Prohibiting Federal Funding of Planned Parenthood Federation of America--Motion to Proceed

Floor Speech

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Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. President, I rise to talk about the important agreement that we are debating here on the Senate floor--the Iran nuclear agreement. I want to begin by saying that there seems to be, as we debate this and as we hold hearings, a growing sense of frustration as we do what is really our sacred duty here in the Senate--to review, debate, and, ultimately, to vote on this agreement as to whether it is something that is going to keep our country secure or undermine the national security of the United States and our allies. This frustration stems from a number of sources. Let me just name a few.

First, I think many Democrats and Republicans feel there has been a dismissive attitude from the administration with regard to this agreement and a dismissive attitude, actually, towards the American people on whether the Congress should weigh in on this agreement, should represent their constituents on something that is this important to the national security of the United States of America.

I mention this because if you look at the last several months, every step of the way the administration has tried to cut out the role of the Congress. Initially, they said it was an Executive agreement and Congress would have no role. Well, I don't think our constituents liked that, and certainly, the Senate didn't like that. So we started debating the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act.

The President said he was going to veto it. Again, that was dismissive of this body and the American people. Fortunately, this body had a very strong veto-proof majority. We are debating it--but not because they wanted us to but because we are representing our constituents who know how important this is.

Then the agreement is taken to the United Nations before we weigh in on it at all. Members of the United Nations, citizens from other countries, are voting on this agreement before we had the opportunity. Again, bipartisan Democrats and Republicans said: Secretary Kerry, don't do that. It is an affront to the American people. But they did it. So we are debating it, and that is important. But that attitude of dismissiveness of this body and the people we represent is frustrating.

There is a second reason there is frustration in the Senate, and it stems from the fact that we are not sure that we are getting the straight scoop. We are not sure we are getting all the documents. The law requires every document to this agreement come to this body. Yet we found out 2 weeks ago that there is a very important agreement, the agreement between the IAEA and Iran on implementation of this agreement. How did we find out about that? One of my colleagues, Senator Cotton, got on a plane, went to IAEA headquarters in Vienna, and found that out--again, frustration. We are not receiving all of the documents, as required by law, to be able to review.

Third, in terms of frustration, there is a sense that as we are doing our duty here, as we are digging into this agreement, as we are reading it, as we are reaching out to experts, as we are trying to understand it, as we are questioning administration witnesses at hearings, as we are doing our required and sacred due diligence, we are told time and again that the plain language of the agreement doesn't appear to mean what it means. This is frustrating. This is particularly true with regard to sanctions.

Let me give you a few examples. First we had a closed briefing. Almost every Member of the Senate came to that briefing a couple of weeks ago. There was a big question. Was there a grandfather provision with regard to sanctions; meaning, if you are a company and you rush to Iran right now and cut some deals and sanctions are later imposed, does the mere fact that you jumped in early mean that you are grandfathered away from these sanctions? Well, a lot of people had questions.

The Secretary of State looked at 100 Members of the Senate and said: There is no grandfather clause in this agreement. There is no grandfather clause in this agreement.

This is paragraph 37 of the agreement. I am just going to quote it, because it certainly sounds like a grandfather clause to me: ``In such event [that sanctions are reimposed], these provisions''--in this paragraph--``would not apply with retroactive effect to contracts signed between any party and Iran or Iranian individuals and entities prior to the date of application .....'' That is when the agreement starts to be implemented.

That sounds like a grandfather clause. Now, maybe there are elements here, maybe there are special circumstances that make it not a grandfather clause, but the Secretary of State was in front of all of us saying that there is no grandfather clause. It is hard to square that with the plain language of this agreement.

Let me give another example--the much-touted snapback provisions in the agreement. Secretary Lew, the Secretary of the Treasury, has talked about how we have a strong snapback provision, how it is going to be prompt, and how it is powerful. These are terms that he has been using in testimony. In many ways I think Members of this body, Democrats and Republicans, see that the effectiveness of this entire deal might hinge on this so-called snapback provision. The more I read about our sanctions and how they work in this agreement, the more questions I have, because to this Senator the snapback provision seems to be an illusion. It actually seems to be aimed back at the United States. I don't think we should be calling it a snapback provision. Maybe it should be called the boomerang provision, because it is aimed at us.

Let me talk a little bit more in detail about this. First, the term ``snapback'' was not in the agreement. It is a good term--catchy--and sounds good. It is actually a term used in trade negotiations when a party violates a trade agreement. Trade agreements will have snapback provisions where we raise tariffs on goods immediately. That is a snapback. But that is not what is going on here. That is not what is going to happen here. The practical reality of sanctions, particularly economic sanctions, is that there is no snap when you put them in. It is a slog.

