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Ms. DeLAURO. Mr. Speaker, I rise to support the agreement reached by Secretary Kerry and the international community because I believe there is no better alternative for preventing Iran from immediately developing a nuclear weapon.
Since the first sanctions were imposed on Iran a decade ago, I have supported tough economic measures as a means to bring Iran to the negotiating table. In that respect, the sanctions worked, but sanctions alone will not stop Iran from moving toward nuclear weapons.
After strenuous review of the July 14 agreement and all its annexes, I have reached the conclusion that the agreement is the best option available today for keeping nuclear weapons out of Iranian hands. Under the agreement, Iran is bound ``under no circumstances ever to seek, develop or acquire nuclear weapons.''
Among other things, Iran must reduce its active centrifuges by two-thirds, give up 97 percent of its uranium stockpile, and reconfigure the Arak reactor so it cannot produce weapons-grade plutonium.
The number of inspectors in Iran will triple. They will gain full access to nuclear facilities, including the entire uranium supply chain, at any time. This is indeed the most intrusive inspection regime of any nonproliferation agreement in U.S. history.
That is important because it will give the United States and the international community far greater insight into the regime's behavior and enable us to monitor them closely.
It is true that Iran may try to cheat, but that is exactly why we need this agreement. With severe restrictions and an aggressive inspections regime in place, we will be much more likely to discover any violations.
In that event, the United States will be authorized to reimpose sanctions on Iran immediately, and that applies not just to the U.S. sanctions, but to U.N. sanctions as well.
In summary, this agreement comprises harsh restrictions on Iran's nuclear activities, a strong monitoring system, and tough penalties for violation.
A group of 29 leading American scientists, including Nobel laureates, has called it ``a technically sound, stringent, and innovative deal that will provide the necessary assurance in the coming decades and more that Iran is not developing nuclear weapons.''
If we walk away from this agreement, the only remaining alternative is military action. We have been down that path for 15 years, and we have seen the grave consequences of not allowing diplomatic efforts to move forward.
Ronald Reagan said of the Soviet Union: ``Trust, but verify.''
This agreement is not rooted in trust but in our ability to verify compliance and to deal with enforcement. I believe it meets the goals of our negotiations to deny a dangerous Iranian regime access to a nuclear weapon.
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