Hire More Heroes Act of 2015

Floor Speech

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Mrs. FISCHER. Madam President, I rise today to discuss our strategy against ISIL.

Yesterday at our Armed Services Committee, we held a hearing on this topic. Instead of reassuring me that our mission was on the right path, the testimony provided further evidence that the administration must change their approach. I agree with the President's stated goal of degrading and destroying ISIL, but the steps we have taken thus far will not achieve ISIL's defeat. Indeed, the root of the problem seems to be that our strategy does not connect with events on the ground. There is no better example of this than our plan to train and equip the so-called moderate Syrian troops.

At the end of last year, Congress approved the President's request of $500 million for the purpose of building a force of moderate Syrian fighters. Testifying in September of last year, then-Secretary of Defense Hagel laid out the administration's plan to build a force of about 5,000 fighters in 1 year. General Dempsey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, added his assessment that about 12,000 fighters would need to be trained for the force to have an effect on the battlefield.

Initial results were expected within 8 to 12 months. At that time, many Members, including myself, questioned whether those goals were attainable and whether this assumption--that we could fight a war without taking on significant risk because local partners would provide ground forces--was even realistic.

Let's consider where we are today, about 10 months later. According to public reports, the program produced about 60 fighters, and, upon their return to Syria, they were attacked by Al Qaeda-affiliated forces.

General Austin testified yesterday before our committee. In response to my questioning, he said that only four or five of those fighters remain. Again, we expected 5,000, and 4 or 5 remain. I wish I could say the complete failure of this strategy comes as a surprise. Unfortunately, I cannot. While ISIL has lost some territory in northeastern Syria, it has expanded its control in the western half of that country.

Iraq is a similar story. Recruits for U.S. training programs remain below expectations, with U.S. forces training just over half the number of Iraqis expected, and progress on the battlefield is uneven. It is plain to see why General Dempsey, our most senior uniformed military officer, has recently characterized the fight as ``tactically stalemated.''

The question is, What are we going to do? How will our approach change? What can we do to break that stalemate? What can we do to begin rolling back this tremendous threat?

I attended yesterday's hearing with those questions in mind, and I was extremely disappointed to hear that no real change was in order. To be fair, press reports indicate that changes are being considered, such as deploying graduates of our training program in groups larger than 50 or in safer areas of the country.

But even if such minor adjustments are made, they will not alter the basic fact that the idea of a new Syrian force is a complete fantasy under our current approach.

Perhaps in recognition of this, another report has surfaced that suggests the administration is no longer attempting to build a moderate ground force in Syria. Instead, they will simply train Syrians to direct U.S. air strikes and then embed them within existing rebel brigades.

If our experience thus far indicates that very few moderate groups remain on the battlefield, we will either be providing air support to a contingent too small to make a difference or we will be providing it to groups that are too extreme to currently warrant any support from us.

Again, I support the President's goal to destroy ISIL, but I don't see how anyone can believe this program is going to accomplish it. Instead of providing a new direction, the message this administration is sending is that they will stay the course. I admit I share the complete confusion expressed by some of my colleagues yesterday when we learned of this situation.

This White House acknowledges that the training programs in Syria and Iraq--the linchpins of our strategy--have vastly underperformed. They express moral outrage at ISIL's barbarity, as well as grave concern for the plight of the 4 million refugees that have fled the country and sorrow for the 250,000 that have lost their lives. Our military characterizes the conflict as a stalemate. But, apparently, the administration feels no change is necessary. We are told the long-term trajectory is favorable, and ISIL's future, as General Dempsey put it, is ``increasingly dim.'' I appreciate the fact that patience is required when it comes to military operations, but at the same time, patience doesn't fill the fundamental gaps in this administration's strategy. And the idea that we can wait ISIL out seems to overlook the death, destruction, and collateral damage its continued presence inflicts on the neighboring countries or to at least suggest that it is tolerable.

I have visited the region several times. Our allies there cannot sustain the strain of this conflict for years on end. I have visited a Syrian refugee camp in Turkey. Those people cannot wait there forever. Lest we forget, colleagues, this conflict has been raging for 4 years. Sadly, the flood of refugees reaching Europe was entirely predictable.

And how long before a divided Iraq becomes irreparable? As long as ISIL exists and continues to exercise initiative on the battlefield, it will draw recruits, expand its global network, and inspire those ``lone wolf'' attacks. Its ability to execute attacks against Europe and the United States will improve as more foreign fighters pass through its ranks and then return to their home countries. These are the very reasons Congress supported taking military action against ISIL in the first place, but I certainly did not support the deployment of forces to establish a stalemate.

When our soldiers are put in harm's way, we shouldn't be content to just ``patiently'' leave them there, with no strategy to achieve our goals. As my colleague Senator McCain--who has been a tireless advocate on this issue--has pointed out, there are a variety of options available to the President between the current approach and deploying large amounts of troops on the ground. With only a stalemate to show for the thousands of soldiers we have deployed, the 5,000 air strikes that we have conducted, and the past year we have spent training Syrians and Iraqis, I think these options deserve reconsideration.

The President has stated that ``all wars must end'' and that our country ``must move off a permanent war footing.'' I believe the best way to do so is by crafting a strategy that plans for victory.

Before I yield the floor, I want to note my appreciation of Secretary Carter and General Austin for their frank testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Both men have come before our panel and they have provided honest assessments and also specific figures about the results of the Syria training program, for which they have received significant media scrutiny.

The point of a public hearing is to provide the American people and their representatives in Congress with the information they need to know so we can make informed policy decisions. I sincerely hope more witnesses follow their example and justly uphold the valuable tradition of congressional oversight by not shying away from discussing these very difficult topics.

I yield the floor.

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