Hire More Heroes Act of 2015

Floor Speech

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

Mr. BLUMENTHAL. Mr. President, I am honored to follow my friend and colleague from Rhode Island in his very eloquent and powerful remarks, and I wish to add my own on the same topic. The question of whether the Senate should accept the agreement between the P5+1 and Iran to end their illicit and treacherous nuclear program is one of the most difficult and critical matters of national security that I have confronted since my election to the Senate.

I am deeply grateful to many in my State of Connecticut, here in Washington, DC, and around the country who have offered me their insight, interest, and involvement--most especially the people of Connecticut who have given me their thoughts in letters, in emails, phone calls, and in one-on-one conversations across our State in a vast variety of settings, whether at parades or fairs or in one-on-one meetings or meetings in groups. I have made my decision based on conscience and conviction. I will vote to accept the proposed agreement concerning Iran's nuclear program and against the resolution of disapproval before the Senate.

My two paramount goals have been consistently and constantly to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran and to do so by peaceful means. I believe this agreement, using diplomacy, not military force, is the most viable remaining path now available--now available--to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran.

This agreement is not the one I would have negotiated or accepted, but it is better than no deal. This agreement is an opportunity for us to push back and deter Iran, and it brings on us a special obligation of vigilance and vigorous enforcement. It can be made better. It can be improved and strengthened through unilateral action by the United States and through consultation and collaboration with our allies, not resuming or reopening the negotiations but acting in collaboration with our allies, as well as through actions we can take as a nation alone and working closely with our ally, our friend, our critical partner in the Middle East, the State of Israel.

The administration set forth a case that the current agreement immediately reduces Iran's nuclear program and places it under a series of overlapping safeguards. Together these measures push a threshold nuclear power back from the brink. The agreement imposes an intrusive inspection and surveillance regime relying on international certification and verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Future U.S. Presidents have the authority immediately and through Executive order to reimpose our sanctions if Iranian actions are inconsistent with our national security.

Rejecting this agreement is fraught with unacceptable risk. Our formal negotiation partners and allies have signaled clearly they are simply not coming back to the table--a point confirmed in my direct conversations and meetings. There is no better deal available now. The present sanctions will soon become unenforceable, producing an economic windfall for Iran whether or not the United States accepts this agreement. The United States, instead of Iran, would be isolated, and Iran's nuclear program would be unconstrained. Rejection would fracture our unified efforts with our allies and greatly weaken international pressure on Iran and undermine American leadership on this issue and others, especially if economic sanctions are needed in the event of a violation.

This agreement has shortcomings, no doubt, and they are serious. I have listened to my colleagues, including Chairman Corker, whom I deeply respect, and others here today, enumerate a number of them. Yet I remain convinced the most constructive and clear-eyed role for Congress is to support specific steps to make implementation and enforcement of this agreement stronger and more effective. In fact, in my view, the day after this agreement is approved and accepted is as important as the agreement itself--the day after, the months after, and the years after because that is when this agreement must be enforced vigorously and strenuously and unyieldingly.

I have taken additional time to look beyond this agreement to create a blueprint for diplomatic steps to strengthen it. Specifically, I am working with the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Ben Cardin of Maryland, to craft new legislation. Congress must act to encourage and enable diplomacy with Iran, which is not only possible but critically important. Now we must begin the process of addressing those shortfalls and shortcomings, unwanted impacts and consequences revealed during congressional review of the agreement.

No. 1, countering Iranian terror with dollar-for-dollar sanctions. To counter Iran's role as a leading state sponsor of terrorism, Congress must sustain and expand existing sanctions that crack down on terror financing and demand their full enforcement by both the United States and the European Union.

I will continue--indeed, I will increase--pressing Secretary of State John Kerry to take long overdue, aggressive steps to interdict arms to Hezbollah, and I will work to block Hezbollah's financing and logistical support from Iran, applying tools and techniques available through our banking and financial system.

No. 2, empowering our allies to counter Iran and terror proxies. We must renew and reinvigorate our efforts to protect our allies, especially Israel--our major strategic partner in the Middle East--from the threat of Iran and its terror proxies. We need a new framework of defense cooperation that takes into account how this agreement will affect the changing threat from Iran.

Congress must work to expand Israel's qualitative military edge and bolster intelligence cooperation. The Pentagon must establish new joint training exercises that involve strategic air assets and invite Israeli pilots to train flying long-range bombers. Now is the time to aid Israel with extra F-35 Joint Strike Fighter squadrons and the tankers they need to cut off any threat to Israel--well before it reaches their borders. No equipment should be precluded if needed for Israel's self-defense.

As a member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, I will work to establish such a parallel agreement with Israel to cover threats, both nuclear and conventional, along with an ongoing joint review forum, bringing together the United States, Israel, and NATO members to enhance our deterrent capabilities.

No. 3, preventing a nuclear-armed Iran. The United States must reaffirm unequivocally that Iran will never be allowed to obtain a nuclear weapon and that all available options will be used to stop it from ever accumulating enough highly enriched uranium or weapons-grade plutonium to produce one. Such a policy is consistent with this agreement.

Congress must articulate in statute that that policy is unchallengeable and that Iranian violations both during this agreement and afterward will be met with strong, unquestionable action. It must be clear we will defend our vital interests in the Persian Gulf region, and those vital interests include preventing a nuclear-armed Iran. It is a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy.

As a member of the agreement, the United States is in a stronger position to deter and remedy violations, whether through economic sanctions or military action as a last resort. If the agreement is rejected and economic sanctions or military actions are ever necessary, we would act alone. That is a simple fact about our rejection. If the agreement is accepted, we act with a coalition of allies and partners with the legitimacy and credibility of diplomacy having run its course and with the intelligence produced by inspections that will help to guide any military action necessary as a last resort. There will be popular support at home, which is absolutely necessary for such action. That support is essential because acting without it will make it difficult, if not impossible, for the President to in effect seek to enforce the very terms of an agreement this Nation has rejected, if that is the result.

Most importantly, this agreement cannot be based on hope or trust. History belies both in our experience with Iran. This deal is not an agreement I have long sought, it is not the agreement I would have preferred, but it makes the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran less imminent. It requires the United States and the international community to sustain their commitment to verify and enforce its provisions over many years, and I am ready to join in the hard work of preventing a nuclear-armed Iran on this difficult diplomatic path.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Source