Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015--Motion to Proceed

Floor Speech

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Mr. KING. Mr. President, I have never faced a more difficult decision than the vote on the Iran nuclear weapons agreement which is currently scheduled for mid-September. The stakes could not be higher, the issues more complex or the risks more difficult to calculate. In approaching this decision, I have taken a two-pronged path. The first is to have learned everything I possibly could about the agreement itself and then carefully analyzed the alternatives.

This second step is critically important, particularly in this case. No negotiated agreement is perfect. It is easy to pick apart whatever agreement is before you, but the question is, Compared to what? Often, an imperfect agreement is preferable when compared to the likely alternatives. Starting with a close reading of the agreement over several nights and early mornings back in July, and following hearings, classified briefings and sessions, meeting with experts inside and outside the administration, extensive readings about the agreement and its implications and discussions with my colleagues, this is where I have come out: First, if implemented effectively, I believe this agreement will prevent Iran from achieving a nuclear weapon for at least 15 years and probably longer; second, at the end of that 15 years, if we take the right steps, we will have the same options then that we have today if Iran moves toward the building of a bomb; third, the current alternatives, if this agreement is rejected, are either unrealistic or downright dangerous.

So based upon what we know now, I intend to vote in favor of the agreement. This is why: The deal itself, I believe, is strong and explicit in terms of the burdens it places upon Iran's nuclear program for the first 15 years--a 98-percent reduction in their current stockpile of enriched uranium, strict numerical limits on further enrichment, the effective dismantling of the plutonium reactor at Arak, and dismantlement of two-thirds of their current fleet of enrichment centrifuges.

But many argue that after 15 years, Iran could become a nuclear threshold state, which is certainly a possibility we need to be prepared to address, but Iran is a nuclear threshold state today. To be arguing about what may or may not be the case in 15 years and ignore the fact that they are a nuclear threshold state today, it seems to me, is the height of folly. If they decided to build a bomb today, they could get there in 2 to 3 months. After the rollbacks required in this agreement, however, this period is extended to at least 1 year, and we would know almost immediately if they were on track to a bomb.

I might mention that we will have a much greater insight into their activities if this agreement is enacted than we do today. The inspection and verification provisions, as I mentioned, which will be monitored and enforced by the International Atomic Energy Agency, coupled with the tools and capabilities of the U.S. intelligence community and those of our international partners which, by the way, is an important part of the verification regime.

There is a lot of discussion about the IAEA, as if those are the only people who will be watching, but indeed the intelligence agencies of at least half a dozen countries will also be watching. I believe the combination of the IAEA and our intelligence assets provide us with a high level of confidence that any attempt by Iran to cheat on its enrichment program will be detected.

IAEA inspections at known nuclear sites indeed are anytime, anywhere, and include Iran's entire uranium supply chain. While it is true that inspections at hidden sites--sites we don't know about--could be delayed for up to 24 days from when the IAEA requests access and that some covert work at such a site could be harder to detect, it is in the nature of uranium that traces can be detected long after 24 days, no matter how much they try to clean it up.

The half-life of uranium-235 is 700 million years. They are not going to be able to clean it up in 24 days. In the end, to build a bomb, there has to be nuclear material. But what about after 15 years when most of the restrictions on enrichment are lifted? If the Iranians try to break out at that point, we have the some options we have today, including the reimposition of sanctions or a military strike.

In other words, we are in a similar place in 15 years to where we are now, but we will have achieved 15 years of a nuclear weapon-free Iran. If Iran violates the terms of the agreement at that point, I believe reimposing the effective international sanctions involving the rest of the world would be stronger and more likely than it would be today because it would be Iran breaching the agreement, not us walking away from it. I cannot argue, nor can anyone, that this deal is perfect. For example, I would prefer that the 15-year limits be 20 or 25 or 30 years or that the U.S. arms embargo would remain in place indefinitely. I would prefer to see that in the agreement.

In fact, I think Congress can and should have a role to play in seeking to ensure the strict enforcement of the agreement and to mitigate some of its weaknesses, as well as reassuring our regional allies and partners and further strengthening our ability to ensure Iran never becomes a nuclear weapons state, but then we get to the central question. As I said, it is easy to pick apart a deal: I don't like this aspect. I don't like that. I think it should be longer. I think it should be shorter.

But the question is, Compared to what? What are the alternatives? What happens next if we reject this agreement? The usual answers I have heard in this body, in hearings, and in meetings over the last month or so are sort of vague references to reimposing or strengthening the sanctions, bringing Iran back to the table, and getting a better deal.

The problem with this is that the countries which have joined us in the sanctions--and by doing so have considerably strengthened the impact of those sanctions on Iran--believe this deal is acceptable. They have accepted it. Our unilateral rejection would almost certainly lead to those sanctions eroding rather than getting stronger. I would not argue they will collapse, but they will definitely erode. It is hard to argue that the sanctions will get stronger when the countries that have helped us to enforce and make those sanctions effective believe we should endorse and enter into this agreement.

