, language matters. We know that because the Iranians are already taking all kinds of different positions on what the language means in this agreement to their benefit. Yet we have not been given access to the two-side agreements between the IAEA and Iran. By the way, that is in direct violation of the express language of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, which says Congress should have access to side agreements. But what we do know about these side agreements that has been reported in the press is truly disturbing; that is, as to the side agreements themselves, information has been leaked that indicates Tehran could declare some areas as suspected nuclear sites, including the Parchin military complex, off-limits to inspectors and that Iran could even be permitted to self-inspect there.

Can you imagine allowing a country with a history of cheating the ability to self-inspect or collect their own samples in terms of how inspections would be done? Yet those who are supporting the agreement are saying this is a robust inspection method.

I would ask my colleagues on the other side of the aisle who are supporting this agreement, does it not trouble you that you have not been given access to the language of these side agreements given that what has been leaked about them is that they pertain to the actual inspection process at important sites such as Parchin? I would hope that our constituents would expect us to review every word of the language of something so important to our national security. That, in and of itself, I would say, is a reason to be highly skeptical of this agreement, along with the other issues I have raised.

Finally, we have a long history in this body of debating important international agreements, including agreements that deal with very fundamental issues involving our foreign policy--issues that involve nuclear nonproliferation, issues that involve many sensitive treaty issues. We have a long history of actually debating these in a bipartisan manner and working in a bipartisan manner to approve agreements. Yet on this agreement, we are left in a position where a majority of the Senate on a bipartisan basis has said that we have serious reservations about this agreement and have declared that we are going to vote against this agreement. Yet the administration is continuing to push forward to get this done, to make sure that this agreement is fully implemented without reaching out in a bipartisan fashion to ensure that the strength of the Congress in a bipartisan fashion is behind something so important to our national security.

That should say something about the merits of this agreement. This agreement is deeply flawed. This is an agreement that I believe does not protect our national security. In fact, in the long run it will undermine our security in this country by giving Iran more cash, legitimizing their nuclear weapons program in terms of keeping their infrastructure for that program, legitimizing their ICBM program, and hurting our ability to impose further sanctions if they conduct acts of terrorism, which they certainly have a history of doing through their proxies.

I hope as we continue this debate, we will disapprove this agreement, which I do not believe protects our national security.

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