The Nuclear Deal With Iran and Our National Security

Floor Speech

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Mrs. BLACKBURN. Mr. Speaker, I come to the floor this morning to talk for a few minutes about the primary issue that my constituents are talking about right now, and that is the issue of national security, homeland security, and how what is happening in the world is affecting our communities right where we live and work and where our children go to school. Isn't that what everyone wants to know: that we are going to be safe, that our children are going to be safe, and that future generations are going to be safe here in the United States?

Mr. Speaker, as we look at these issues of illegal immigration, as we look at ISIS and the threats that are carried out, such as what happened in Chattanooga, and as we look at the Iran deal, we know this affects where we live and where we work.

Today, Mr. Speaker, I want to spend just a few minutes talking about the Iran nuclear deal.

One of the members, retired, of a military organization, MOAA, came up to me Saturday as I was talking to them. He said: Marsha, this is a bad, bad deal. It is a bad, bad deal.

I have got to agree with him. It is. Of course, he speaks from the perspective of having worn the uniform and served, having had a full military career. It is interesting. They know a bad deal when they see one, and in this Iran nuclear deal that is proposed, they see the tenets of a very bad deal.

Let's look at a few of these components that will not serve us and future generations, our national security, or our homeland security well.

As you review this deal, you see that Iran retains the ability to enrich uranium. That does not stop. It is going to continue on. We can already see how a nuclear Iran would create an arms race in an area which is already volatile. Any capability to enrich uranium may cause a nuclear arms race to happen and further destabilize the Middle East.

You see, Mr. Speaker, we are not prohibiting them from doing anything. All we are doing is basically setting a date certain 10, 15, or 20 years down the road. Now, think about your children and grandchildren 10, 15 or 20 years down the road. If Iran has a nuclear weapon, what are they going to say at that point in time? How is it going to affect them?

Think about the region. A Saudi official has said: ``Politically, it would be completely unacceptable to have Iran with a nuclear capability and not the kingdom.'' I am quoting a Saudi official's remarks.

Any deal must have full transparency, and we need to know that there can be and will be because there must be anytime, anywhere inspections. It is my fear that a deal with Iran is not going to accomplish this.

The Wall Street Journal reported yesterday--and, Mr. Speaker, I will submit this for the Record--``Iran Inspections in 24 Days? Not Even Close.'' It was a Wall Street Journal article, and I commend it to my colleagues to read as they review this and think about how they are going to vote on this deal.

The Wall Street Journal stated: ``The Obama administration assures Americans that the Iran deal grants access within 24 days to undeclared but suspected Iranian nuclear sites.''

When you look at the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, it reveals that actually it is going to be closer to months. They can end up holding inspectors at bay for months.

Again, from the Journal I am reading and quoting: ``So from the moment the IAEA first tips its hand about what it wants to inspect, likely three or more months may pass.''

Now, Mr. Speaker, I ask you, does this sound like the type of deal that you would want to make with a country whose people recently were out chanting ``death to America'' and burning our flag to celebrate the Muslim holy day with the Supreme Leader in attendance at that rally? Does this sound like the type of deal that should be approved by our Secretary of State and supported by our President? Why? Why would they want to do this? Why would there be a deal that sets a date certain and kind of lays out that path? Simply put, there is no way--no way--that we can trust Iran to allow inspectors unfettered access to both civilian and military sites to verify that they are not pushing a nuclear weapon. So we would be left wondering if--if--they are going to hold up their end of this so-called nuclear deal.

Mr. Speaker, a senior commander in the Revolutionary Guard has recently said that inspectors will not be allowed on military sites. General Hossein Salami said: ``We will respond with hot lead ..... We will not roll out the red carpet for the enemy.''

In addition, Mr. Speaker, it is extremely concerning that Iran is asking for sanctions on weapons sales and ballistic missile technology transfers to be lifted. It is a bad, bad deal, as my constituent said. I commend further study to my colleagues.

[From the Wall Street Journal, July 21, 2015]
Iran Inspections in 24 Days? Not Even Close

(By Hillel Fradkin and Lewis Libby)
The Obama administration assures Americans that the Iran deal grants access within 24 days to undeclared but suspected Iranian nuclear sites. But that's hardly how a recalcitrant Iran is likely to interpret the deal. A close examination of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action released by the Obama administration reveals that its terms permit Iran to hold inspectors at bay for months, likely three or more.

Paragraphs 74 to 78 govern the International Atomic Energy Agency's access to suspect sites. First, the IAEA tells Iran ``the basis'' of its concerns about a particular location, requesting clarification. At this point Iran will know where the IAEA is headed. Iran then provides the IAEA with ``explanations'' to resolve IAEA concerns. This stage has no time limit.