If that happens, we have the worst of all worlds: Iran is unfettered from the terms of the agreement, and they are subject to a weaker sanctions regime. It is important to remember, and this often is not conveyed much in the information that is shared, this is not simply an agreement between the United States and Iran, this is an agreement between the United States and Germany and Great Britain and France and China and Russia and Iran. This is not a unilateral agreement. This is an agreement that has been entered into by the major world powers. They have found it acceptable.

The other option, if we cannot somehow find our way to a better deal--and I have not heard anybody credibly argue why or how that would happen. The only other option, of course, is a military strike, which the experts estimate would only set the Iranian nuclear program back between 2 and 3 years. Where are we then? Are we in a position where there would have to be follow-on strikes to prevent the reconstitution of Iran's nuclear facilities every 2 or 3 years? That would be at an unpredictable and incalculable cost.

It is true that as a result of Iran's acceptance of the limitations of the agreement, they get relief from the nuclear sanctions and the release of approximately $50 billion of restricted foreign assets that they will be able to spend, but it is important to remember they only get that after they comply with the limitations. If we sign on to this agreement, they don't get the money the next day. They have to meet the limitations in the agreement and the IAEA has to verify that.

Let me repeat. There is no sanctions relief until Iran implements and the IAEA verifies that its nuclear commitments have been met. To get that relief is why they entered into these negotiations in the first place. And to get them into the negotiations is why we led the imposition of the nuclear weapons sanctions in the first place.

In other words, sanctions relief in exchange for acceptance of limitations on their nuclear program is the essence of the deal. Neither the sanctions nor the negotiations were ever about Iran foreswearing terrorism or recognizing Israel or releasing hostages. All of those things are things I wish we could do. I believe those are good policies, but that isn't what this negotiation was about. To try to add them now or argue that the deal falls short because they aren't included is simply unrealistic.

The United States, along with our allies and partners, must redouble our efforts outside of the nuclear agreement to address these issues. They are critically important issues. We need a strategy to deal with an expansionist Iran that is completely separate from the nuclear issue--I don't deny that--and to deal with Iran's malign activities in the region. It is also important to reiterate that all U.S. sanctions on Iran related to terrorism and human rights will remain in place.

When President Kennedy was negotiating the removal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba, he did not throw in that Cuba had to depose Castro or that the Soviets had to foreswear their dangerous enmity to the West. The phrase they used was this: ``We will bury you.''

He simply wanted to get those missiles out. He didn't try to settle all the issues in the Cold War. And, indeed, so it is with this deal. The idea is to constrain. The idea has always been to constrain Iran's nuclear capability, not settle all the issues of the Middle East--no matter how desirable that might be.

In my book there is only one thing worse than a rogue Iran seeking to make trouble for its neighbors and us, and that is a rogue Iran seeking to make troubles for its neighbors and us armed with nuclear weapons. That is the issue before is.

Finally, of equal importance as the terms themselves of the nuclear agreement is ensuring that it is effectively implemented. One of the principles of my life is that implementation and execution are as important as vision. If this agreement is approved, that is day 1 of the critical implementation and execution period. There is a real risk, I believe, that as time wears on, the attention of the international community on this issue will diminish. It will be vital to the United States, across successive Presidents, to maintain focus on implementing and enforcing the terms of the agreement.

Congress also will have a crucial role to play, both in oversight of the deal's implementation and in making certain that the IAEA and our intelligence agencies have the resources they need to monitor and assure compliance, and more broadly to ensure that all of our options to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon--whenever they may decide to take that step--remain viable if the agreement collapses.

I have negotiated lots of contracts over the years, and one side or the other rarely wins in a negotiation. The idea is that all sides get something they want or need, and, in the end, I believe that is what happened here. If this deal is implemented properly, I believe it will accomplish our national security objectives, while preserving or improving all of our existing options to ensure that Iran never develops a nuclear weapon.

There is no certainty when it comes to this question. As I said at the beginning, I believe this is the most difficult decision I have ever had to make. There are risks in either direction, and there are credible arguments on both sides. But, in the end, I have concluded that the terms of this agreement are preferable to the alternatives--and that is the crucial analysis; what are the alternatives--and that it would be in the best interests of the United States to join our partners in approving it.

I intend to remain deeply engaged in this issue in the weeks and months ahead because the process does not end the day of our vote. If this agreement moves forward, it will fall to future Presidents and future Congresses to oversee it and make it work. We owe the American people our best judgment, and it is my belief that this agreement, if implemented effectively and in conjunction with the other measures we must take to ensure its ongoing vitality, will serve our Nation, the region, and the world.

I yield the floor.

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