Hire More Heroes Act of 2015

Floor Speech

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Mr. KING. Madam President, I want to talk about this arrangement and agreement with Iran and cover several points and what I think are important realities that have not been emphasized in this debate, but first I would like to address the issue of the 60-vote margin.

First, I think it should be on the record that the minority leader offered to the majority leader a unanimous consent agreement that there would be no filibuster on the motion to proceed and there would be a 60-vote threshold required for final passage of the bill. As I understand it, that offer was rejected. That means the only alternative is to go the technical rule of the filibuster in order to require a 60-vote margin.

It is absolutely clear from the legislative record of the Corker-Cardin bill that everyone involved in that discussion, including the Senator from Tennessee, understood that a 60-vote margin would be required in the passage of this legislation. There is no question about it. There are quotes in the Record. Everyone understood that from the beginning of the consideration of the Corker-Cardin bill.

Finally, every major issue that has come before this bill since I have been here has required 60 votes, whether it was immigration or background checks or extension of unemployment benefits or the minimum wage. All of those have required a 60-vote threshold. That has been the standard in this body. We could debate whether that should or should not be the standard, but it is, it has been, and this is not a time to decide we are going to arbitrarily abandon that.

I must say I am sort of amazed to hear people discussing this as if this is some kind of new imposition of a rule, and it reminds me of ``Casablanca": I am shocked--shocked--to understand that there might be a 60-vote requirement on this piece of legislation.

That has been the standard for this body certainly for as long as I have been here and for some time longer. As I say, we can discuss whether that should be the standard, but that is what it is, and no one should be surprised that is the way we are proceeding here today.

OK. Let's talk about the agreement--five quick realities.

No. 1, Iran is a nuclear threshold state today. There is a lot of argument. I sat through the long debate yesterday afternoon about what happens in 2030, what happens in 15 years, and would Iran be somehow a legitimized nuclear threshold state. They are a nuclear threshold state today. The risk to the world is imminent. It is not in 15 years; it is today. That is why this agreement is so important--because basically it freezes and rolls back Iran's nuclear capabilities for at least the next 15 years and probably longer.

The No. 2 reality: Iran is a rogue nation. It foments terrorism around the world. It is a state sponsor of terrorism. Everyone knows that. Under this agreement, as has been pointed out, because of the nature of the negotiations, which were ``roll back your nuclear program in exchange for relief from the sanctions,'' they will indeed receive relief from the sanctions, and that will give them additional funds for their economy and possibly for their nefarious purposes. But I would submit that the only thing worse than a rogue Iran is a rogue Iran armed with nuclear weapons. That is the essence of this deal. It prevents their opportunity to gain nuclear weapons, to create sufficient fissile material. It rolls back what they already have.

I should point out that they became a nuclear threshold state during the imposition of various sanctions regimes. So it is clear that sanctions in and of themselves are never going to prevent their achievement of becoming a nuclear weapons state.

No. 3, this is a multilateral agreement. All the discussion around here acts as if it is the United States and Iran, Obama and the Ayatollah. It indeed involves the world's major powers. It involves Great Britain, France, Germany, China, Russia, and other countries that have helped to enforce those sanctions and make them effective. If we walk away from this deal, we are doing so alone.

We had an extraordinary meeting before the recess with Ambassadors from the P5+1 countries. They made it clear that they had accepted this agreement and that if we rejected it, their willingness to go back to the table, reimpose the sanctions, reinforce the sanctions--I believe one of the Ambassadors used the term ``far-fetched''--it is not going to happen.

The sanctions are going to erode starting now, no matter what we do in this Congress. I can't figure out any way that a weaker sanctions regime--which is inevitable because other countries involved in the sanctions have already started to make moves toward doing business with Iran--I don't see how a weaker sanctions regime is ever going to bring Iran back to the table to get a better deal.

Reality No. 4: This agreement is flawed. It is not the agreement I would prefer. There are elements that I think could be improved. I wish the 15 years was 20 or 30 years. I wish the 24 days was 12 days or 8 days or 1 day. But this is the agreement that is before us. And the analysis could not be strictly of the agreement itself and within its four corners, but compared to what? That is really the basic question here--not whether this a good deal or a bad deal. The question is, How does this deal, no matter what its flaws, compare with the alternatives that are out there? In all of the drama and all of the argument and all of the speeches and rallies that we have heard, no one has yet come up with a credible alternative. I have not yet heard a credible alternative. The only thing I hear is this: We will reimpose sanctions and bring them back to the table and get a better deal. It is going to be very hard to reimpose those sanctions without the support of our international partners. If we enter into the deal and Iran cheats, then we can bring the international partners back with us, but to do so--to try to think that we could do so now is just unrealistic. I wish there were a better alternative. I also wish I could play tight end for the New England Patriots, but it is not going to happen. It is simply not realistic. There is no credible alternative.

Finally, we have to talk about what happens after the deal. Congress has a responsibility. The administration has a responsibility. We cannot trust Iran. Everyone knows that. No one argues that.

There has been a lot of discussion about the IAEA. I serve on the Intelligence Committee. We had a briefing just yesterday morning with the heads of our intelligence agencies. It is not just the IAEA that is going to be watching this agreement, it is the world's intelligence community, and we have significant capability to know if they are cheating over and above and in addition to anything the IAEA brings to the table. This is not trust; this is verification based upon the IAEA's worldwide experience but also based upon the considerable intelligence assets of the United States and other countries that are supporting us in this effort.

Finally, there are risks. I understand that. There are risks on both sides. There are severe risks. This is not an easy call. It is one of the hardest decisions I have ever had to make. But if you analyze the alternatives and weigh the risks, I believe the risks of not going forward with this agreement are significantly greater than the risks of giving diplomacy a chance going forward with this agreement, which can be verified. If there is cheating, it can be caught, No. 1, and punished, No. 2, and if the agreement doesn't work, we have the same options we have today.

This is a difficult decision. It is one that has weighed on this body and on this country. But I think this is a tremendous opportunity for us to avoid a nuclear-armed Iran and secure at least that part of a peaceful Middle East and more secure world.

Thank you, Madam President.

I yield the floor.

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