Let me give you an example. In my experience, I worked with many people at the beginning of our efforts in the Bush Administration, during 2006, 2007, and 2008, to start economically isolating Iran. What does that mean? Well, what we did is we leveraged the power of the U.S. economy in close coordination with the Congress of the United States, and we went to countries and companies that were big investors in Iran, say, in the oil and gas sector, and we told them that they needed to start divesting out of the largest sponsor of terrorism in the world or the Congress of the United States might look to sanction their company or limit their access to the American market. We were leveraging the authority of the Congress and the power of our economy to get countries--yes, many of which were our allies--such as Norway, Germany, France, and Japan to divest and economically isolate Iran. That took months and years to accomplish. It was a slog. There was no snap.

What do we see today? European companies--it is in the newspapers every day--European CEOs, senior administration officials in Germany, and government officials are already in Tehran. Already, there are companies looking to set up shop, looking to invest billions, as they did before.

They are there now. This deal is not even done yet. They are there. They cannot wait, licking their chops to reinvest in one of the--not one of the biggest, the biggest terrorist regime in the world, which has done more to kill Americans than probably any country in the world in the last 30 years. Of course, this is disappointing, but this history is a reminder to all of us that the sanctions regime Secretary Kerry talks about--and we certainly did have Iran surrounded in terms of sanctions--which was a 110-percent-American-led sanctions regime, involving Democrats, Republicans, this Congress, and the Bush administration. Yes, a lot of credit goes to the Obama administration on this economic isolation of Iran, which is what brought them to the table to begin with.

If we reimpose sanctions, there certainly won't be a ``snap'' when it happens. It will be slow. It will be a slog again trying to convince reluctant Europeans, Russians, and Chinese to pull out of the market once again.

Finally, I just want to say one other thing, and it goes back again to the plain language of the agreement, where again the snapback provision, so-called snapback provision, seems aimed back at us, the boomerang provision.

I posed a hypothetical to Secretary Kerry, Secretary Lew in a closed session, in a Senate Armed Services session yesterday to try and get specifics on what would happen in certain situations. I gave them this hypothetical: Let's assume sanctions are lifted in the next 6 to 9 months. These are called Annex II sanctions. It is a huge list of sanctions, the most powerful sanctions our country has placed on Iran. All of them--financial, oil, market--are going to be lifted in 6 to 9 months. Let's assume that happens.

As we are already seeing, European companies, other countries, certainly the Chinese, Russians, Japanese, are going to be rushing into this market, investing billions once again. Assume the Iranian economy is going to start humming with all of this new investment, the lifting of sanctions. A senior Iranian official recently said they are looking for $120 billion of new investment by 2020. They are likely going to get a lot of it, and they are abiding by the deal--no violations of any of the nuclear aspects of this deal. Then, what I think is very likely, sometime within the next 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 years, Iran commits a major act of terrorism. Let's say they kill more American troops. Let's say they blow up a consulate or embassy somewhere. They are the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism. It doesn't look as though they want to do anything but continue to do that, so that is a very likely scenario. When that happens, this body reapplies sanctions. It looks at Annex II, some of our most powerful sanctions. We are very upset--bipartisan. We reapply sanctions. The President, whoever that is, signs it because that President, he or she is very upset, and we reimpose serious Annex II sanctions.

Now, what happens then? I think what is going to happen, very likely at that point, is Iran is going to look at this agreement, and they are going to cite either paragraph 26 or paragraph 37. Let me read you both of those. Again, this is the plain language of the statute.

Paragraph 37. Iran has stated that if sanctions are reinstated in whole or in part, Iran will treat that as grounds to cease performing its commitments under the entire agreement.

Another provision. Iran has stated it will treat the reintroduction or reimposition of the sanctions specified in Annex II as grounds to cease performing its commitments under the agreement.

That is in the agreement. So, you see, if we reimpose sanctions as part of the snapback, Iran can look at this agreement and say: I'm done. I'm walking. I can legally leave this agreement. They can legally leave this agreement with a humming economy, on the verge of a breakout of a nuclear weapon, still being the largest state sponsor of terrorism, and they can say: Hey, I complied with the agreement. The United States reimposed sanctions. I told them what I was going to do, and they do it.

Again, bottom line, if we use the so-called snapback provision, it certainly appears from the language of this agreement that the deal is done. So I have asked Secretary Kerry and Secretary Lew twice now: How is that an improper reading of the agreement? Secretary Lew, the Secretary of the Treasury, is trying to argue we are reading that language wrong. He says Annex II sanctions--the big American sanctions, which are what has kept Iran down and what has brought them to the table--can be reimposed if they are reimposed for nonnuclear violations like terrorism.

When I read this agreement, that seems to be a bit of a stretch. Certainly there is a lot of ambiguity, but it is also clear the Iranians clearly won't agree with that reading. They don't agree with that reading. This was filed--I ask unanimous consent to have this printed in the Record. This is the Iranian letter dated 20 July 2015, to the United Nations Security Council. It is their interpretation of the agreement.

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