Opportunities for delay abound. Iran will presumably want to know what prompted the IAEA's concern. The suspect site identified by the IAEA is likely to be remote, and Iran will no doubt say that it must gather skilled people and equipment to responsibly allay IAEA concerns. Iran may offer explanations in stages, seeking IAEA clarifications before ``completing'' its response. That could take a while.

Only if Iran's ``explanations do not resolve the IAEA's concerns'' may the IAEA then ``request access'' to the suspect site. Oddly, the agreement doesn't specify who judges whether the explanations resolve concerns. If Iran claims that it has a say in the matter, the process may stall here. Assuming Iran grants that the IAEA can be the judge, might Iran claim that the ``great Satan'' improperly influenced IAEA conclusions? Let's assume that Tehran won't do that.

Now the IAEA must provide written reasons for the request and ``make available relevant information.'' Let's assume that even though the IAEA may resist revealing the secret sources or technical means that prompted its suspicions, Iran acknowledges that a proper request has been supplied.

Only then do the supposed 24 days begin to run. First, Iran may propose, and the IAEA must consider, alternative means of resolving concerns. This may take 14 days. Absent satisfactory ``arrangements,'' a new period begins.

During this period Iran, ``in consultation with'' the Joint Commission, will ``resolve'' the IAEA concerns ``through necessary means agreed between Iran and the IAEA.'' The Joint Commission includes China, France, Germany, Russia, the U.K, the U.S., the European Union and, of course, Iran. Not exactly a wieldy bunch.

The Iranians will likely claim that ``consultation'' with the Joint Commission doesn't bind Tehran, just as the U.S. president isn't bound by consultations with Congress. The agreement says the consultation process will not exceed seven days, but Iran can point out that the nuclear deal doesn't specify when Iran and the IAEA must reach agreement and ``resolve'' IAEA concerns.

In the absence of Iran-IAEA agreement, a majority of the Joint Commission has seven days to ``advise'' on the ``necessary means'' to resolve the matter. Iran may fairly argue that the commission's right to ``advise'' is
not the same as a right to ``determine'' the ``necessary means.'' Lastly, the agreement provides that ``Iran would implement the necessary means within 3 additional days.'' But what ``necessary means'' are these? As noted, the agreement refers to ``necessary means agreed between Iran and the IAEA.'' So these additional three days don't even begin until an agreement is reached.

Now what? Well, the U.S. may take a ``Dispute'' to the Joint Commission, on which Iran sits, which has 15 days to resolve the issue. Parties may or may not invoke a similar 15 days for foreign ministers to act. Parties may also request a nonbinding opinion within 15 days from an advisory board consisting of three members, one appointed by Iran, one by the complaining country and ``a third independent member.''

But Iran may argue that nothing in the nuclear deal specifies how quickly a country must appoint its advisory-board member or even how the ``independent member'' is selected. In short, this stage may take at least 30 days and possibly 45 of consideration at the different levels, but Iran may argue that the last 15 days don't start until an advisory board has been duly formed. Then we get another five days of Joint Commission deliberation, before a disappointed U.S. or other commission member seeking IAEA inspections can hobble off to the United Nations seeking resolutions reimposing sanctions.

In short, as Iran is free to interpret the agreement, 63 or even 78 days may pass, plus three potentially lengthy periods that Iran can stretch out: One of ``explanations'' before the clock starts, one to agree on necessary means and ``resolve concerns,'' and one for advisory-board selection near the end.

So from the moment the IAEA first tips its hand about what it wants to inspect, likely three or more months may pass. All along, the Joint Commission is required to act in ``good faith,'' and to make only ``minimum necessary'' requests limited to verification, not ``interference.'' Tehran could also cite these terms to challenge particular requests.

The description of this process is based on the English-language text of the nuclear agreement. The text lacks a provision that it is the entire agreement, so Iran may claim support in supposed side agreements or statements during negotiations.

Announcing this ``comprehensive, long-term'' deal, President Obama quoted President Kennedy's 1961 call for negotiations with the Soviets. Kennedy reached two notable nuclear agreements. Mr. Obama didn't mention that within a decade of Kennedy's 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, Soviet nuclear forces--once a fraction of America's--were at parity or had surpassed ours.

During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy reached secret agreements--undisclosed to Americans for decades--not to invade Cuba and to withdraw U.S. weapons from Turkey. By invoking Kennedy was President Obama signaling there is more to this ``long-term'' deal than we know?

He is a subtle man.

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